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Overview 
 
In the last two decades much effort has been devoted to the study of transition 
economies. All the countries of the ex Soviet Bloc had to deal with profound changes in 
every aspect of their structure such as the design of their institutions, the labor market 
and the standards of living of the population. The contributions to alleviate the burden 
of the overall reconstructions came from numerous sources like international 
institutions - the International Monetary Fund and the World bank, politicians and a 
growing number of academics.  
This doctoral thesis aims at contributing to the literature on transition economies 
focusing on the Russian Federation and in particular on its internal regional division. 
Two broad themes are studied: income differentials and fertility patterns. Each chapter 
covers a specific topic and is self-contained. 
 
In particular, the first two chapters deal with the issue of income differentials and 
measures of inequality across Russian regions. Chapter one provides an historical-
institutional analysis of the period between the late years of the Soviet Union, its 
collapse and recovery, and finally the last decade of economic growth when regional 
differentials acquired more importance. From a theoretical point of view, transition 
countries in the early Nineties could adopt one of two models to deal with the 
reconstruction: a gradual approach or a shock therapy approach. The former called for a 
step-by-step path for the construction of a fully democratic market economy, the latter 
instead proposed simultaneous interventions to stabilize the economic and financial 
situation of the country, liberalize prices and  privatize State-owned firms. Russia 
followed the path of the shock therapy liberalizing prices in 1992 and starting firms’ 
privatizations soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The process did not 
proceed as expected and by 1994 output had almost halved, more than 30 percent of the 
Russian population was living in poverty according to international standards and even 
statistics as mortality rates had a sharp increase. 
Although the failure of the application of this strategy up to the financial crisis of 
1998 has been generally recognized, why it failed was one of the main discussion of the 
literature in the Nineties as I will review in depth in the first chapter. For instance, while 
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Stiglitz (1999) criticized the “excessive reliance on textbook model of economics”, 
Aslund (1999) defined the reforms adopted as “slow and partial”.  
The Russian economy eventually started a new phase of economic growth in the 
late Nineties which has been interrupted only in the recent years by the crisis of 2008. 
Economic growth has been driven by oil production at first and this is one of the 
reasons behind the regional differentials which are the focus of my work.  
In chapter one first I review the literature on transition and Russian transition in 
particular, then I analyze the internal division of Russia and different measures of 
inequality such as income dispersion and regional composition of Gross Regional 
Product at the national and regional levels. Given its geographical extension, Russia is 
composed of regions which differ for climate, population density, the agrarian or 
industrial vocation of the region itself, the availability of natural resources among other 
factors. 
In chapter 2 I extend the descriptive analysis applying spatial econometrics 
techniques for an empirical examination of the Solow growth model in a sample of 77 
Russian regions. The contributions of this chapter to the literature are twofold. First, I 
perform a detailed exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) of per capita gross regional 
product at the global and local level using the spatial analysis softwares GeoDa and R to 
determine whether Russia is characterized by clusters, which regions contribute to their 
formation and what types of policy measures could be adopted to reduce, for instance, 
the full industrial specialization of the oil-productive regions. Second, I extend the 
traditional setting of the Solow model and construct a matrix to design the spatial 
correlation between regions in order to determine whether the proximity to a rich region 
has positive effects on economic growth and whether the clusters’ structure is an 
obstacle to income convergence. 
 
The second part of this thesis is composed of three chapters which deal with the 
demographic situation of Russia. The motivation behind this section is the severe 
decline in population faced by the country since the beginning of transition. In fact, in 
one decade, 1998-2008, total population dropped from 147 millions to 141 millions 
people and two causes have been identified so far: first, the increase in male mortality in 
the first phase of transition – which is attributed to the increase in alcohol consumption 
and the decline in standards of living in that critical phase – and the decline in birth 
rates. Although the decline in birth rates is not a specific feature of Russian 
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demographic patterns but a widespread phenomenon – as recalled by the theory of the 
Second Demographic Transition – the Russian case is unique for the combination of 
low birth rates, high mortality rates and low life expectancy which is a pattern not found 
in other countries. 
In chapter three I analyze the national demographic patterns of some vital 
statistics such as population growth, life expectancy and fertility rates since 1965 and I 
provide a review of the policies on maternity leave and family benefits since Soviet 
times. This chapter is self-contained and also instrumental to chapter four and chapter 
five. The contribution of this study and the next one stands in the richness of the data 
that are discussed which do not have wide circulation, in fact data sources are the series 
of the Statistical Yearbooks of USSR, the Statistical Yearbooks of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic and the Demographic Yearbooks of Russia. Data 
collection has highly benefited from a visiting period that I spent at the Higher School 
of Economics in Moscow during the third year of my PhD and I am indebted to all the 
researchers who helped me. 
 
Although the literature of Russian fertility patterns is rich and growing, the issue 
of the pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical direction of fertility with respect to the business 
cycle remains unsolved, in fact the sample and the period of analysis play a major role 
on results. For this reason, in chapter four I analyze the Russian demographic patterns in 
light of the theoretical framework of the model of fertility behavior designed by Becker 
(1960), the Second Demographic Transition and the economic-crisis argument 
employing a top-down strategy which is data-specific to the national, regional and 
individual levels data that I collected. With national data from 1960, the theoretically 
issue of the pro or countercyclical relation between income and fertility is graphically 
analyzed and discussed, as are the trends of female employment and education. Given 
the structural break of 1991 which prevents long-term econometric estimations, this 
strategy appeared to me as the most suitable one. On the other hand, with regional data 
available since 1995 I apply different panel data models which allow to determine what 
affects fertility rates within region controlling for specific regional characteristics such 
as population density, regional urban and rural population and life expectancy. To my 
knowledge, the only study using regional level data is Brainerd (2007) who focuses on 
the first decade of transition. Finally, individual level data from the Russia Longitudinal 
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Monitoring Survey are employed using the logit model to study fertility intentions in 
1994, 2002 and 2008 following the whole phase of recovery and economic growth. 
The use of survey data on intentions is indeed the most promising technique for 
the study of behavior and it proved to be very useful in the literature on the perceptions 
of the Russian population on several issues such as labor, consumption and fertility 
behavior. In chapter five I use data from the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) 
provided by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) to analyze 
fertility intentions of Russian women in order to understand whether the relation 
between income and the business cycle is pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical at the 
individual level. In 2007 the Russian government launched a new policy measure called 
the Maternity Capital Program to give incentives towards the decision to have a second 
child because of the important decline of the Nineties. It assigns a grant of about 12,000 
euro to the applicant when the child is three years old and it can be used for specific 
purposes such as home reconstruction or it can be assigned to the mother’s pension 
fund. With this dataset I will use the ordered logit model to shed light on the expected 
effectiveness of the Maternity Capital program and the study of birth intentions and 
fertility postponement. 
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Chapter 1 
Regions and Institutions 
 
1.  Introduction 
The Soviet Union and its socio-economic principles have ruled the lives of hundred 
millions of people during most of the XX century. The Soviet Union became in few 
decades in between the Second World War the second world largest economy after the 
United States. The State was designed as a complex system of collectivization of 
agriculture, state-owned enterprises and five years plans issued by the State Planning 
Commission Gosplan to fix targets and sustain the development of heavy industry. The 
extensive growth model worked until the Sixties, when the slowdown in economic 
growth started to deteriorate the stability of the system. After years of struggles and the 
implementation of new policies like glasnost and perestroika shaped to give more 
freedom to the citizens and to economic activity, the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 
December 1991 and the course of transition started.  
After a first phase of crisis, the Russian economy started a new pattern of 
positive growth rates of income, however high inequalities at the regional level 
remained in fact differences in investments, per capita income, quality and availability 
of services, industrial specialization of the region depend mostly on the exploitation of 
natural resources, which is a crucial growth factor. 
In this chapter I will introduce the institutional setting of the Russian Federation 
and in particular its internal division in Federal Districts and regions, which are the 
reference units of the empirical analysis. Paragraph 2 provides a review of the economic 
performance of the Soviet Union from the Thirties up to the slowdown of the Seventies 
and the events that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Stuart and Gregory 
(1995), Davies (1997), Riasanovsky (2010 – eighth edition) and Graziosi (2008, in 
Italian) among others present a comprehensive and detailed history of Russia and the 
Soviet Union. In paragraph 3 I will discuss the literature on transition economies and 
the debate on shock therapy versus gradualism focusing on Russia and Russian regions. 
Paragraph 4 will illustrate the institutional setting of the regions according to the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation and the legal jurisdiction of the federal and the 
local level. Then I will describe the Federal Districts, a sub-national structure 
established in 2000 in order to ensure compliance of the regional laws with the federal 
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legislation and will analyze the differences in population and climate, labor force, 
income inequality and in the structure of Gross Regional Product for the Federal 
Districts and selected regions. 
 
2 .  An overview of Soviet economic performance  
In the XIX century Russia was still a peasant agricultural country1 but soon after in 
1957 succeeded in the launch of the Sputnik satellite. This quick modernization was 
realized through the central planning system which, nevertheless, started to shown signs 
of a slowdown in the Seventies, when Brèžnev was General Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist Party. 
In the Thirties, when the New Economic Policy (NEP) was abandoned by Stalin 
in favor of the five-years plans and the collectivization of agriculture, the role of central 
planning in the economy was reduced compared to the years of war communism, prices 
were liberalized and private trade was made legal (Fischer 1992). The aim of the plans 
since the first one issued in 1928 was to sustain the extensive growth model through 
capital accumulation (Allen 2001 p.863) focusing on the creation of heavy industry 
sectors as steel and machinery. The Soviet Union succeeded in becoming the second 
world power, with 6 percent annual growth rates of national income (GNP), but the 
inner cost paid by the Soviet population has been huge. The years of the Stalin terror 
have been the worse period for the citizens of the Soviet Union. In fact, the 
collectivization of agriculture and the requisition by the state of almost half of the crop 
led to a severe famine and the death of millions of peasant, also the Great Purge of 
1936-1938 and the Second World War killed more than 25 million people.  
After the death of Stalin in 1953 and a period of struggle for leadership of the 
Party, Chruščëv served as First Secretary of the Communist Party and started a program 
of de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union aiming at improving the living conditions of the 
population, condemning the crimes committed by his predecessor and the damages of 
forced collectivization. Although the effects of his policies were limited and his 
consensus in the Party never unanimous, he started a housing program in Moscow and 
proposed reforms for agriculture so that prices paid to collective farms increased, new 
crop cultivations started – with limited results - and specialized vocational institutions 
were established to improve the quality and productivity of agriculture.  
                                                 
1
 At the end of the century, 12.8 percent of the Russian population lived in urban areas, against over 40 
percent in France and Germany and 70 percent in the UK (Baykov 1954, p. 138). 
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Taking the prices in 1952 as 100,  in 1954 the state paid peasants 739 for grain, 
369 for potatoes and 289 for dairy products (Graziosi 2008, p.158). Living conditions of 
the population improved much in the Fifties, though improvements must be read in light 
of the extremely low initial conditions, as stressed by Graziosi (2008, p. 168). Real 
wages in 1954 were finally higher than in 1928, meat and dairy consumption increased 
by 40 percent and the production of consumer goods as radios, motorcycles and 
bicycles almost doubled.  
 
Chruščëv and his authoritative methods never reached full consensus inside the 
Party and by the Sixties attempts to reduce the central bureaucracy and decentralize the 
administration of industrial policies had failed, industrial production was declining, 
agricultural production had increased less than expected and relations were troubled 
with both the United States and China.   
In 1964 Chruščëv was removed by his office and from then up to 1982, Brèžnev 
served as General Secretary of the Communist Party with a leadership strictly related to 
the so-called Era of Stagnation. The annual growth rate of GNP was 5.7 percent 
between 1950 and 1960 and declined to 5.2 in the Sixties and 3.2 in the Seventies (Ofer 
1987, table 1 p. 1778), so actually it was not properly a phase of stagnation, but a 
slowdown in growth. Between 1960 and 1970, the annual growth rate of GNP was 5.2 
percent, 2.1 percent for employment and 8 for capital accumulation, and by the time of 
the tenth plan (1976-1980), the annual growth rate of GNP declined to 2.6 percent, 
employment growth rate to 1.2 and capital accumulation to 6.8 percent (Ofer 1987).  
The cause of the slowdown can not be identified only in the argument that the 
extensive growth model had reached its limit in accumulation of inputs and diminishing 
returns to capital were in place otherwise we would be just looking at raw data. More 
factors have contributed to the decline in growth rates of the Seventies2 such as the 
excessive expenditures for the military; the increasing foreign debt and inflation in 
consumer market (Kim 2002); low incentives to innovate firms and the inability to 
introduce forms of intensive growth in the economy; the lack of flexibility of the plans, 
whose targets were not adequate to the economic conditions at that time; wrong 
investments, which were mainly concentrated on restructuring rather than on new 
activities; and the weakening of the centralized power per se, unable to recognize the 
                                                 
2
 See Allen (2001), Fischer (1992), Harrison (1998) and Ofer (1987)  
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increasing demand of consumer goods, higher wages and most of all freedom and 
reforms. 
 
After his death in 1982, Brèžnev was briefly succeeded by Andropov who died 
after two years and was replaced by Černenko. Both of them served as General 
Secretary for very limited periods of time because of their bad health conditions and 
age, and therefore unable to alter the declining path of the Soviet economy.  
 
From 1985 to 1991, Gorbačëv served as the last General Secretary of the 
Communist Party. At that point the economic decline of the Soviet Union was severe 
with shortages of basic foodstuff and the introduction of a system of monthly quotas 
typical of war times, meanwhile dissent and opposition against the lack of reforms and 
democracy started to spread. Gorbačëv was aware of the deep crisis and believed in the 
possibility of a recovery for the Soviet Union through reforms and new policies as 
uskorenie (acceleration of economic change), glasnost (openness i.e. freedom of 
expression and criticism, freedom of conscience and religion) and perestroika 
(restructuring). In 1987, the Law on Cooperatives allowed citizens to run private 
economic activities, while the Law on State Enterprises prescribed that enterprises were 
free to decide output levels, prices within a certain interval but had to self-finance 
themselves. In 1988 he declared the countries of the Eastern Bloc free to auto-determine 
their internal policies. In 1991, Gorbačëv was elected President of the Soviet Union and 
in the same year El'cin was elected President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic and declared the prevalence of Russian laws to those of the Soviet Union.  
 
Gorbačëv struggled to create a new voluntary federation with the Republics, but 
his idea failed. In 1990-1991, a multiparty system had been created and the free 
elections and declarations of sovereignty from the Baltic and other Republics were 
eventually recognized. Soon after the failed coup of August 1991, it became clear that 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union was unavoidable, while political conflicts between 
Gorbačëv and El'cin – whose openness towards a faster process of creation of a market 
economy was gaining consensus – grew more and more. In 1991, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) was created and on December 25th Gorbačëv, who had 
resigned as Party Secretary in August, resigned as President of the Soviet Union. Since 
1992, the heritage of the Soviet Union was taken by Russia and transition started. The 
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measures adopted by Gorbačëv to avoid the collapse of the Soviet Union failed for 
various reasons. While he stressed his strong beliefs in communism and the possibility 
to avoid the dissolution of the Soviet Union introducing reforms, the new policies he 
adopted – glasnost in particular – had the counter-effect of showing to the Russian 
population the inefficiencies of the system on the long run and that other political 
systems were able to provide more freedom and wellbeing to their citizens3. Gorbačëv 
recognized it in his final speech of December 25th saying “We had a lot of everything 
(…) yet we were living much worse than people in the industrialized countries were 
living”. Other measures, like the anti-alcohol campaign of 1985 which involved a rise in 
prices and cuts in production, aroused the opposition of the population – with the 
creation of a black market and fewer controls on the quality of products – and led to a 
decline in budget revenues which exacerbated the financial crisis. Conflicts with El'cin 
on which path was more adequate to avoid collapse also played a major role. 
 
The process of transition from the centrally planned economy to a market 
economy in Russia can be divided in two periods: a phase of crisis from 1992 to 1998 
and a phase of growth from 1999 onwards. In 1992 the government liberalized prices – 
with the exception of some foodstuff, energy sector and transport – and started the 
process of firms’ privatizations but, having to deal with a dramatic situation, policies 
and reforms were not designed with a long-term view. The main problem to sort out 
was the urgency to create new institutions simultaneously and convert Russia to a 
market economy based country. The reduction in price controls generated a pattern of 
hyperinflation - prices increased by a factor of 8 in few months, with a consistent 
reduction in private savings - aggravated by currency emissions and the depreciation of 
the ruble. On the basis of the Washington Consensus, in 1995 the Central Bank 
interrupted the openness of credit lines to the government and a proper public debt was 
issued, while a market-based banking system was established. Subsidies to firms were 
cancelled. Both the banking system and firms were not prepared to adapt immediately 
to the new model and the increasing amount of private and public debt led to wage 
erosion and the inability of the state to provide adequate public services which were 
traditionally given to workers by the firms in the Soviet economy. The crisis 
exacerbated in 1996 due to the erosion in public resources, to the aggravation of deficit 
                                                 
3
 Romano (in Riasanovsky 2008 p. 596 Chapter XLII, XII Italian edition) recalls that when Gorbačëv 
became General Secretary, in Russia there were 36 cars and 9.8 telephones per 1,000 people. In the US 
the numbers were 540 and 76,  in Italy 359 and 42. 
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and the difficulties in the implementation of fiscal reforms and in tax collection. In 1998 
the government declared its inability to repay the public debt and the currency was 
devaluated. In 1999 the Russian economy entered a new course of positive growth rates 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) mainly thanks to the increase in oil-prices. After 
about 10 years of transition, the institutions, the banking system and the entrepreneurs 
were also more prepared and adapted to the market economy and its rules than the 
previous generation of managers grown in the Soviet planned economy. Since 1999 the 
Russian economy has been on a stable growth path with average annual growth rate of 
GDP of 5/6 percent – much influenced by the variation of oil prices – up to the recent 
crisis of 2008 and has been able to control inflation, to open to international trade and to 
attract both foreign and domestic investors.  
Several issues remain at the social level like the remarkable differences in quality 
and availability of public services across the country, with the Asian part being the most 
critical one. Isolated areas in Siberia and the Far East suffered consistent depopulation 
in the first phase of transition when economic activities were dismantled. Also, income 
inequalities are increasing through time because investments are concentrating in oil-
rich regions and an adequate system of regional re-distribution has not been established 
yet, though new rules were introduced in 2004 to sustain poorer areas. Corruption 
remains a crucial issue which affects chances to start free economic activities and 
politics is still far from being a complete democratic system as open as the United States 
or Western European countries. Finally, demographic patterns are critical, as the 
Russian population has been decreasing in the past twenty years despite the positive net 
migration rate and the decrease in infant mortality. Alcohol consumption and the low 
life-expectancy of Russian men were problems recognized also by Gorbačëv, whose 
measures to reduce alcohol consumption failed. 
 
3.  Literature review 
Since the beginning of transition in 1992, the recovery path has not been homogeneous 
across the numerous countries involved in the process and similar policies have 
produced different macroeconomic results (Sachs 1996). As expected from the 
dissolution of the centrally planned economy and state-owned enterprises, all the 
countries of the former Soviet Union suffered severe declines in output and increases in 
unemployment owing to the reconstructions. On the other hand, something unexpected 
was the magnitude of these phenomena in Russia, given that both the Russian 
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government and part of the international community believed in fast adaptation to 
market principles4. The output decline reached 35 percent in Russia in 1994/1995; 
unemployment, decrease in consumption and even in life expectancy and fertility have 
been much more severe and long lasting than estimated.   
The speed of recovery varied across countries. For instance, the crisis has been 
severe but recovery relatively fast in Poland and the Baltic States, which created strong 
connections with Western European countries and were already on positive growth path 
after five years, but slower in Russia. In fact, it is worth noticing the Baltic States, 
which were annexed to the Soviet Union after the Second World War, and other satellite 
states like Poland recovered faster than Russia, which had been the leader country. The 
main cause of this slow recovery has to be found in the fact that the application of the 
policies of the shock therapy in Russia in 1992, when nor a strong government nor 
adequate institutions were in place, failed. 
The dominant influence of the central planner in the Soviet Union was reflected 
in the so called soft budget constraint (Kornai 1986). The State acted as the final source 
for the financial resources through the coverage of firms’ expenditures with credit lines, 
subsidies and administrative low prices, softening the incentives to form correct 
expectations on the basis of demand. Soviet managers were in the total control of the 
central government, ignoring the risks of losses or bankruptcy and while plans came 
from above, consumers suffered of a widespread excess demand and shortages. 
Moreover, incentives towards efficiency in production and investments in new 
technologies were weak because what mattered to them was to comply with the target of 
production of the plan. In late Eighties, food shortages were so severe that a war-type 
system of ticket with monthly quotas was introduced.  
The debate on which path was to be followed for transition between a gradual 
approach (Aghion and Blanchard 1994; Roland 2002; Stiglitz 1999) and a shock 
therapy of reconstruction with contextual price liberalization, stabilization and 
privatization (Lipton et al. 1990, Aslund 1999) first started in Poland after the elections 
in 1989, even though its case is actually a peculiar one (Shleifer 1997). Poland had 
adopted economic reforms at least since the Eighties and, as Shleifer stresses (1997, p. 
404),  “the private sector was well established when radical reforms began”, so that 
when constitutional protection of private property came in 1989, a large share of the 
economy was already privatized and entrepreneurs adapted to market principles. 
                                                 
4
 See Harrison (2001) for an illustration of the production possibilities during the transition and the main 
Western illusions on recovery path 
 16  
Moreover, Solidarność and the Catholic Church were active in the civil society, whereas 
Russia did not have any civil movement of this kind. At the beginning of the Nineties, 
Poland adopted the Balcerowicz Plan. Through the elimination of price controls and the 
regulations and subsidies to State-owned firms, the country started a great economic 
recovery. The literature highlights the effectiveness of the reforms at the macro level5  
while a survey analysis (Rovelli and Zaiceva 2009) registered a low popular support and 
general discontent for the new economic phase in a broad sample of countries, mainly in 
the early years of transition when output decline and unemployment were higher than in 
previous years.  
A fundamental feature of Russia with respect to the other transition countries is that 
Russia somehow was the Soviet Union, being the leader country, and in 1992 it had to 
create itself on its own, not re-gain independence like the other countries. Moreover, 
Russia was not a small homogeneous nation, but a widespread territory with many 
ethnical groups. The length and magnitude of the Russian crisis came as a shock and in 
1996 it appeared clearly that the country was not on a consistent growth path. 
According to Stiglitz (1999), a reason for the sharp output decline in Russia has 
probably been the blind implementation of policies suggested by international 
institutions, hence the idea of transplantation, i.e. applying the same policies to 
countries whose economic and political histories were not homogeneous, led some of 
them to crisis as much as the “excessive reliance on textbook model of economics” 
(Stiglitz 1999, p.130). Monetary policy was focused only on the short term, so that 
controlling inflation became almost impossible. At the same time, the banking system 
was not ready to operate because of the absence of legitimate credit lines for new firms 
and to the inexperience of managers with Western-type institutions.  
Privatization of State-owned assets has been another crucial problem for Russia, 
generally recognized as one of the bigger failures of the first phase of transition. It was 
realized through a voucher system, but a combination of non transparent rules, 
corruption and weak institutions created a group of powerful oligarchs and the weak 
central government had neither power nor interest to avoid this strategy of privatization. 
The grabbing hand of the socialist government (Shleifer and Vishny 2002) had been 
replaced by a myopic view of the market as an institution able to ensure economic 
development and improvement in living conditions regardless of any agency problem 
and entrepreneurial tradition. This combination of output decline, unemployment, 
                                                 
5
 Lipton, Sachs, Fischer, Kornai (1990); Dabrowski, Gomulka and Rostowski (2000) 
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instability in money supply, wages and prices revealed already in 1995/1996 that 
recovery was not proceeding in the right direction. Eventually, with the financial crisis 
in August 1998, the turning point in macroeconomic policies design, the situation 
collapsed. 
 
As seen so far, there is not any consensus on the inner causes of the failure of the 
recovery in the first phase of Russian transition. Ahrend and Tompson (2005) focus on 
price liberalization showing that the process was slow and not applied to basic food 
consumption, the energy sector and transports, because the government feared negative 
reactions from the population and the energy industry. They also find that the protection 
of property rights, transparency and accountability – the same principles called by 
Gorbačëv in the Eighties - were not fully reached at the time. Aslund (1999) analyzes 
the multi-level collapse of Soviet Union, a political and macroeconomic failure which 
left no space for a gradual approach to capitalism as in China. It was not the failure of a 
government which needed to be replaced, but the failure of a system which had ruled for 
decades. Given political instability and unemployment, the risk of a re-appearance of 
the old communist party appeared too high to try a gradual way of reform. He identifies 
the causes of the failure in limited reforms which were “slow and partial” (Aslund 
1999 p.4) and wrong interventions on money supply, which trapped the country in 
hyperinflation and high public debt. 
 
Comparisons with the Chinese transition have been frequent in the literature6 
attempting to find a successful example to follow and the main point often neglected by 
policy-makers was that China and the Soviet Union were completely different from 
each other. Their economic and social development has in fact been opposite for 
essential features such as, for example, private property and labor. Almost 90 percent of 
the Chinese land was private before nationalization whereas, in Russia, long after the 
formal abolition of serfdom in 1861, most people were not allowed to carry on free 
economic activities as land was given to peasants in communal ownership and by 1913 
less than 1/3 of land was private (Fischer 1992). The Chinese transition to market 
economy was gradual because the institutional component was stable, therefore the 
Chinese Party had the time and power to test new measures in selected regions and 
discuss the results, while Soviet Union was facing a collapse of its structure. The federal 
                                                 
6
 McMillan and Naughton (1992), Oi (1995), Popov (2007) 
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division of the two countries was also different. In China, the provincial structure of 
villages and firms allowed for a strict local supervision on economic activities; the 
Soviet Bloc instead was formed by a high number of occupied countries and many 
ethnic groups and regional divisions inside Russia.  
 
Recovery started in 1999/2000 with the rise in oil prices, which nowadays are 
still one of the main economic forces of the Russian economy, but the process of 
transition is not completed on the institutional side. The main challenges for the next 
future are to increase transparency and decrease corruption of both central and local 
institutions and to ensure a complete protection of property rights and the freedom for 
entrepreneurial activity.  
 
After the first decade of transition with the availability of new data, the interest 
of the literature concentrated on the recovery of Russia as a whole and, among others, 
on its internal subdivisions and disparities across Russian regions7. According to the 
Constitution of 1993, the country is divided in 89 federal units with different degrees of 
autonomy from the central government as for local elections and provision of laws. 
With the increase in oil and gas exports in the last decade, geographical conditions (oil 
extraction, shared-borders with rich regions and good transport lines) play a pivotal role 
in both growth and disparities. Recovery has concentrated in the areas around Moscow 
and Saint Petersburg, which were the most industrialized and developed regions also in 
the previous decades and are now attracting most of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
and in the ones with abundance of natural resources like oil and gas whose abundance 
has indeed been essential, contributing, on the other hand, to the disparities in economic 
growth and in the living conditions of the population (Fedorov 2002). A recent research 
line focuses on explaining the variation in economic performance across regions which 
can be due to fiscal federalism and determine the influence of fiscal arrangements on 
this performance. Using data from the period 1996-1999, Desai et al. (2003; 2009) 
suggest an asymmetrical federalism across the regions according to their economic 
condition. The consequences of fiscal federalism depend upon the extent to which 
regional rent seeking and strong relationships between government and firms persist. 
Increased federal control may limit the local economy, but it will also limit rent seeking 
behavior. Results suggest that an increase in the retention rate is generally accompanied 
                                                 
7
 Ahrend (2008); Berkowitz and DeJong (2003, 2005); Popov (2001)  
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by a stronger economic growth, although data show that for the regions with a high 
share of revenues deriving from natural resources and for the poorest ones, a deeper 
central control is recommended to regulate local governments and avoid excessive 
competition and corruption in order to get rents. Freinkman and Plekhanov (2009) stress 
the high costs required to create such a system and the limited ability of the central 
government to put it in practice, opting for an intraregional fiscal decentralization from 
regions to municipalities.   
 
4.  Russian regions 
Social and economic differences at a sub-national level such as the different lifestyle 
and life quality of inhabitants due to climate conditions, agrarian or industrial vocation, 
ethnical groups, availability and quality of the social services, characterize the Russian 
Federation. The aim of this paragraph is to illustrate the institutional design of Russian 
regions, which are the reference unit for the following chapters and to analyze the 
differences in climate, population, labor force, income inequality and the structure of 
Gross Regional Product (GRP) between the Federal Districts, which are the new 
administrative division of the country established in 2000 to ensure compliance of 
regional laws with the federal legislation.  
 
  4.1  Institutional design of the regions 
The institutional design of the Russian Federation as established in the Constitution of 
1993 is composed of a federal level and a local self-government level. The Constitution 
recognizes as constituent units the regions, called Subjects of the Federation, further 
divided in provinces and municipalities. The regions were 89 when the Constitution was 
approved and became 83 in 2008 because of mergers between regions, usually between 
a main region and the smaller regions in the surroundings areas. The mergers were not 
active from the administrative point of view in 2008, so that the structure of 1993 has 
not dramatically changed.  
Each subject can take one of four designs: Republic, Kray (territory), Oblast 
(region) and Autonomous Okrug.  Nowadays there are 21 Republics, 9 Krais, 46 
Oblasts, 2 Federal Cities (Moscow and Saint Petersburg), 1 Autonomous Oblast and 4 
Autonomous Okrugs8.  
                                                 
8
 See the Appendix for a list of regions 
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These subjects have equal federal rights being represented by two delegates in 
the Federation Council, the Upper House of the Parliament, but they differ in the degree 
of autonomy. For example the Republics have the right to write their own Constitution, 
have a Parliament and a President and hold the right to choose a state language to be 
used together with the Russian language (Chapter 3, Article 68 of the Constitution). 
Most of the Republics have a high degree of autonomy because during the process of 
the formation of the country were composed of ethnic minorities and were guaranteed 
with higher independence than other areas. Oblasts and Krais are administrative subjects 
with a Governor appointed by federal power and have local elections. Each autonomous 
okrug (with the exception of Chukotka) is under the jurisdiction of its main oblast and 
this is the reason why they are rarely considered explicitly in empirical studies. 
 
The Constitution provides the baseline for the separation between federal and 
local government. In 1992 the Federation Treaties were signed by most of the regions 
with the exception of the Republics of Chechnya and Tatarstan and incorporated in the 
Russian Constitution. Chapter 3, titled “Russian Federation”, provides the official list of 
the subjects and the legal jurisdiction of the Russian Federation itself, i.e. the federal 
level. Below are listed the topics of national jurisdiction: 
a) the adoption and amendment of the Constitution and federal laws and supervision 
over compliance with them;  
b) the federal structure and territory of the Russian Federation;  
c) regulation and protection of the rights and liberties of the human being and citizen; 
citizenship of the Russian Federation; regulation and protection of the rights of national 
minorities;  
d) establishment of the system of federal bodies of legislative, executive and judiciary 
power, procedure for the organization and activities thereof; formation of federal bodies 
of state power;  
e) federal and state property and management thereof;  
f) determining the basic principles of federal policy and federal programs in the field of 
state structure, the economy, the environment, and the social, cultural and national 
development of the Russian Federation;  
g) establishment of the legal framework for a single market; financial, monetary, credit 
and customs regulation, emission of money and guidelines for price policy; federal 
economic services, including federal banks;  
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h) the federal budget; federal taxes and levies; federal funds of regional development;  
i) federal power grids, nuclear energy, fissionable materials; federal transport, railways, 
information and communications; space activities;  
j) foreign policy and international relations of the Russian Federation, international 
treaties of the Russian questions of war and peace;  
k) foreign trade relations of the Russian Federation;  
l) defense and security; defense production; determining procedures for the sale and 
purchase of arms, ammunition, military hardware and other equipment; production of 
fissionable materials, toxic substances, narcotics and procedure for the use thereof;  
m) defining the status and protection of the state border, territorial waters, the air space, 
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation;  
n) law courts; Prosecutor's Office; criminal, criminal-procedural and criminal-executive 
legislation; amnesty and pardon; civil, civil-procedural and arbitration-procedural 
legislation; legal regulation of intellectual property;  
o) federal conflict of laws;  
p) meteorological service; standards, models, the metric system and time measurement; 
geodesy and cartography; names of geographical objects; official statistics and 
accounting;  
q) State decorations and honorary titles of the Russian Federation;  
r) federal state service 
 
The division of competencies is not clearly arranged, so the legal authority on 
the same topic is often attributed to different levels and in Hanson words (1994, p.6) 
“the division of powers and responsibilities is as clear as an old-fashioned London 
fog”.  
Article 72 lists the topic of the joint jurisdiction between federal and local level: 
a) providing for the correspondence of the constitutions and laws of the Republics, the 
charters and other normative legal acts of the territories, regions, cities of federal 
importance, autonomous regions or autonomous areas to the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation and the federal laws;  
b) protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen; protection of the rights of 
national minorities; ensuring the rule of law, law and order, public security, border zone 
regime;  
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c) issues of possession, use and disposal of land, subsoil, water and other natural 
resources;  
d) delimitation of state property;  
e) nature utilization, protection of the environment and ensuring ecological safety; 
specially protected natural territories, protection of historical and cultural monuments;  
f) general issues of upbringing, education, science, culture, physical culture and sports;  
g) coordination of issues of health care; protection of the family, maternity, paternity 
and childhood; social protection, including social security;  
h) carrying out measures against catastrophes, natural calamities, epidemics, elimination 
of their aftermath;  
i) establishment of common principles of taxation and dues in the Russian Federation;  
j) administrative procedure, labor, family, housing, land, water, and forest legislation; 
legislation on subsoil and environmental protection; 
k) personnel of the judicial and law enforcement agencies; the Bar, notaryship;  
l) protection of traditional living habitat and of traditional way of life of small ethnic 
communities;  
m) establishment of common principles of organization of the system of bodies of state 
authority and local self-government;  
n) coordination of international and foreign economic relations of the subjects of the 
Russian Federation, fulfillment of international treaties and agreements of the Russian 
Federation.  
 
Topics which were under the joint jurisdiction according to Article 72 are now 
de facto under the federal power; these are mainly the subjects described in point c) 
“possession, use and management of the land, mineral resources, water and other 
natural resources”, which the Treaties attributed jointly to the regions and exclusively 
to the Republics “but the use must be compatible with federal legislation” (Hanson 
1994, p.8). Taxes and State-transfers are also controlled by the federal level, but ad hoc 
agreements on budgets prevent a complete control and knowledge of rules and amounts. 
 
 
4.2  Federal Districts 
In order to re-centralize control over regional laws and ensure compliance with federal 
laws, in 2000, President Putin established the creation of seven units called Federal 
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Districts named Central, North-Western, Southern (divided in Southern District and 
District of the North Caucasus in 2010), Volga, Urals, Siberian and Far Eastern. This 
sub-national level of division is useful for the empirical analysis because it collects 
regions in few homogeneous areas9. Each district has a Governor appointed by the 
Kremlin upon approval of local legislatures who guarantees that local laws comply with 
federal laws. The economic development of the regions is strictly related to their 
characteristics such as climate, temperatures and soil fertility. In a country as wide as 
Russia, the variation on these characteristics has been crucial for the agrarian or 
industrial vocation of certain regions, for the type of industry to be established, and also 
in demographic and social characteristics as population density and the design of the 
labor market. 
 
4.2.1  Climate and population  
With a surface of more than 17 millions km2, Russia is the largest country in the world 
and its climate and topography vary with the zones. European Russia, whose eastern 
boarder is identified in the Urals Mountains, and Asian Russia occupy respectively 
about 25 percent and 75 percent of the territory.  
Nowadays the population of Russia reach 143 million people with a density of 
8.4 people per km2. Due to the harshness of most of the Asian territory and climate, 80 
percent of Russian population lives in the European region where the weather is 
continental and milder in the Southern Districts than in the North-Western District. 
Arctic weather in Asian Russia, Siberia and in the north region of the Far Eastern 
District, in fact, is characterized by unfavorable climate conditions that do not 
encourage people to live there. In the South of the Far Eastern District the temperature 
is milder during the summer and the weather is similar to the one in the North of China. 
Economic activities in the area between the Urals and the Far East are mostly 
related to natural resources such as oil and gas while milder weather and longer 
summers help the diffusion of the agriculture in the South of Siberia and in the South of 
the Far East.  
More than half of the Russian Gross Domestic Product comes from heavy and 
light manufacturing and service sector diffused in the European Russia where the 
activities are more differentiated and include mining and quarrying in the Central 
District. 
                                                 
9
 See table 1 in the Appendix 
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4.2.2  Labor force    
Characteristics of the labor market and participation rates depend upon the types of 
industries which can be found at the regional level. Data are published on a yearly basis 
by Rosstat. Total labor force in 2010 was 75 millions people; 20 millions in the Central 
Federal District,  with 6 millions being concentrated in Moscow City, 10 millions in the 
Volga District, concentrated in the most industrialized regions of Bashkortostan, 
Nizhny-Novgorod, Perm and Tatarstan and 2 millions in the Tyumen region of the 
Urals District. The role played by Tyumen in the Russian economic growth is very 
important as the region accounts for 90 percent of total Russian production of natural 
gas, more than 60 percent of the oil production and 10 percent of the production of 
electricity.  
In industrial sectors, 6 millions people work in agriculture, in the Southern, Volga 
and Siberian Districts, 10 millions are employed in manufacturing, with higher shares in 
European Russia than in Asian Russia and 12 millions are employed in wholesale retail 
trade and small businesses.  
Participation rate at the national level is 74 percent for men and 62 for women. 
Female participation rate is higher in areas specialized in services and light industry 
such as Moscow and the North-Western District, while it is lower in agricultural areas 
like the Southern District or the Kurgan region of the Urals, which is not specialized in 
oil extraction and has male and female participation rates 5 to 6 percentage points lower 
than its neighbor region Tyumen and the national average. Unemployed people were 5.5 
millions in 2010 and the unemployment rate 7.5 percent at the national level, with the 
majority being men aged 20-29 with vocational or secondary completed education. 
Unemployment rate is higher in the Southern, Siberian and Far Eastern Districts than in 
European Russia. 
 
4.2.3  Measures of inequality 
Measuring disparities is very important to understand how wealth is distributed across 
regions. Here I illustrate two inequality indexes of per capita GRP computed at the level 
of the Federal Districts which are the coefficient of variation (CV) and the Gini 
coefficient reported in table 1. The coefficient of variation is a measure of the dispersion 
of a distribution and it is computed as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. 
When comparing groups – Federal Districts in this exercise – with different means, the 
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coefficient of variation is more precise than the standard deviation from the mean. The 
Gini coefficient is a measure of dispersion which measures inequality in a frequency 
distribution and it ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to one (maximum inequality). 
 
 
District Central North-W Southern Volga Urals Siberian Far Eastern 
 CV Gini CV Gini CV Gini CV Gini CV Gini CV Gini CV Gini 
1995 .42 .19 .43 .23 .39 .20 .27 .15 .91 .37 .36 .19 .37 .19 
1996 .53 .20 .35 .18 .36 .19 .30 .16 1.05 .42 .36 .19 .44 .23 
1997 .82 .29 .28 .15 .33 .18 .36 .19 1.23 .49 .41 .21 .97 .39 
1998 .57 .21 .39 .20 .35 .19 .31 .17 1.10 .43 .36 .19 .40 .21 
1999 .58 .21 .33 .18 .38 .20 .32 .17 1.08 .43 .36 .19 .39 .21 
2000 .62 .22 .33 .18 .34 .18 .33 .18 1.08 .43 .35 .19 .39 .21 
2001 .62 .22 .33 .17 .33 .17 .45 .19 1.11 .44 .33 .18 .39 .21 
2002 .66 .23 .29 .15 .33 .17 .34 .18 1.13 .45 .35 .18 .46 .24 
2003 .70 .24 .26 .14 .33 .17 .33 .18 1.14 .45 .37 .19 .60 .29 
2004 .71 .25 .26 .14 .32 .17 .33 .18 1.14 .45 .37 .19 .54 .27 
2005 .76 .26 .27 .14 .32 .17 .33 .18 1.15 .46 .36 .19 .47 .25 
2006 .78 .27 .28 .14 .31 .16 .33 .18 1.13 .45 .35 .19 .47 .25 
2007 .77 .26 .28 .14 .31 .17 .33 .18 1.09 .44 .35 .19 .50 .26 
2008 .78 .27 .29 .15 .32 .17 .33 .18 1.09 .44 .34 .19 .54 .27 
  
Table 1 Gross Regional Product inequality metrics – Federal Districts 
Author’s calculations on Rosstat data 
 
 
The Urals District is the most unequal one, a result which is attributed to the 
limited number of regions which belong to the District and to the role of the Tyumen 
region. The Central District shows an increasing degree of inequality in the GRP 
distribution which likely reflects the difference between Moscow and surrounding 
regions with respect to other poorer regions in the same District. Inequality is 
decreasing over time in the North-Western and Southern Districts and it is stable in 
Siberia. Looking at per capita GRP in table 2, the Districts with the highest increases in 
per capita income between 1998 and 2008 were the Central District, the Urals District 
and the North-Western District. As for the distribution, while inequality has been 
decreasing in the North-Western District it increased in the Central and the Urals 
District providing preliminary evidence of a detrimental effect of the concentration of 
investment and economic activities in Moscow (for the Central District) and in oil 
productive regions (for the Urals District) on within-District equality.   
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4.2.4  Composition of Gross Regional Product 
In this section the structure of Gross Regional Product (GRP) for the years 1998 and 
2008 has been analyzed, taking the Federal Districts as reference unit. The structure of 
GRP allows to detect how the Russian economy has changed through time from the end 
of the first critical phase of transition (1992-1999) to a second phase characterized by 
positive growth rates of GRP. The structure of GRP published by Rosstat was enriched 
between 1998 and 2008, as shown in table 2 in the Appendix. In 1998 the two broad 
categories used were physical goods and intangible services. Physical goods were 
divided in GRP deriving from industry, agriculture and construction, while intangible 
services were divided in transport, communications, trade and catering. In 2008, 
instead, the three broad sections used were industry and agriculture, services and social 
service (public administration, defense, education etc), divided in further levels.  
Data for natural resources and the share of GRP deriving from these industries 
are published in different forms. For both years, the quantities of extracted oil and 
condensate gas are available at regional and District levels so that it is possible to see 
what the most oil-productive regions are and how they perform. For 2008 the GRP 
structure for industry is disaggregated in mining and quarrying, production of 
electricity, gas and water.  
In 2008 at the national level, 5 percent of Gross Domestic Product is given by 
agriculture, 35 percent by industry and 60 percent by services. 
 
In 1998, at the threshold of the financial crisis that changed the path of Russian 
transition, per capita GRP in purchasing power parity was 5,400 US dollars (15,400 
rubles in current prices) while in 2008, before the recent financial crisis, it reached 
13,200 (240,000 rubles in current prices) with very high regional disparities. Through 
time, the poorest District is the Southern one which suffers by ethnical conflicts, 
political instability in fact does not allow a consistent growth path despite its fertile soil 
and the availability of oil in some areas. As a consequence, in 1998 and in 2008 per 
capita GRP in the Southern District was below the national value and the disparity was 
increasing; in 1998, per capita GRP was 5,400 US dollars at the national level and 3,000 
in the Southern District, while in 2008 it was 13,200 at the national level and 5,400 in 
the Southern District. On average the Districts and regions with the best economic 
performance in the decade 1998-2008 have been the ones with better initial conditions, 
i.e. higher initial levels of GRP and oil extraction. These are in particular the Central 
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District and Moscow City, the Urals District and Tyumen region, and other regions as 
Sakhalin in the Far Eastern District.  
 
• Physical goods 
In 1998 the shares of GRP deriving from physical goods and intangible services were 
around 50-50. Physical goods were disaggregated in industry, agriculture and 
construction and industry was not disaggregated in heavy and light industry, while in 
2008 industrial production will report also mining and quarrying, manufacturing, 
production of electricity, gas and water and wholesale retail trade.  
In the same year the average share of GRP deriving from industrial activities was 30 
percent at the national level and above this value in the North-Western, Volga and Urals 
Districts. As already mentioned, in the Urals District the activities are concentrated in 
Tyumen region where 60 percent of total national oil-extraction is done. Indeed the 
majority of oil and gas condensate activities is done in the Urals District, with 210,000 
thousand tons, followed by Bashkortostan in the Volga District (specialized also in 
mining activities and chemical products) and Tatarstan with 75,000 thousand tons while 
the North-western District is active in mining activities, in particular coal and iron.  
In 2008, the share of GRP deriving from industry was still around 35 percent at the 
national level with a 13 percent share deriving from mining and quarrying and still 
concentrated in the Volga, Urals and North-Western Districts. Tyumen remained the 
first oil-producer with 324,000 thousand tons, followed by the Volga District. In the 
Central District aside Moscow City which derives 50 percent of its GRP from light 
industry, wholesale retail trade and real-estate activities, manufacturing produces almost 
20 percent of GRP in heavy industries like manufacture of coal, chemical and plastic 
industries and machinery whereas mining activities are limited. In the Far Eastern 
District, positive results are driven by the performance of Chukotka and Sakhalin 
Island; even though the oil extraction in Sakhalin decreased owing to a lack of 
investments in new technologies during the Eighties and early Nineties, in the second 
phase of transition this area attracted both national and foreign investors in the oil 
industry, the oil extraction went from 1,700 thousand tons in 1995 to  3,300 in 2000 and 
15,000 thousand tons in 2007. 
 
In 1998 the share of GRP from construction was on average 7 percent at the national 
level and in all Districts with the exception of the Siberian one, which indeed suffered 
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by a consistent de-population in the north during the first phase of transition. In 2008 
the share decreased by a percentage point, mainly because of the fall in residential 
construction and the recent financial crisis. 
The average share of GRP deriving from agriculture at national level was about 6 
percent in 1998 and it was mainly concentrated in the Southern and Volga Districts and 
the regions of central and south Siberia like Kemerovo and Tomsk which benefit from 
continental weather and fertile soil. The share deriving from agriculture was stable 
through time and it was still around 6 percent in 2008. With respect to 1998, agricultural 
production increased in both quantity and technological efficiency in those regions with 
availability of natural resources and a differentiated economy (Volga District) while it 
remained stable in those almost totally specialized in oil production like Tyumen. In the 
Volga District, the share of GRP deriving from agriculture increased by a percentage 
point between 1998 and 2008 (from 6.2 to 7.2 percent) while in the Urals District it 
remained stable at 2.5 percent despite the increase in region of Kurgan. The same 
dynamic is found for other industrial sectors as manufacturing and wholesale retail trade 
which are below the national average in the areas specialized in oil-extraction.   
 
• Services 
In 1998 intangible services were disaggregated in transport, communications, trade and 
catering while in 2008 are disaggregated in transport and communications, financial 
activities, real estate and business activities, which account all together for 1/3 of the 
total share of services on GRP. Data are published also for public administration and 
defense, education, health and social services. 
On average, services contribute to more than half of Russian GDP and the share 
is increasing through time. Transport and communications account for 11 percent of 
GRP while trade and catering and real estate contribute for more than 10 percent of the 
total share. In Moscow City and in Saint Petersburg they account for almost 20 percent 
and 16 percent of GRP respectively. The share of financial services is limited and 
concentrated only in the Central District and in particular in Moscow City.  
In 2008 the shares of social services for public administration, compulsory social 
security and defense, education, health and related social services and other social 
services are reported. Each of these sectors accounts for 3 percent of GRP at the 
national level and they were rather homogeneous across the Districts with the exception 
of public administration, defense and compulsory social security which contributed to 7 
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percent and more of GRP in the Southern, Siberian and Far Eastern Districts, which are 
also the ones with the highest shares of people employed in public administration. 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
After a long and difficult process of transition, Russia is today the 6th world economy 
and the first oil producer, with 12 percent of world oil. Living standards of the Russian 
population had a noticeable increment after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
critical first phase of transition, however social differences remain and even rose in the 
last decade. Differentiated business activities, light industry and services now play a key 
role in the Russian economy and are influenced by the geography of the territories. For 
instance, most of the Gross Regional Product from the service sector is produced in 
European Russia, while agriculture remains the main activity in the southern areas and 
most of the Asian Russia. 
 Income differentials at the regional level are increasing through time and a process of 
convergence has still not taken place despite the recent effort of federal policies to 
reduce the gap between richer and poorer regions. As it will be empirically analyzed in 
the next chapter, the leading role of oil in economic growth and the industrial 
specialization created a pattern of regional clusters where most of the investments are 
concentrated in few areas.  
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Appendix 
List of Russian regions and Federal Districts  
 
Central Federal District 
Belgorod Oblast, Bryansk Oblast, Vladimir Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kaluga 
Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast, Moscow Federal City, Moscow 
Oblast, Orel Oblast, Ryazan Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Tambov Oblast, Tver Oblast, Tula 
Oblast, Yaroslav Oblast 
 
North-Western Federal District 
Arkhangelsk Oblast, Vologda Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Republic of Karelia, Komi 
Republic, Leningrad Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Pskov Oblast, Saint 
Petersburg Federal City 
 
Southern Federal District 
Republic of Adygea, Republic of Dagestan, Republic of Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria 
Republic, Karachay-Cherkessia Republic, Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Republic of 
Chechnya, Stavropol Krai, Astrakhan Oblast, Volgograd Oblast, Republic of Kalmykia, 
Krasnodar Krai, Rostov Oblast 
 
In 2010 the Southern Federal District was divided in two Districts. The regions of Dagestan, 
Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia-Alania, Chechnya and 
Stavropol now form the North Caucasian Federal District 
 
Volga Federal District 
Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Tatarstan, Republic of Udmurtia, Chuvash Republic, 
Mari El Republic, Kirov Oblast, Republic of Mordovia, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Orenburg 
Oblast, Penza Oblast, Perm Krai, Samara Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast 
 
Urals Federal District 
Kurgan Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Tyumen Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast 
 
Siberian Federal District 
Republic of Altai, Altai Krai, Republic of Buryatia, Irkutsk Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Tuva 
Republic, Republic of Khakassia, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, 
Tomsk Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai 
 
Far Eastern Federal District 
Sakha-Yakutia Republic, Primorsky Krai, Khabarovsk Krai, Kamchatka Krai, Magadan 
Oblast, Amur Oblast, Jewish Autonomous Okrug, Sakhalin Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug 
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Table 2 - Structure of Gross Regional Product by industry in current prices 
 
 
Table 2A year 1998 
Federal 
Districts 
GRP 
per 
capita 
PPP 
US 
dollars 
Total 
GRP 
Physical 
goods, 
of 
which 
1/Industry 2/Agriculture 3/Construction Intangible 
services, 
of which 
1/Transport 2/Communic
ation 
3/Trade and 
catering 
National 5,400 100 44 30.3 5.7 7.3 48.9 9.3 2 14 
Central 5,800 100 33.1 20.3 4.5 7.2 56 6.7 3 21.4 
Moscow  12,000 100 22.1 13 0 7.7 66.5 5.7 4.2 30.4 
NorthW 5,800 100 44.2 33.6 3.5 6.3 52 11.5 2.3 13.4 
Southern 3,000 100 44.3 22.2 13.4 8.1 50.3 10.3 1.8 13.2 
Volga 4,700 100 49.5 35.7 6.2 7 42.7 8.5 1.4 10.8 
Urals 8,800 100 52.6 40.1 2.5 9.4 40.6 11.9 1.1 7.5 
Kurgan 3,000 100 44.1 31.7 6 5.5 51.8 9.3 1.9 12.8 
Tyumen 20,600 100 53.1 40.2 1.2 11.4 39.4 13.7 0.9 5.2 
Siberian 5,100 100 49.7 35.2 8.1 5.8 45.7 10.1 1.5 11.6 
Far East 7,000 100 46.4 33.7 5 7.1 53.1 12.3 2.2 9.7 
 
Notes: values are percentage of total GRP of each sector in current prices. In cases where subsidies exceed taxes, the 
sum could be higher than 100 
Source: Rosstat data, volume “Russian Regions” 2001 
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Table 2B - year 2008 
Physical goods 
Federal  
Districts 
GRP  
per  
capita 
PPP  
US 
dollars 
Total 
GRP 
Agriculture Mining, 
quarrying 
Manufacturing Electricity, 
gas, 
water 
Construction Wholesale 
retail trade, repair of 
motorvehicles and 
personal goods 
National 13,200 100 5.2 12.8 18.5 3.8 5.7 21.8 
Central 19,000 100 2.3 0.8 18.7 3.3 4.8 32.9 
Moscow  43,000 100 0 0 15.3 2.6 3.5 39.5 
NorthW 14,000 100 2.4 6.9 22.1 3.9 8.2 16.8 
Southern 5,400 100 13.6 1.8 16.9 3.3 10.4 17.7 
Volga 9,700 100 7.2 12.5 24.7 3.7 7.8 14 
Urals 21,700 100 2.5 35.1 13.6 2.4 7.1 14.8 
Kurgan 6,100 100 14.1 0.6 18.1 2.9 8.5 13.6 
Tyumen 51,000 100 1.1 52.9 2.4 2.1 7.5 13 
Siberian 9,700 100 6.8 9.2 22.5 4 6.2 14.1 
Far East 13,000 100 3.7 20.6 6.1 4.2 10.7 12.7 
 
 
Services 
Federal  
Districts 
Transport and 
communication 
Financial 
activities 
Real 
estate 
P.a. and 
defense, 
compulsory 
social 
security 
Education Health Other 
social 
and 
personal 
services 
National 10.6 1.1 9 2.9 2.8 3.1 1.5 
Central 8.6 1.5 14.9 3.7 2.3 2.8 2.4 
Moscow  8.2 2 18.6 2.6 1.7 2.2 2.9 
NorthW 12 0.3 10.5 5.3 3.3 4.5 2 
Southern 11.2 0.2 6.9 6.7 3.7 4.5 1.2 
Volga 9.9 0.2 7.3 4.3 3.1 3.3 1 
Urals 7.9 0.3 7.2 3 1.9 2.7 0.7 
Kurgan 16.2 0 5.6 8.4 4.7 5.2 0.9 
Tyumen 7.1 0.4 7.1 2.1 1.3 1.8 0.5 
Siberian 12.5 0.2 7.7 6.2 3.9 4.5 1.2 
Far East 12.9 0.2 6.6 8.4 4 4.9 1.2 
 
Notes: values are percentage of total GRP of each sector in current prices. In cases where subsidies exceed taxes, the 
sum could be higher than 100 
Source: Rosstat data, volume “Russian Regions” 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36  
 
Chapter 2 
 
Spatial Aspects of Convergence  
Evidence from Russian Regions  
1995 – 2008 
 
1.  Introduction  
Soon after the Soviet Union was formally dissolved in December 1991, the Russian 
economy had to deal with a period of hyperinflation and severe crisis, with a consistent 
decline of income and worsening life conditions to such an extent that unemployment 
rate rose from 4 percent of total labor force in 1992 to 10 percent in 199710 so that by 
1994  a share of 35 percent of the Russian population was living in poverty, according 
to World Bank and IMF studies. Thereby, State-owned enterprises were privatized and 
trade together with prices liberalized with the exception of primary food, energy and 
transportations. The phase of recovery11 ended in 1999 and since then, up to the recent 
international crisis of 2008, the Russian Federation had a 5-6 percent positive trend 
within the annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, mainly obtained by 
exporting oil, natural gas and other natural resources.   
Thank to the export market strategy based on natural resources, for the first time 
after years of severe decline the Russian Federation achieved positive growth rates, but 
on the other hand the risks connected to oil prices fluctuations and weak diversification 
are high and weaker sectors of the economy have not received the resources they need 
to improve.  
Natural resources represent a fundamental growth factor for Russia and oil-
productive regions are concentrated in few areas, in fact in the year 2000, almost 60 
percent of the total oil and gas production of the Russian Federation was concentrated in 
Tyumen, in the Urals, however the regions in the North West can rely on industrial 
activity linked to oil production and other businesses. Moreover, they have stronger 
relationships with European countries and a milder climate. As a matter of fact, in the 
Far East District and in Siberia, population density and business activities are limited 
                                                 
10
 International Monetary Fund IMF – 2011 World Economic Outlook 
11
 I thank the researchers at the Centre for Labour Market Studies HSE (Moscow) for the suggestion to consider 
recovery the time span 1992-1998, when the country was indeed recovering from the crisis, and economic 
growth the years after. 
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because of mountainous regions, permafrost and difficult transports. Currently a limited 
8 percent of the Russian population lives in the Urals, whereas more than 10 percent 
lives in Moscow City and surrounding areas. 
Only recently, policies have recognized disparities being arisen by export-driven 
growth between western regions and eastern regions due to oil business. The system of 
budget transfer, for example, has been modified to give more resources to the poorest 
areas. Other solutions work in the direction of new activities so that areas in the Far East 
or near Mongolia like Vladivostok are creating networks with Chinese enterprises and 
attracting tourism.   
The factors which could explain regional differences are to be searched with initial 
conditions,  the exploitation of natural resources and the effectiveness of institutions. 
Berkowitz and DeJong (2003) stress the importance of reform policies and find price 
liberalization to be beneficial on growth and large-scale privatization to have a positive 
effect on the formation of new enterprises on a subset of 40 regions. Equally they point 
out (2005) how entrepreneurial activity can improve the growth of the Russian economy 
depending on initial conditions and policy reforms. Ledyaeva and Linden (2008) using 
data for the period 1996-2004 suggest that initial conditions, domestic investments and 
exports are the main determinants of economic growth. They do not find evidence of 
absolute convergence, but conditional converge can be found by splitting the sample in 
high-income and low-income regions. Another recent study conducted by Ahrend 
(2008) analyzes the determinants of economic growth before and after the financial 
crisis of 1998. Before this threshold, initial conditions, exports and natural resources 
played a major role in recovery; after 1998, natural resources remain significant and 
also political reforms have an impact on economic activity. Two recent papers focus on 
the geography of the country: on the one hand Buccellato (2007) studies the issue of 
convergence at a regional level after the recovery phase, on the other hand Kholodilin et 
al (2009) test different cross-section specifications. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on spatial analysis with an empirical analysis 
of growth factors across Russian regions. Using regional based data in the period 
between 1995 and 2008, the aim is to assess which factors have contributed to the 
economic growth after the Soviet collapse. The contributions to the literature are 
twofold, providing a detailed explanatory spatial data analysis (ESDA) of per capita 
gross regional product (GRP) at a global and local level and employing fixed-effect 
 38  
spatial panel techniques applied to the neoclassical Solow model of economic growth, 
compared with the traditional benchmark fixed-effect panel model. 
Results from the ESDA show that the regions are characterized by positive spatial 
autocorrelation, forming homogeneous clusters which preclude convergence. Panel data 
models confirm the absence of convergence using both the benchmark specification and 
the spatial fixed-effects models, but the diverging path is weakening over the period.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I will describe methods and 
data. As for the methods, I will analyze ESDA techniques at the global and local level, 
the theoretical framework of the neoclassical Solow model and the empirical models 
proposed by the literature for empirical convergence studies, whereas spatial 
autoregressive model (SAR) and spatial error model (SEM) are tested. With regard to 
the sample, it is composed of 77 Russian regions and employs data from Rosstat for the 
period 1995-2008. In section 3, I will focus on the spatial analysis and the panel data 
models. Besides confirming the pattern of positive spatial autocorrelation and 
divergence from the ESDA, as a robustness check I chose to follow the suggestion 
offered by Solanko (2003) and will analyze separately the two sub-periods at the 
threshold of 1999. Section 4 provides concluding remarks and policy advices. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) 
Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) is a set of techniques, graphs and statistics 
used in the analysis of spatial patterns of data (Anselin 1998a, b; Le Gallo, Ertur 2003). 
GeoDa, Quantum GIS and Stata12 are the softwares used to conduct this study.  Several 
statistics and graphs have been designed to analyze spatial autocorrelation at all levels. 
Finally the R splm package has been used for the estimation of spatial panel models. 
 
Spatial autocorrelation is defined by Cliff and Ord (1981) as the phenomenon that 
occurs when the spatial distribution of the variable of interest shows a systemic pattern.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 “Tools for spatial data analysis” by Maurizio Pisati 
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The statistic employed to measure global spatial autocorrelation is Moran’s I, 
developed by Patrick Moran (1950), which takes, for each year t, the form 
 
             It = 
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j jiij∑ ∑= =
 
 
 
where wij are the elements of the NxN spatial weight matrix corresponding to the 
observations (i,j). The elements of the diagonal wii  are set equal to zero, that is to say 
that each region is not considered as sharing a border with itself, instead the elements wij 
identify the contiguity or distance between each pair of regions according to the 
established criterion. 
Zi=(Xi-X)/N is the vector of the n=77 observations in year t in deviation from the mean. 
X identifies the variable of interest, which in this study is per capita gross regional 
product (GRP) in the first and in the last year of analysis. 
S0=ΣiΣjwij  is a scaling factor equal to the sum of the elements of the weight matrix and 
m2=Σi(Zi2/N). 
Various types of weight matrices can be constructed, based on contiguity or distance. I 
use a queen-criterion binary contiguity weight matrix which assigns value one to the 
element wij if  region i and region j share a point or border, zero if they do not.  
Under the null hypothesis of absence of global spatial autocorrelation, the expected 
value of Moran’s I is 
 
                                                  E(I) = 
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1
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If Moran’s I in each year is higher than the expected value, one can consider the 
distribution of X as being characterized by positive spatial autocorrelation: the value of 
X in each region i tends to be similar to the values taken by X in spatially contiguous 
locations. The opposite is true for I < E(I). 
Inference is based on z values 
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Moran’s I statistic is global in the sense that it indicates if, in each year t and 
through time, there is a positive or negative spatial relationship in the whole sample, but 
it does not identify the presence of clusters, outliers, nor it identifies which regions are 
significant for spatial autocorrelation.  
To analyze local spatial autocorrelation, four techniques usually are combined: 
Moran scatterplot, the statistic Getis and Ord’s G (Getis and Ord 1992, Ord and Gestis 
1995), Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) (Le Gallo, Ertur 2003) and 
Geary’s C (Roy Geary 1954). 
Getis and Ord’s G measures spatial clustering. If Gi,t>E(G), the distribution of X 
shows positive spatial autocorrelation with a prevalence of high-valued clusters around 
region i. If the value of the G’s is negative, then around region i there is a clustering of 
low-valued regions. Geary’s C represents local spatial autocorrelation and its values lie 
between 0 and 2. If C=1 there is no local spatial autocorrelation, but if C<1 there is 
evidence of positive spatial autocorrelation. 
The Moran scatterplot shows the distribution of the regions in the four quadrant 
space according to the values taken by variable X. The x-axis reports the original values 
z of the variable of interest, while the y-axis reports the spatial lag Wz. Quadrants are 
named clockwise, from top left: low-high (LH), high-high (HH), high-low (HL), low-
low (LL). Regions in the top right and bottom left quadrants are characterized by 
positive spatial autocorrelation: high value regions nearby high value regions (HH) and 
low value regions nearby low value regions (LL) respectively. Regions located in the 
other two quadrants, top left and bottom right, are characterized by negative spatial 
autocorrelation: low value regions nearby high regions (LH) and high value regions 
nearby low value regions (HL) respectively. 
The Moran scatterplot highlights how the data are distributed, but not which ones 
significantly contribute to the identified patterns, therefore LISA techniques are 
employed  to provide a clear visualization of patterns. A LISA is any statistics, 
proportional to a global one (Anselin 1995; Le Gallo, Ertur 2003), showing which 
observations are significant and takes generally the form of a local Moran’s I. As a 
consequence, the combination of Moran’s I, Moran scatterplot and LISA maps provides 
complete visual evidence about spatial patterns, clusters and significant regions. 
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2.2 Theoretical framework – the Solow Growth Model 
The benchmark theoretical framework for convergence and growth is the neoclassical 
Solow-Swan exogenous growth model (Solow 1956; Swan, 1956). In this paragraph I 
will briefly summarize the results of the Solow model and then discuss the issue of non-
independent observations to introduce the spatial econometrics models. This brief 
explanation is based on Anderson and Thiesse (2004, Part III) and Romer (2006). 
 
Consider an economy where aggregate physical capital Kt and labor Lt are used to 
produce an homogenous good.  
At denotes labor-augmenting technical change or the effectiveness of labor which grows 
at an exogenous rate g. Capital depreciates at an exogenous rate δ. The saving rate s is 
exogenously defined as the fraction of output to be used as an input in t+1 and the rest 
is used for consumption c. The production function takes the form 
 
      Yt = F(Kt, Lt At)      (1)  
 
with constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal products for K and L, which 
depends only on the K/L ratio. 
Defining quantities per unit of effective labor, with y* = Y/(Lt At) and k* = K/(Lt At), the  
production function simplifies to  
 
       y* = f(k*)       (2) 
 
The fundamental difference equation of the Solow model is given by 
 
    kt+1* - kt* ≤  sf(kt*) – (δ + n + g)kt*    (3) 
 
 
where n is the growth rate of population and ct*=(1-s) f(k*). 
From (3) we can see that the rate of change of the capital stock per unit of effective 
labor is the difference between two terms: sf(kt*), which is the actual investment per 
unit of effective labor, and (δ + n + g)kt*, which is the breakeven investment, i.e. the 
amount of investment necessary to keep k at its existing level.  
 
The steady-state is the point where physical capital per effective unit of labour k* is 
constant. 
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 It corresponds to a stationary point of equation (3) so that the equation becomes 
 
     0 =   sf(kt*) – (δ + n + g)kt*    (4) 
 
The amount of investment, sf(k), is employed to replenish the K/L ratio given 
depreciation δ, population growth rate n and technological progress g. 
At  k*, investments sf(kt*) equal effective depreciation (δ + n + g)kt* and k remains 
constant over time.  
The behavior of aggregate variables in steady-state can be summed up as follows: 
- effective labor AL grows at rate g+n 
- capital grows at g+n because when k is constant, K=ALk*=AL 
- the assumption of constant returns to scale implies that the aggregate output grows at 
rate g+n. 
In steady-state, all variables grow at constant rates and the rate of growth of output per 
capita is determined only by the rate of growth of technological progress g. 
 
The Solow model proves that given any initial level k0, the economy will 
convergence to the steady-state with a monotonic transition: 
- if k0 < k*, the growth rate of capital per unit of effective labor is positive and decreases 
gradually 
- if k0 > k*, the growth rate is negative and increases gradually. 
The model implies conditional convergence: countries which are far from the 
steady-state will grow faster than those which are close to the steady-state. 
Steady-state capital, productivity and income are determined by A, δ,  g, s and n. 
Assuming that countries have the same technology, differences in income and 
productivity should be explained by cross-country differences in s and n. 
 
The first study to provide an empirical specification for the Solow model was 
Baumol (1986) with the cross-section regression 
 
    log (yt) – log(yo) = a + b* log(yo)    (5) 
 
 
If the coefficient b is negative, there is proof of convergence. Barro (1991) and 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) define the concepts of absolute β convergence and 
conditional β convergence founded on the results of the Solow model. Poor countries 
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could grow faster than rich countries only if they shared the same steady-states, that is a 
situation of absolute convergence. If countries instead are characterized by different 
steady-states, then the concept of conditional convergence applies as it is necessary to 
condition the different steady-states themselves.  
 
The empirical approach received two main critics through the years: first, the 
problem of omitted variables which is typical of cross-sectional studies; second, a critics 
specific to application in regional studies, where observations may not be considered as 
independent from each other. The use of panel data methods helps to solve, at least 
partially, these issues (Islam 1995; Arbia, Basile, Piras 2005) as, with regards to 
differences across regions, they allow to control for unobserved heterogeneity through 
regional fixed effects αi, constant over time, and time effects ct 
 
               ln[yt+k,i / yt,i] = αi + β*lnyt,i + ct + εt,i     (6) 
 
where i (i=1…N) denotes the observations, and t (t=1…T) denotes time periods. 
The dependent variable is the log of the annual growth rate of per-capita GRP and αi are 
the time-invariant regional fixed effects. 
 
The literature on spatial econometrics explicitly relaxes the assumption of 
independent observations i, (i=1…N), which is a strong one when dealing with regions 
of the same country, and controls for spatial dependence (spatial autocorrelation) and/or 
spatial heterogeneity in the same panel-data environment. Applications are numerous, 
both with cross-sectional and panel data. See for example Elhorst (2001, 2003), Ertur, 
Le Gallo, Baumont (2006), Buccellato (2007), Ledyaeva (2009) and Kholodilin, 
Oshepkov, Siliverstov (2009) for applications to the Russian Federation. 
 
The model for spatial dependence with panel data dates back to Anselin (1988) and 
Arbia (1989). Spatial dependence can be incorporated in the panel regression model 
seen above in two ways, either creating a spatial autoregressive model SAR or a spatial 
error model SEM. 
In the SAR model, spatial dependence enters the model as an additional regressor in the 
form of a spatially lagged dependent variable Wy where W is the weight matrix as 
defined in section 2.1. This specification is used to verify the presence of spatial 
interactions between the regions when it is likely that yi is influenced by y from the 
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neighbouring regions. The panel regression model (6) becomes a fixed-effect spatial lag 
model with the form 
 
   ln[yt+k,i / yt,i] = αi + ρ∑
=
N
j wij1
 ln[yt+k,i / yt,i] + β*lnyt,i + ct + εt,i   (7) 
 
where ρ is the spatial autocorrelation coefficient which provides evidence of positive 
spatial autocorrelation if positive and significant.  
In the SEM model, spatial dependence enters the model in the error term εt,i. This 
specification is used to correct the influence of spatial dependence which takes the form 
of a nuisance. It simply assumes that the errors are spatially correlated and controls for 
it. 
 
Therefore the model (6) takes the following form 
 
    ln[yt+k,i / yt,i] = αi + β*lnyt,i + ct + εt,i 
            
(8) 
    
with εt,i = λ ∑
=
N
j wij1
εt,i + ηι 
 
where λ is the spatial correlation coefficient and ηι  are assumed to be normally 
distributed with zero mean and known variance. 
Both models are estimated by using maximum likelihood with the R package splm. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Data 
The dataset used in the empirical analysis is composed of 77 Russian regions. It covers 
the period 1995-2008 and employs data from the yearly collections Regions of Russia 
published by Rosstat (Goskomstat). The Russian Constitution recognizes the regions as 
constituent units, called Subjects of the Federation which are defined as Republic, Kray 
(territory), Oblast (region) or Autonomous Okrug. Constituent units were 89 when the 
Constitution was approved and became 83 by 2008 because of some mergers which so 
far have occurred especially between the main region and the smaller areas in the 
surroundings, so that the structure of 1993 has not dramatically changed. By now, there 
are 21 Republics, 9 Krais, 46 Oblasts, 2 Federal Cities (Moscow and Saint Petersburg), 
1 Autonomous Oblast and 4 Autonomous Okrugs. The republics of Chechnya and 
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Ingushetia are excluded from the sample because data are incomplete. The oblast of 
Kaliningrad is also excluded as it is under the jurisdiction of Russia but located between 
Poland and Lithuania. Data for the autonomous districts13 are not explicitly shown for 
each one of these areas is under the jurisdiction of its main oblast so they are already 
counted in the main reference region.  
The spatial weight matrix is a queen-criterion binary contiguity matrix which 
assigns value 1 to the wij cell if region i and region j share a point/border, 0 if they do 
not. Three modifications were applied to the matrix with respect to the administrative 
regional division: one for Moscow City, one for Saint Petersburg and the last one for 
Sakhalin Island.  
According to the Constitution and from an administrative point of view Moscow City is 
a region per se and being completely located inside Moscow Oblast, within a binary 
contiguity matrix would seem as having no other neighbours but Moscow Oblast, a 
figure that does not correspond to reality. For this reason, I modified the matrix so that 
Moscow City has the same borders as Moscow Oblast besides Moscow Oblast itself. 
The same has been done for Saint Petersburg, in Leningrad Oblast. Sakhalin Island 
instead is located in the Far East of Russia in the North Pacific Ocean and because of its 
position would be automatically excluded from the matrix, but given that it is still an oil 
and coal productive region and recipients of foreign investments (though not the main 
one as in the past decades), I chose to set Sakhalin Island as boarding with its nearby 
region.  
 
 
3.2 Spatial patterns of Gross Regional Product (GRP) 
Table 1 shows annual values of Moran’s I and Geary’s C for real per-capita gross 
regional product (GRP) over the period 1995-2008. Per-capita gross regional product is 
defined by Rosstat as the gross value added of goods and services created by the 
residents of the region, i.e. the difference between output and intermediate consumption 
net of the value added by non-market collective services provided by public institutions. 
Values for the Moran’s I are positive and significant at one percent level for each year, 
providing evidence of positive global spatial autocorrelation: regions with per-capita 
GRP higher (lower) than the mean tend to be located nearby regions of the same type.  
 
                                                 
13
 Nenets, Khanty-Mansi, Yamalia, Ust-Ordynsky and Aginsky 
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Year Moran’s I Geary’s C 
1995 0.33 0.60 *** 
1996 0.34 0.60 *** 
1997 0.14 0.88 
1998 0.30 0.66 *** 
1999 0.30 0.67 *** 
2000 0.28 0.73 *** 
2001 0.27 0.74 *** 
2002 0.26 0.75 ** 
2003 0.24  0.76 ** 
2004 0.24 0.77 ** 
2005 0.23 0.81 * 
2006 0.22 0.83 * 
2007 0.21 0.82 * 
2008 0.20 0.83 * 
 
Table 1  - Global Moran’s I and Geary’s C on per capita GRP – Author’s calculation 
Notes: The expected value of the Moran’s I is constant in each year and equal to E(I)= -0.013. 
All Moran’s I are  significant at 1 percent level 
*** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance 
 
Though significance level remains at one percent with positive values, the value of 
the statistic itself is decreasing through time in particular after the year 2000, showing 
that the high-high and low-low clusters have not been stable between 1995 and 2008 but 
they are indeed reducing both in the number of regions and in the absolute value. The 
statistics Geary’s C assumes values lower than one if the sample is characterized by 
positive spatial autocorrelation. As for the Moran’s I, Geary’s C provides evidence of 
positive spatial correlation which is decreasing through time, in fact the statistic 
increases from the lowest value 0.60 in 1995 to 0.83 in 2003. 
To detect how regions are distributed across clusters and which ones contribute 
significantly, figures 1 and 2 show the Moran scatterplot for per-capita GRP in the first 
and in the last year of analysis. For this analysis I use the software Geoda. 
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Figure 1 Moran scatterplot  - per capita GRP 1995 
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Figure 2 Moran scatterplot  - per capita GRP 2008   
 
 
Table 2 reports the distribution of significant regions in the four quadrants in 1995 
and in 2008 according to the LISA maps in figures 3 and 4. 
 
 
 LH (purple) HH (red) HL (pink) LL (blue) 
1995 Kurgan, 
Kirov, Omsk, 
Khabarovsk 
Arkhangelsk, Chukotka, 
Magadan, Komi, Kamchatka 
Krasnoyarsk, Sakha-Yakutia, 
Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, Tyumen, 
Buryatia,  Karelia 
- Dagestan, 
Rostov, 
Volgograd, 
Kalmykia, 
Krasnodar, 
Stavropol, 
Astrakhan 
2008 Kurgan, 
Kamchatka 
Arkhangelsk, Chukotka, 
Magadan, Komi, Sakha-
Yakutia, Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, 
Karelia, Omsk, Khabarovsk 
Nizhny-
Novgorod, 
Krasnodar 
Dagestan, 
Stavropol, 
Astrakhan, Altai 
Republic 
 
Table 2 Distribution of Russian regions in the four quadrants  
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Figure 3 LISA Cluster Map  - per capita GRP 1995   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 LISA Cluster Map  - per capita GRP 2008   
 
 
In 1995, 23 regions out of 77 significantly contribute to local spatial autocorrelation 
and most of them are in the high-high and low-low groups, the ones characterized by 
positive spatial autocorrelation as detected at global level. The high-high cluster is 
composed mostly by oil-productive regions in the Urals District and the richest and less 
populated regions in Siberia and the Far East, whereas there are no regions which 
belong to the Central District. The low-low cluster comprehends almost entirely the 
Southern District in the Caucasus but it is worth noting that the economic-political 
situation was highly critical in 1995 during the First Chechen War. The high-low cluster 
is empty, meaning that there are not high-income regions located near low-income 
regions. In 2008, fewer regions were still significant, with a lower Moran’s I. Few 
regions form the low-high cluster and the most interesting case is Kurgan, which is 
located in the Urals District but it is not an oil-productive region like Sverdlovsk and 
Tyumen. Per-capita GRP in Kurgan is much lower than those of its surrounding areas, 
in fact it is nine times lower than the one of Tyumen (111,000 rubles in Kurgan and 
900,000 in Tyumen in 2008) and half the amount in Sverdlovsk (220,000 rubles in 
2008). 
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Patterns in 2008 are more diversified than in 1995: the high-high cluster is now 
composed of a lower number of regions, in particular Tyumen region is not significant 
anymore, and the high-low cluster emerged in Nizhny-Novgorod and Krasnodar, which 
succeeded in leaving the low-low cluster. Also Kalmykia, Volgograd and Rostov 
eventually succeeded in leaving the poorer low-low cluster.  
 
To summarize the spatial analysis, two results seem to be clear. First, the Russian 
Federation is characterized at national and the local regional level by positive spatial 
autocorrelation, a pattern where high (low) value regions are located near high (low) 
value regions, forming homogeneous groups. Second, as shown by the local spatial 
analysis, political and social instability had a consistent detrimental effect on the 
economic performance of the Caucasus and the composition of the low-low cluster, 
whereas the availability of oil and natural gas at regional level appears as the significant 
factor for high-high type regions, though it appears to be weakening through time.  
 
 
3.3 Convergence and growth factors across Russian regions 
 
In this paragraph I will firstly comment the results on convergence obtained with the 
fixed effects panel data model in table 4 in the Appendix and then will discuss the 
results of the two spatial fixed effects models, SAR and SEM, in tables 5.1 and 5.2 in 
the Appendix14. 
 
Following the suggestion made by Solanko (2003), as a robustness check the 
analysis is divided in three periods: 1995-2008 and two sub-periods. The threshold is 
the year 1999, when the Russian economy started to have average annual growth rates 
of GDP of approximately 5-6 percent. Indeed the assumptions that the period 1995-
2008 is a continuous one and that the Russian economy was in steady-state in 1995 are 
strong ones, as major reconstruction in all economic and institutional sectors was in 
place. Though the length of the first period is limited, the years 1995-1999 had a 
peculiar unstable pattern which deserves specific inspection.  
Column 1 tests the hypothesis of absolute β convergence of equation (6). In column 
(2) I extend the analysis to control for the growth factors of the Solow model: 
                                                 
14
 The estimation of a dynamic panel model is prevented by the limited temporal length of the time period 
of this study (14 years) given that the precision of dynamic model’s estimates depends upon the length of 
the time span, therefore I use the fixed-effects model. Moreover, with a dynamic specification one would 
not be allowed to perform the analysis for the two periods 1995-1999 and 2000-2008 separately.  
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population growth rate n, and technological progress g. Population growth is the 
determining factor of labor supply together with migration. Since migration is not 
significant in any specification and it is likely to be endogenous with respect to regional 
income, I am taking in consideration just the regional population growth rate. It is worth 
stressing that for the period of analysis, Russia mostly had negative growth rates of 
population. As a proxy for the growth rate of labor-augmenting technical change, I will 
use researchers with scientific degree on employed population at regional level, but any 
control related to education or employment could suffer from endogeneity. On the other 
hand, researchers who now already hold a scientific degree enrolled in graduate studies 
at least five years earlier. As a consequence, it is then plausible to assume that it does 
not depend on current business cycle, but on the economic situation at the time of 
enrolment.  
 
Different Barro-type regressions have been tested in previous growth studies 
applied to Russian regions. Buccellato (2007) focuses on the period of recovery 1999-
2004 and finds little evidence of convergence controlling for oil and gas production, 
people employed in R&D and FDI. Hydrocarbon supply appears as the main diverging 
factor. Regions that produce oil and gas are few in the country and 70 percent of 
extraction is concentrated in the Tyumen and Sverdlovsk areas. Controlling for oil-
productive regions with a set of regional dummies is feasible, but then it would not be 
possible to control for regional fixed-effects. Russian regions are characterized by 
numerous peculiar time-invariant phenomena which play a major role in economic 
growth. Aside oil production, climate, religion, agrarian or industrial vocation of each 
area are leading factors in shaping Russian economy. For this reason, I pursue a full 
fixed-effects model and do not control explicitly for oil productions. Another possible 
strategy could be controlling for the physical amount of hydrocarbons, but most of the 
sample would have zero values for the whole period as the regions which are oil and gas 
producers did not change over time. Indeed researches in unexplored areas to build new 
plaintiffs started only in recent years. For this reason, I do not explicitly control for oil 
and gas production, considering the effect of hydrocarbons already controlled by the 
time-invariant fixed effects. Both FDI and people employed in R&D surely play a role 
in economic growth, but they are likely to be endogenous as any type of investment. 
FDIs are mainly attracted by oil-productive regions themselves. Ledyaeva (2007) 
performes a spatial analysis of FDI at regional level to find out which factors are 
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attractors of foreign investment and the results are significant for market size, the 
presence of big cities and ports and indeed hydrocarbons extraction in the region. As 
said before, the issue of climate and climatic zones is a critical one for Russia, as 
climate determines population density and also the attractiveness of investments in the 
area, therefore using a fixed-effect approach, the model controls for time-invariant 
characteristics at regional level and the biases due to climate are eliminated.  
 
Summary statistics are shown in table 3 in the Appendix. The dependent variable in 
the empirical analysis is the average annual growth rate of per-capita GRP whose mean 
is positive for the total period and the second one, whereas it is negative in the recovery 
phase. To detect any different pattern between the early phase with negative trend and 
the second phase of economic growth, the sample will be divided in two sub-periods. 
Also, because the average annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product at national 
level after 2000 has been about 5-6 percent up to the crisis of 2008, the analysis stops at 
year 2008. Researchers with scientific degree on 10,000 employed population is used as 
a proxy for technological progress. Variation in the absolute numbers over time and 
between regions is high, as the geographical localization of these workers is strictly 
connected to the vocation of the region, agrarian or industrial. 
 
Results in table 4 show that the hypothesis of convergence is not confirmed. The 
coefficient for the initial level of per-capita GRP is positive and significant in all 
specifications, indicating that richer regions grow faster hence this result strengthens the 
evidence of the spatial analysis. Russian regions are characterized by positive spatial 
autocorrelation, forming homogeneous clusters, as a consequence if this spatial setting 
is not taken into account it is unlikely that a phenomenon like convergence can arise per 
se. The sign of the proxy for technological progress is in line with the Solow model and 
technological progress has a significant positive effect on economic growth which is 
however small, probably because of the magnitude of the variable.  
The coefficient for the initial level of per-capita GRP is higher in the total period 
and in the first period (1995-1999) than in the second one, confirming that the diverging 
path of the regions was stronger in the early phase of transition and so it is advisable to 
analyze the patterns of the two periods separately. This result is a positive sign towards 
the chance of a process of convergence in the future together with the decrease in the 
Moran’s I and the LISA maps which show the recent formation of the high-low cluster 
in 2008. It is indeed the presence of the high-low and the low-high clusters the type of 
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spatial pattern which is favourable to convergence, while homogeneous clusters as high-
high and low-low impede income convergence.  
Finally, population change is a crucial issue for Russia. Since the late Eighties, the 
demographic crisis is one of the major concerns of Russian government as the 
population has been decreasing since 1986 and only in recent years the trend seems to 
be reversing. Different explanations have been proposed for the sharp decline in fertility 
rate and population growth, motivated by economic crisis arguments or by the second 
demographic transition (Zakharov 2008). The Solow model outlines how an increase in 
population can have a negative short-run effect on growth, because - due to diminishing 
returns - it lowers steady-state output per effective worker. The effect of population 
growth on the economic one is a critical theoretical and empirical issue, in fact findings 
mainly depend upon the time period, the sample of countries and their stage of 
development (see Headey and Hodge 2009). In the sample of analysis, the average 
growth rate of population is negative, with difference between regions and time periods. 
Unobserved heterogeneity has been controlled for with fixed-effects, on the contrary the 
dynamic of employed population is taken into account in the proxy for technological 
change. Fixed-effects control for unobserved heterogeneity and time-invariant 
characteristics which can be related to population growth such as religion, climate, share 
of urban population. For these reasons, the significant negative sign of the negative 
growth rate of population - following the Solow assumption that it is exogenous - can be 
interpreted as the negative effect of the severe decreasing trend of population on 
regional GRP growth rate.  
 
The spatial analysis and the fixed-effects panel model provide consistent evidence 
of income divergence. Regions tend to form homogeneous clusters, which preclude 
findings of convergence at the aggregate level. Table 5.1 and 5.2 show results for the 
spatial regression models. The SAR model controls for spatial dependence through the 
ρ coefficient, whereas the SEM model controls for spatial heterogeneity in error term 
through the λ coefficient but both models control for fixed and time effects. The 
motivation behind this analysis is to see if  - explicitly controlling for the positive 
spatial autocorrelation found in the ESDA – there is an effect on the long term path of 
economic growth. 
Spatial fixed effects are significant for Moscow, Tyumen, Karachay-Cherkessia 
Republic, Adygea, Chukotka, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, Kalmykia, 
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Magadan, North-Ossetia, Sakha-Yakutia and Tuva. Signs and magnitude of the 
coefficients are not affected by controlling for spatial patterns in the  whole period 
1995-2008, as the spatial coefficient is small and Russian regions remain on the 
diverging path detected through the spatial analysis and the benchmark fixed effects 
model. The inclusion of the spatial term has a higher effect on the magnitude of the 
GRP coefficient in the recovery phase 1995-1999 which is now lower than in the 
benchmark specification: the process of divergence decreases by controlling for spatial 
patterns, in fact in the specification for conditional convergence the GRP coefficient is 
.71 in the benchmark model and .64 in the spatial one. In the second period 2000-2008 
the proxy for technological progress acquires a limited more positive effect on 
economic growth but it remains not significant as expected by the Russian growth 
patterns and the spatial analysis. On the one hand, the main growth factor after 1999 has 
indeed been the performance of the oil-sector which is already controlled for and acts 
through the regional fixed effect. On the other hand, the spatial analysis through the 
Moran’s I statistic and the LISA maps showed that the spatial correlation is decreasing 
and that the high-high cluster is smaller in the second phase of economic growth with 
respect to the first one. The combination of these two effects explains why the proxy for 
technological change is significant in the whole sample and in the first phase of 
recovery, but not in the second phase per se. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The aim of this study was to analyze the patterns of convergence in per-capita gross 
regional product and growth rates in the Russian Federation from 1995 to 2008. The 
results of the exploratory spatial data analysis and different specification of panel 
models highlight the presence of a diverging path across Russian regions, characterized 
by clusters of homogenous type. 
The ESDA conducted at a global and local level shows that – computing spatial 
statistics techniques as the Moran’s I and visual analysis as LISA – positive spatial 
correlation is decreasing over the period as some poor regions in the Caucasus 
succeeded in leaving the low-low cluster and the presence of the high-low cluster 
emerged. The composition of the high-high cluster is also changing over time, in 
particular the effect of Tyumen regions is decreasing over the period. At the same time, 
the low-low type cluster in the Caucasus is persistent for Dagestan, showing that 
political instability is a major obstacle to economic growth. 
 55  
The benchmark specification for the fixed-effects model confirms that the regions 
are diverging, though the magnitude of the effect is affected by the period of analysis 
and in particular by the recovery phase 1995-1999.  Results for the spatial econometrics 
models demonstrate that both positive spatial autocorrelation ρ in the SAR model and 
spatial heterogeneity λ in the SEM characterize Russian regions, confirming the results 
of the LISA analysis. The magnitude of the Gross Regional Product coefficients is not 
deeply affected by the introduction of the two spatial specifications in the whole period, 
whereas it decreases the diverging path in the recovery phase.  
 
Two policy indications can be drawn by this study. First, to break the diverging 
path of Russian regions, the policy advise is to differentiate on economic activities. A 
major diverging factor is the fundamental role of the oil and gas industry in the Russian 
economy. Because oil and gas extractions are exogenous geographical factors, growth 
will remain concentrated in oil-productive regions and surrounding areas if other sectors 
of the economy are not sustained. As shown by Kurgan region, still in 2008 being 
located within the rich oil-productive Urals District does not enhance economic growth. 
The second policy direction is related to political instability. The Caucasus area remains 
a critical point for social and economic reasons, as the cluster of low income regions 
shows. Though Russian intra-national ethnical conflict is a topic that goes much beyond 
this study and the pattern of per-capita income, it is advisable to put more effort on the 
economic development of the area, for example attracting investment and sustaining 
numerous industries as the case of Krasnodar, Volgograd and Rostov regions – which 
succeeded in leaving the poor cluster. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3 Summary statistics   
 
 Mean and standard deviation 
 Total 
period 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2008 
Per-capita gross regional product (natural log) 10.9 
(.54) 
8.87  
(.48) 
10.98 
(.52) 
Average annual growth rate of pc GRP (natural 
log) 
.034 
(.22) 
-.02 
(.09) 
.06 
(.05) 
Average annual population change -5.09 
(4.7) 
-4.8 
(4.4) 
-5.2 
(4.9) 
Researchers with scientific degree on 10,000 
employed population 
7.8 
(12.6) 
8.1 
(14.4) 
7.5 
(11.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Fixed-effect panel model   
 
Fixed-effects panel data model 
 Total 1995-1999 2000-2008 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Per capita GRP .76 
(.03) 
*** 
.79  
(.03) 
*** 
.74  
(.10) 
*** 
.71  
(.09) 
*** 
.14  
(.04) 
*** 
.14  
(.03) 
*** 
Population change - -.004  
(.007)  
- -.02  
(.01) 
** 
- -.007  
(.004) 
* 
Technological progress - .007  
(.001) 
*** 
- .008  
(.006) 
* 
- .0009 
(.0009) 
 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1001 1001 308 308 693 693 
Groups 77 77 77 77 77 77 
R2  .78 .79 .49 .51 .17 .18 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is average annual growth rate of real per-capita gross regional product 
Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis 
* 10 percent significance; ** 5 percent significance; *** 1 percent significance 
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Table 5.1 Fixed-effect spatial autoregressive model (SAR) 
 
Fixed-effects SAR model 
 Total 1995-1999 2000-2008 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Per capita GRP .76*** 
(.03) 
.79 
*** 
(.03) 
.66*** 
(.07) 
.64*** 
(.07) 
.14*** 
(.02) 
.14*** 
(.02) 
Population change -  -.004 
(.004) 
- -.02 
*** 
(.007) 
- -.007 
*** 
(.002) 
Technological 
progress 
- .007** 
(.001) 
- .01*** 
(.003) 
- .001 
(.001) 
ρ  .06* 
(.03) 
.06 * 
(.03) 
.24*** 
(.06) 
.24*** 
(.06) 
.09** 
(.05) 
.09 ** 
(.05) 
 
Spatial Fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1001 1001 308 308 693 693 
Groups 77 77 77 77 77 77 
 
Notes: Coefficient ρ is the spatial autocorrelation coefficient. 
* 10 percent significance; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent 
 
 
Table 5.2 Fixed-effect spatial error model (SEM) 
 
 
Fixed-effects SEM model 
 Total 1995-1999 2000-2008 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Per capita GRP .76 *** 
(.03) 
.79 *** 
(.03) 
.68*** 
   (.08) 
.65*** 
(.07) 
.14*** 
(.05) 
.15*** 
(.02) 
Population 
change 
-  -.005  
(.004) 
- -.02 
*** 
(.008) 
- -.008 
*** 
(.002) 
Technological 
progress 
- .007 
(.002) 
*** 
- .009 
*** 
(.003) 
- .001 
(.001) 
λ  .09 ** 
(.04) 
.10 *** 
(.04) 
.23*** 
(.07) 
.24*** 
(.07) 
.10 ** 
(.05) 
.11 ** 
(.05) 
 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1078 1078 385 385 693 693 
Groups 77 77 77 77 77 77 
 
Notes: Coefficient λ is the spatial error term.     
* 10 percent significance; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent 
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Chapter 3 
 
Russian Demographic Patterns  
Before and After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union 
 
1.  Introduction 
This chapter describes the national demographic patterns in Russia since 1960. Data 
have been collected mainly from the Statistical Yearbooks of the USSR and Statistical 
Yearbooks of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic for the years before the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union15. Other sources are the Demographic Yearbooks of 
Russia and the Generations and Gender Program Contextual Database16. The second 
paragraph is devoted to general vital statistics such as population, life expectancy at 
birth, mortality rates for men and women and infant mortality rate. Migration patterns 
are also analyzed as after the dissolution of the Soviet Union great migration flows have 
influenced the composition of the Russian population. The third paragraph describes 
fertility patterns, analyzing specific demographic indicators such as total and age-
specific fertility rates, maternal age at birth and abortions. The Russian federal 
government has established since early Nineties a system of maternity grants and 
benefits to substitute for the Soviet system and try to increase fertility rates: paragraph 
four provides a complete insight of the policy measures adopted in recent years. 
In paragraph five, international comparisons are shown, to highlight how the Russian 
patterns reconcile with other industrialized countries over time. The main vital and 
demographic patterns of Russia are compared with the ones of the United States, Poland 
and Belarus. The last section provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. General vital statistics 
Serious concerns about the dynamics of Russian population started in mid-Eighties17. At 
the time, after decades of continuing increasing or stable population, the country started 
to show a decreasing pattern with no signs of reversal and indeed in one decade, 1998-
                                                 
15
 НАРОДНОЕ ХОЗЯЙСТВО СССР and НАРОДНОЕ ХОЗЯЙСТВО РСФСР. The books are 
available at the Russian State Library in Moscow. I am grateful to the researchers of the Center for Labour 
Market Studies (HSE Moscow), professor Andrei Markevich (NSE Moscow) and the staff of the Library for 
their suggestions and help in data collection. 
16
 Available online at www.ggp-i.org 
17
 See Pugh and Lewin (1991) 
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2008, total population dropped from 147 millions to 141 millions people. Two causes 
are identified by the literature and policymakers for the decline which will be analyzed 
in this study: the decrease in fertility rates and the increase in male mortality rate 
registered in the early years of transition. 
 
2.1  Population 
 
Figure 1 shows the dynamic of Russian population since 1960.  In 1960, the population 
was 120 millions people and it remained on an increasing path until mid-Nineties. In the 
year 1996/1997, the declining path that we still see today started and in 2008, with 140 
millions, the numbers were back to the levels in 1980.  
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  Figure 1 – Population of Russia 
 
The age composition of the Russian society in figure 2 is changing too. The shares of 
younger cohorts in particular display the most evident decline: in 1960, 30 percent of 
the population was below 15 years of age, while 50 years later the share is around 10 
percent. 
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  Figure 2 – Age composition of the population 
 
This is the dynamic which motivates the concerns of the Russian government 
towards the size of the labor force from the next decade. This same decline motivates 
also the concerns towards fertility rates18. Infant mortality rate19 is now much lower  
than in Soviet times (it was 17.4 in 1990,  7.5 in 2010) and lower than Eastern European 
countries as Latvia (8.4 in 2009) and Ukraine (9.1 in 2010) and also abortions are much 
less than in Soviet times, though still higher than in Western Europe: the decline in the 
youngest cohorts is therefore not due to increased infant mortality (health conditions 
and services improved in the Nineties) or an increase in abortions, which are now 
evolving towards Western trends and the choice of less invasive and dangerous 
techniques. 
 
Table 1 shows the age composition by sex for selected years, 1959 – 1989 – 2002 and 
2009. 
 
 
1959 1989 2002 2009 
 M F M F M F M F 
Pop 
 
52,424,832 
44% 
65,109,474 
56% 
68,713,869 
46% 
78,308,000 
54% 
67,605,133 
46% 
77,561,598 
54% 
65,641,634 
46% 
76,262,345 
54% 
0-14 0.33 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.13 
15-64 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.65 0.73 0.68 0.74 0.69 
65 - 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.1 0.18 
                                                 
18
 In the annual State of the Nation speech, on November 30, 2010, the main focus has been devoted to children 
and the country’s future. President Medvedev called for increasing social support to help solve the demographic 
crisis, proposing higher support to families with more than two children and also calling for a reform of the 
orphanage system 
19
 Defined as the number of deaths of children under 1 year of age per 1,000 live births 
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Table 1 – Age composition of the population by sex 
Author’s elaborations on Rosstat data, Demographic Yearbook of Russia  
 
Through time, the shares of males and female on total population remained stable 
with the majority of the population being composed of women. Looking at the age 
composition of each sex group, in 1959, 33 percent of the male population was 
composed of children and 26 percent for the female population. After four decades, both 
shares halved, 16 and 13 percent respectively. The relative higher share in the male 
group is standard and due to the human sex ratio at birth20 and not to any practice of 
sex-selection as in China. The most evident change across time is the phenomenon of 
aging population, for both men and women: in 1959, 63 percent of the male population 
was between 15 and 64 years old, while in 2009 in the same range one finds more than 
70 percent of the male population. The same trend is found for people over 65 years, 
who are now 14 percent of the total population and were 5 percent in 1959. 
 
 
2.2 Life expectancy at birth 
 
For Russian women the patter is homogeneous, without jumps over time: life 
expectancy at birth was 72 years in the Sixties and 75 years in 2010, as shown in figure 
3. It is also in line with other Eastern European countries as Estonia and Latvia (77 
years) and higher than Bulgaria or Ukraine. 
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       Figure 3 – Life expectancy at birth 
                                                 
20
 Also called secondary sex ratio, it is assumed to be 105 newborn boys per 100 newborn girls 
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Male life expectancy has generally been lower for people living in Eastern Europe 
compared with Western European levels, mainly because of differences in health 
services and diet, in particular alcohol consumption. Male life expectancy was 62 years 
in 1960 for Russian men. It increased in the years 1986-1992 and then in late Nineties 
dropped to 59 years, the lowest value of the past three decades. In 2010 it is recovering 
and now it is 63 years.  
 
 
2.3 Mortality rate 
 
The pattern of male mortality rate is crucial to understand the reasons for the decline in 
male life expectancy. Two recent papers offer different explanations: Treisman (2010) 
adopts a political economy approach and, using regional data, finds that the reason for 
the increased mortality among middle-aged men is the decrease in the relative price of 
vodka compared with beer: between 1990 and 1994, the price of vodka dropped by 77 
percent in real terms. Alcohol consumption and related health problems are indeed the 
first cause of death among middle-aged men. Denisova (2010) uses household and 
individual level data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey and finds that the 
dangerous effect of smoking has the same magnitude of alcohol addiction, and therefore 
policy measures should focus on this point, and also relative social status is significant. 
The drop is more severe for men and this evidence strengthens the validity of the 
reasons identified so far. It is not the signal of a general worsening in life conditions or 
health services, given that female life expectancy did not show the same trend nor is 
female mortality rate so high, and also infant mortality has improved much over time. 
New policies against alcohol consumption have been adopted at the national 
level: in 2010, the beer industry faced increased taxation by 200 percent and the 
minimum price of vodka has been doubled; since 2011, also beverages containing less 
than 10 percent alcohol have been classified as alcoholic and not just beverages, so that 
it is now possible to control the selling of beer and spirits.  
The mean death rate for Russians, shown in figure 4, in 2009/2010 is 14 deaths 
per 1,000 people, the specific value for men is 16 per 1,000 people. The value is almost 
double than the world average, which is 8.6 per 1,000 people, and also higher than in 
the European Europe, where it is 9.6. 
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                  Figure 4 – Mortality rate by sex 
   Source: author’s elaborations on Rosstat data, Demographic Yearbook of Russia  
 
 
Finally, figure 5 shows the pattern of infant mortality rate. It was 36 deaths per 
1,000 live births for children under 1 year of age in 1960 and decreased to 7.5 per 1,000 
in 2010 for improvements in health care and diet.  
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  Figure 5 – Infant mortality rate 
 
This indicator, which is considered one of the most important to evaluate the 
wellbeing of a country and its social services, is however still higher than European 
Union (5.7 per 1,000 live births) or United States standards (6.3 per 1,000 live births). 
In Eastern European countries as the Czech Republic, Belarus and Slovakia it is below 
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6.5 per 1,000 live births. One key factor, which is specific to all health services in 
Russia, is regional variation: in Moscow it is around 6 per 1,000 live births, but around 
30 per 1,000 live births in some regions of the Far Eastern area, which also suffered by 
high out-flows of residents in the Nineties and therefore received less resources and 
investments through time.  
 
 
2.4 Migration patterns 
 
With the in-flows in the early Nineties, almost five millions people moved from foreign 
countries to Russia from 1990 to 2009, mainly from CIS countries. As shown in figure 
2, this positive flow is reflected in the age structure of the population which shows a 
negative natural increase, but the share of working age population is increasing from 
1996. Figure 6 shows that the first years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the elimination of the restrictions of movements had the highest migration rate and in 
1995 immigration from foreign countries signed a +850,000 people. 
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    Figure 6 – Net migration rate 
 
With the phenomenon of migration, the composition of Russian population is also 
changing. Soviet authorities tried to avoid the depopulation of remote areas as the Far 
East or Siberia with limitations on the freedom to set the residence in a certain city or 
area21 in fact the flows have mainly been from the North and Far East to Southern and 
Central Districts. The Far East lost almost 1 million people in the time spam 1990-1999, 
                                                 
21
 The propiska was formally abolished in 1992 and substituted with a registration 
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whereas Siberia lost about 200,000 inhabitants. In general, the reasons why more and 
more people wanted to move to areas were finding job opportunities and better life 
conditions with regards to climate and facilities like transports, schools and hospitals. In 
the area of the Caucasus, the trend has been an out-flow of Russians and a 
concentration, in each area/republic, of the specific vocal ethnic group. According to the 
census of 200222, six ethnical groups other than Russians have a population which 
counts more than one million people, and their lifestyles vary for religion, fertility rates, 
female participation rate and other factors. These groups are Tatars (3.8 percent), 
Ukrainians (2 percent), Bashkirs (1.15 percent), Chuvash (1.13 percent), Chechens 
(0.94 percent) and Armenians (0.78 percent). Inter-regional migration flows have 
modified not only density, but also population composition. In particular, the higher 
fertility rates among some groups have changed the size of the population of the regions 
they moved in and also the relative shares with respect to the past, in particular in North 
Caucasus. The relative share of Russians versus non-Russians also changed, as Russians 
were 81.5 percent of the total population in 1989 and 79.8 in 2002.  
 
 
3.  Fertility patterns 
 
3.1 Total and age-specific fertility rates 
 
Total fertility rate is defined by the CIA Worldbook as “the average number of children 
that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if she were to experience the exact 
current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime, and she were to survive from 
birth through the end of her reproductive life”. Child-bearing years are considered 15-49 
but 15-40 is widely used, since the chances to have children for women older than 40 
years are limited. Figure 7 shows total fertility rate for Russian women since 1960 while 
figure 8 provides more detailed data with age-specific birth rates, which are defined as 
“live births per 1,000 women in each age-group”. 
Looking at total fertility rate, the most evident drop is in the years around 1987-
1995, few years before the dissolution of the Soviet Union up to the very first years of 
transition, when the economy had the sharpest decline. The small drop in the previous 
decades is in fact in line with other industrialized countries. Total fertility rate, which 
was still above 2 children per woman in the year 1989, reached the lowest value ever in 
                                                 
22
 Available online at www.demoscope.ru, Bullettin N. 81, September 2004 (in Russian).  
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2000 with 1.2 children per woman, and it appeared to be in a slowly increasing path 
only in 2008-2010.  
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       Figure 7 – Total fertility rate 
 
Figure 8 describes more in detail how the decision of Russian women has changed 
through time according to their age. Before 1980, data are available only for selected 
years. Two main trends are present: on the one hand increasing trend for births at young 
age between 15 and 29 years which lasted until mid-Nineties; on the other hand, fast 
decreasing trends for births between 20 and 29 years which started in early Nineties.  
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         Figure 8 – Age specific birth rates 
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The increasing patterns before the Nineties were sustained by extensive public 
services provided to families by the Soviet Union system, which could alleviate the 
economic burden of childbearing, if not the time constraints due to the balance between 
works at home, the amount of time spent queuing up to buy foodstuff and work 
outside23, so mothers with more than two children would have priority for queues in 
shops and families with children used to have priority for bigger houses assignments, 
while day-care for kids, all levels of education and health care were universally 
provided. With the economic crisis, births rates declined for all age-groups, in a pro-
cyclical trend: as economic conditions worsen, fertility rates decline. The same pro-
cyclical trend, which would predict higher fertility rates with the improvement of life 
conditions, is not found in all age-groups after the year 2000 when economic growth 
started but only for the group 25-34. To see if a postponement effect of childbearing is 
emerging, the analysis would require data on completed fertility for different cohorts, 
which however are not available at this level of aggregation. For this reason, here I will 
discuss only the pattern of maternal age at childbirth at the national level and discuss 
more in detail the issue of postponement with individual level data.  
  
 
3.2 Maternal age at childbirth 
 
The demographic indicator which must be combined with age-specific birth rates to find 
the determinants of the decline in fertility is the age of the mother at childbirth, in 
particular for the first child. As shown in figure 9, this value did not change 
significantly through decades: it was around 24 years old for first-time mothers in the 
Sixties (who were the cohort of late Thirties-Forties), it declined to a value of 23 years 
from the Seventies to the year 2000 and since then it is now 24-25 years. It is worth 
noting that 24 years is the age that defines the threshold between the age groups 20-24 
and 25-29. This purely computational threshold could explain why  - despite the 
evidence of no postponement effect among Russian women - in figure 8 birth rates for 
these two groups have opposite trends after the year 2000  – with births decreasing for 
women aged 20-24 and increasing for women aged 25-29 - and eventually converge to 
the same level in 2008. 
 
                                                 
23
 See Stone (1969) for some insights on daily queues in Soviet Russia. 
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      Figure 9 – Mean maternal age at childbirth 
 
The habits of Russian families changed from Soviet times up to the recent years, 
but Russian women do not seem to be affected by the phenomenon of postponement of 
first motherhood as is happening in other European countries. In fact, the drop in age-
specific birth rates in figure 8 is common to all age-groups (20-24, 25-29 and 30-34) 
and not only to the first one. The cohort born in the Seventies has been the most 
affected by all the phenomena related to transition: born and raised in a system where 
the State virtually cared for every aspect of life like health care, education, employment, 
housing, this cohort was the one who suffered more from the failure of the system. For 
fertility decision, they found out that housing was becoming less affordable, daily-care 
for children would not have been provided anymore by all firms and, as a first thing, the 
labor market they expected did not exist anymore. For the age-group 25-29, combining 
figure 8 and 9 for all-orders birth the drop can be considered as a drop in second births: 
25-29 years old women are generally not first-time mothers and mean maternal age at 
all order-birth is slightly increased, but is still between 25 and 27 years since 1990. This 
group is the focus of the more recent policies analyzed in section three and adopted to 
boost fertility, which tend to balance the decision to have children with the high 
participation rate of women in the Russian labor market 
 
3.3 Mean age at first marriage 
 
Although available starting only from 1996 in figure 10, data for the mean age at first 
marriage for both men and women do not provide evidence of a consistent increasing 
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path. It is indeed in line with the age of the mother at first childbirth and age-specific 
fertility rates analyzed so far. For men, from 1980 to 1996 the age of the grooms 
increased on average only by .5 year, while for brides it actually decreased by few 
months with respect to the Eighties. For the same time period, 2/3 of the marriages per 
1,000 females involve women younger than 25 years of age24 
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   Figure 10 – Mean age at first marriage  
   Data source: Generations and Gender Program, Contextual Database  
 
 
 
3.4 Abortion rate 
 
The practice of abortion in Russia is widespread and much diffused than in Western 
European countries (figure 11). Russia has been the first country in the world to legalize 
abortion in 1920. The practice then became illegal in the Stalin years up to 1955. It is 
now legal on request of the woman up to 12 weeks of pregnancy, and at any stage of the 
pregnancy for medical reasons25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Generations and Gender Program, Contextual Database. Available online at www.ggp-i.org 
25
 Federal Law 22 July 1993, N. 5487-1 and amendments 
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     Figure 11 – Abortion rate                      
      Data source: Generations and Gender Program, Contextual Database 
 
In 2007, for the first time the number of births has been higher than the number of 
abortions: 1.6 million births and 1.3 million of abortions were registered in Russia. The 
numbers have decreased much after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when oral 
contraceptives became available, but Russia still had 1.4 millions abortions in 2009, 
whereas in other Eastern countries as the Czech Republic, they do not reach 25,000.  In 
2011, President Medvedev signed amendments to the law so that women are better 
informed about the risks of abortion on health and future chances of having children. 
 
4. Pro-fertility policy measures 
 
In Soviet times it was around the Seventies when discussions about fertility patterns 
started to recognize the potential problems of decreasing fertility. Weber and Goodman 
(1981) provide an insight on the debate during the 26th Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, when the idea of differentiated regional interventions was 
adopted, and a summary of the legislation in the Eighties. Mothers had 56 days of pre-
natal leave and 56 days of post-natal leave, and unpaid leave was allowed for one year 
then extended to 18 months of the child. Partially paid leave differentiated by region 
started in 1981. Family income supplements for families under the subsistence income 
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level were introduced in 1974 and since 1981 child allowances increasing in the number 
of children was introduced26.  
Today, policy makers are concerned for the future labor force and the chances of 
the country to maintain adequate levels of production and economic growth27 and to 
sustain social security because the dependency ratio28 is likely to increase in the next 
decade. The laws and measures adopted since the early Nineties are focused on working 
mothers and, in recent years, on the decision to have a second child. Labor participation 
rate of Russian women is around 60 percent29 and the number of children per woman is 
1 since more than a decade. In 1991, universal child allowances were introduced but 
analysis as Misikhina (1999), Denisova, Kolenikov and Yudaeva (2000) find that only 
1/3 of the eligible families received the benefits, with wealthier families receiving more 
than poorer ones. In 1998 it was prescribed that only families below the subsistence 
income level of the region were eligible for child allowances, but then in 1999 the 
Duma suspended the federal family planning programs, in reaction to the financial crisis 
of 1998 and the small effects of the policies adopted in the past decade. 
 According to the Labour Code of the Russian Federation30, benefits for working 
mothers are paid by the regional Social Insurance Fund until the child reaches the age of 
18 months. According to article 255, working mothers are granted seventy calendar 
days of pre-natal leave and seventy calendar days of post-natal leave (longer periods are 
prescribed for multiple births) at full salary, with a minimum set for the year 201131 at 
2,200 rubles (doubled for second and subsequent children) and a maximum of 35,000 
rubles. For the first 18 months of life of the child, mothers must receive 40 percent of 
the salary of the previous year, with a minimum of 2,200 rubles and a maximum of 
14,000 rubles. The leave benefits from 18 months to 3 years old of age of the child are 
set at 50 rubles32 and paid by the employer. Moreover, a lump-sum allowance for 
childbirth of 10,000 rubles can be requested by the working parent of the family at the 
Social Insurance Fund according to different income criteria depending on the region of 
residence, according to a regional indexation system. A family-income criterion is 
applied also for monthly child allowance if the mother is unemployed and does not 
                                                 
26
 See Weber and Goodman (1981) for a detailed summary and remainder to Soviet legislation and official speeches 
27
 See note 4 
28
 This indicator is the ratio between population outside the labor force (under 14 and over 65) and the labor force 
(population aged 15-65) 
29
 This same value is the one defined as a goal of the Lisbon agenda for the European Union, still not reached 
30
 Available online in English at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WEBTEXT/60535/65252/E01RUS01.htm#chap41 
31
 Federal Law of 2010 N. 357-FZ 
32
 Presidential Decree of 1994 N. 1206 
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receive unemployment benefits. Rules are prescribed also for single mothers. A lump-
sum benefit of 440 rubles is provided to women who registered in a medical institution 
before the 12th week of pregnancy. Additional lump-sum allowances are provided to 
young couples of less than 30 years of age and for third child and subsequent33.  
Finally, at the end of 2006 the government started the Maternity Capital Program for 
Russian Citizens34 (also called Maternal Capital Program) which is a policy designed to 
give incentives towards the decision to have a second (or subsequent) child. Women 
giving birth to or adopting a second child (or third/forth etc, if the grant was not 
requested for the previous one, i.e. the second/third child) are eligible to apply for a 
grant set at 344,000 rubles (8,600 euro) in 2010, not to be spent before the child turns 
three years old. The grant was set at 250,000 rubles when the program started and it is 
indexed on inflation. It can be used for loans, housing, education, or added to the 
mother’s pension fund. Official data in figure 7 shows a small increase in fertility rates 
in very recent years, but it is too early to make any policy evaluation about the 
Maternity Capital Program given its very recent start. Moreover, when survey data will 
be available, it will be feasible to evaluate if this program is influencing the fertility 
decision of Russian women35. 
 
5.  International comparisons   
 
For international comparisons I chose to analyze the patterns of two Eastern countries 
(Belarus and Poland) and the United States36. Historically the USA have been the 
opponent of the Soviet Union and also they can offer a relevant geographical extension 
with different climatic areas and land features within the country which made them an 
interesting case to compare with Russia. Poland and Belarus are instead much smaller 
than Russia, but still interesting to compare for their different approach to transition 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Poland became the benchmark model for 
institutional reforms in late Eighties for its system of privatizations and liberalizations 
and, after decades as a Soviet satellite state, finally became a member of the European 
Union in 2004. Belarus, on the other hand, keeps stronger connections with the old 
Soviet system and its government since early Nineties openly opposed to the path of 
                                                 
33
 Federal Law of 1995 N.81-FZ and Federal Law of 2008 N.308-FZ and amendments. See www.kukuzya.ru (in 
Russian) for a complete coverage of the benefit system. 
34
 Federal Law N. 256-FZ 
35
 Questions about the Maternal Capital Program are asked in recent waves of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey, but by now data are not available for public use. 
36
 Data from the Contextual Database of the Generations and Gender Program 
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privatizations and liberalizations suggested by international organizations. Although 
subject to severe critics from the United States and the European Union for the 
limitations to democratic rights against its population, but with positive relations with 
the Russian government, Belarus is a country worth studying indeed for its complicated 
approach to transition.  
The population of the United States doubles the one of Russia, which has vast areas 
of its land scarcely inhabited for severe climate conditions and permafrost. As shown in 
figure 12, the population of the USA is increasing, whereas Russia shows a decline 
since the late Nineties. Both Poland and Belarus have stable population in the Nineties 
and therefore did not face a declining path like Russia, which, as a consequence,  
confirms to be unique also among Eastern countries. 
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         Figure 12 – Population of Russia, Belarus, Poland and the United States 
 
 
 
It is also worth stressing that in the same years, Russia had positive net 
immigration, while for Poland it was negative: OECD data report negative net migration 
rate since 2001 with an average value of -0.5 per 1,000 population, while Russia has an 
average +1.5. 
 
Death rate per 1,000 people in figure 13 provides clear evidence of the unique 
pattern of mortality among Russians. First, two different magnitudes are evident, for 
Eastern and Western countries: Poland and the USA are on a declining pattern, with 
values between 8 and 10 deaths per 1,000 people. World average is 8.6. Both Russia 
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and Belarus are on a higher scale, between 14 and 16 deaths per 1,000 people. Belarus 
is stable at a value of 14 since 2000, while Russia had two peaks, in 2004 and in 2006.  
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        Figure 13 – Death rate in Russia, Belarus, Poland and the United States 
 
The same two scales are found in life expectancy at birth, in figure 14. In the USA 
it is increasing since the Sixties and now around a value of 77 years. Poland had a small 
negative flexion between late Eighties and mid-Nineties, but indeed male life 
expectancy declined by just one year and then followed an increasing path. The value is 
now 70 years. 
 
 
                    
Male life expectancy at birth
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
19
58
19
62
19
66
19
70
19
74
19
78
19
82
19
86
19
90
19
94
19
98
20
02
20
06
Russia
Belarus
Poland
USA
 
    Figure 14 – Male life expectancy at birth in Russia, Belarus, Poland and the United States 
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The pattern for Belarus is decreasing over time: life expectancy decreased from 70 
years in the Sixties to 65 years today, with a positive flexion in the years 1988-1989. 
Today male life expectancy for Russian men is the lowest one among the countries of 
analysis, with 62 years. It is also the only one which had a decline between 1994 and 
1998 and it reached the lowest value of 57 years in 1996. As said, two causes have been 
identified: a negative reaction to the economic crisis and the high alcohol consumption 
among Russian men which the government is trying to reduce increasing prices and 
controlling sale and production with new regulations.  
 
Looking at fertility-related issues, two indicators are here compared: total fertility 
rate and mean age of mother at first childbirth. As figure 15 shows, first-time mothers in 
Poland and the United States are now between 25 and 26 years old. The United States 
were around a value of 22 years in the Sixties and the indicator followed an increasing 
pattern through time. Values for Poland are not available before the Seventies, when the 
age remained stable around 23 years and then increased since the Nineties to 26 years. 
As already mentioned, Russia did not face high changes through time in fact the value 
was around 24 in the Sixties, it declined for some decades to 22 years and is now at the 
same value of the Sixties, at 24-25 years. Long time series are not available for Belarus 
which however appears to be on the same scale as Russia, confirming the hint of 
Western versus Eastern countries. 
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        Figure 15 – Mean age at first childbirth in Russia, Belarus, Poland and the United States 
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Finally, the patterns of total fertility rate are shown in figure 16.  
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       Figure 16 – Total fertility rate in Russia, Belarus, Poland and the United States 
 
For this indicator, which is however on average and not age-specific, the outlier are 
the United States. In Russia, Belarus and Poland the average number of children per 
woman is now around 1.4, while it is still 2 in the US. The drop in Russian fertility 
between late Eighties and mid-Nineties appears sharper than the cases of Belarus and 
Poland and through time Russia has had the lowest fertility rates among all the countries 
of analysis. What emerges from the data is therefore not a unique case of low fertility 
for Russia, but a unique combination of low fertility, high mortality and low life 
expectancy which motivates the concerns of the Russian government and the policies 
adopted to sustain the population. As reported before, measures to reduce alcohol 
consumption are also in place, but due to the need to keep the dependency ratio 
balanced and guarantee the sustainability of the pension system and the size of the 
population itself, the main focus of the government is on fertility patterns.  
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I presented a preliminary descriptive analysis of Russian demographic 
patterns in the past decades. The negative impact of the severe economic crisis which 
followed the transition from the Soviet system to a market economy and the changes in 
the Russian society appear in numerous indicators such as male mortality, birth rates 
and life expectancy. On the other hand, long-term improving trends are found for infant 
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mortality and more conscious and safe contraception and abortion decisions. As for 
Western European trends, Russia shows the positive absence of a postponement effect 
of childbearing, in fact the mean age of mothers at childbirth is still 24-25 years like in 
the past decades, and the negative presence of high alcohol consumption which is 
detrimental to male health and life expectancy.  In the next chapters I will extend the 
analysis of the decline in birth rates studying the relation between fertility – both 
realized and intentional - income and economic uncertainty using data at the national, 
regional and individual level. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Only-Child Decades 
Fertility Behavior in Russia  
1965-2009 
 
1. Introduction 
Total fertility rate had a sharp decline in Russia in the last two decades. In the period 
from the Sixties to 2008, the average number of children per woman decreased from 2.5 
to 1.4, a level which calls for Russia as a lowest-low fertility country. The most evident 
drop has been in the years between 1987 and 1995, few years before the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. The lowest value ever was reached in 2000 with 1.2 children per 
woman and it appeared to be on a slowly increasing path since 2007.  
Declining fertility is not a special feature of Russian demographic patterns, but a 
world-wide phenomenon therefore what makes the Russian case worth investigating is 
the effect of the economic crisis and the transition on fertility patterns. Is fertility pro-
cyclical or countercyclical over time? What is the effect of regional-specific 
characteristics? What drives the intention to have children of Russian women? This 
paper applies a data-specific, top-down strategy to answer these questions.  
Empirical studies at the aggregate and individual level give mixed results. Kohler 
and Kohler (2002) study the relation between crisis and fertility in the early Nineties 
and find a positive association between early years of crisis and fertility. Grogan (2003) 
studies the fertility crisis after the transition across Eastern Europe and Russia and finds 
a negative relation between income and fertility, in line with the economic crisis 
argument. Grogan (2006) uses waves of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey - 
which is a nationally representative survey - between 1994 and 2001 and finds that 
income decline in the first years of transition had a negative effect on fertility and 
childcare structures do not play a relevant role in fertility decisions. Perelli-Harris and 
Gerber (2009) uses the Survey of Stratification and Migration Dynamics in Russia to 
analyze the effect of maternity leave on employment and on the decision to have a 
second child and they find a positive effect of maternity polices on both issues. Finally, 
Brainerd (2007), analyzing the decline in fertility through both the Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey and aggregate data for the decade of recovery 1990-2001, finds a 
positive relationship between household income and fertility, and a negative 
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relationship between unemployment and fertility. Childcare structures are significant at 
10 percent level, a small magnitude as found by Grogan (2006). 
 
This paper analyzes long-term and short-term trends in fertility patterns using a top-
down approach. Long-term national data from 1965 are analyzed and discussed 
graphically, whereas regional level data, which are available for the period 1995-2008 
for total fertility rate and for age groups, are employed in fixed-effects panel data 
models to determine what factors affect fertility patterns. Then, individual data from 
three waves of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) are employed in a 
logit model to determine what factors affect the desire to have children and whether 
these factors changed through time. 
The paper is organized as follows: in paragraph 2 I will define the theoretical 
framework of fertility behavior and the expected feature of the Russian case, paragraph 
3 will present data sources and methods and the empirical analysis will be presented and 
discussed in paragraph 4. Each section is devoted to a specific type of data and is self-
contained. Finally, the last paragraph will summarize the results to give a 
comprehensive picture of Russian fertility patterns and will present concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Theoretical framework  
The literature on fertility determinants is extensive and the debate about the pro-cyclical 
or countercyclical direction of fertility is still in place because results mainly depend on 
the sample and the period of analysis. Most long term cross-sectional studies (D’Addio 
and D’Ercole 2005, Engelhardt et al 2004) find a negative relation between income and 
fertility, but this trend seems to be reversing in the recent years. The issue for Russia 
and transition countries if further enriched by the features of transition itself, in 
particular the serious income decline in early Nineties.  
Two primary models have been developed by the literature to link fertility behavior 
and income: Becker’s and Easterlin’s. Both frameworks attempt to explain the empirical 
negative relation between income and fertility. Becker focuses on the opportunity cost 
of children and the trade-off between quantity and quality of children, Easterlin, instead, 
considers cohort size and relative income. In this section I will briefly summarize both 
models and their underlying assumptions, then I will focus specifically on Russia and 
the role of the economic crisis argument.  
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In his seminal work, Becker (1960) models the demand for children in the context 
of a trade off between quality and quantity. Children are considered as consumer 
durables, and so it is likely that a rise in income would increase the amount spent on 
them. As for quality, as income increases, families will purchase more goods of better 
quality. As stressed by Becker (1960, p. 217), “it suggests that a rise on income would 
increase both the quality and the quantity of children desired; the increase in quality 
being large and the increase in quantity small”. While the increase in quality is 
confirmed by real world evidence, raw data mostly show a negative relation between 
income and quantity of children. Also, contraceptive knowledge and its diffusion 
converted the positive desired relation into the negative actual one. Other factors 
involved in the observed negative relation are numerous: decline in child mortality, 
increased costs of raising children – which is strictly related to their quality, movement 
from farm to urban communities, increased education and marriage postponement, 
among others.  
Therefore, it is clear that quantity and quality are strictly related, as an increase in 
income would affect both, that is to say that as income grows or contraceptive 
knowledge diffuses or the cost of raising children increases, family demand switches 
from quantity to higher quality. Further studies (Becker and Lewis 1973, Willis 1973) 
extended this framework of quantity versus quality in a setting where the decision to 
have children is the combination of two effects: a substitution or price effect and an 
income effect which act through labor participation. When income increases, the 
substitution effect  leads to an increase in the opportunity cost of spending time with 
children - with a negative effect on the decision to have children. On the other hand, the 
income effect moves in the opposite direction having a positive effect on children 
demand. The crucial factor in determining fertility behavior is labor participation, in fact 
since labor participation decisions for men are generally not affected by the decision to 
have children, men only have the second channel, that is the positive income effect: an 
increase in the husband wage is supposed to have an increasing effect on the demand for 
children. On the other hand, the final effect for women is the combination of the same 
income effect and the substitution effect because an increase in woman’s wage would 
have a negative effect on the demand for children through the substitution effect.  
Critics, like Okun, to the model of 1960 mainly refer to the definition of children 
quality, which is likely not to be a choice of the family but a straightforward 
consequence of family standard of living, and considerations about the inner difference 
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between children and durable goods when dealing with quantity and quality income 
elasticity. Finally, as men acquire a more relevant role in children care and adequate 
childcare is provided to parents, higher female wages could make their income effect 
prevail.  
Easterlin’s model (1987) is based on the concepts of cohort size and relative 
income, which refers to young adults earnings relative to their aspirations. In the first 
part of the model, he defines the relation between cohort size, unemployment and 
family formation. Low birth cohorts face lower competition and more favorable career 
conditions, which ultimately result in a rise in employment and family formation, 
whereas the opposite will be true for the next generation, which will be formed by a 
large cohort.  In the second part of the model, relative income is introduced as a 
determining factor of family formation, together with aspirations and social 
environment. Easterlin argues that as relative income increases, family formation and 
the number of children will increase. This model encompasses economics, psychology - 
through material aspirations - and sociology – through social characteristics as religion, 
community values etc - and it is considered to be valid for the United States fertility 
patterns between 1940 and 1980 and proved to be confirmed also for Europe. 
Macunovich (2003) extends Easterlin’s model to female participation rate and specific 
features of the US economy as trade deficit.  
Critics to this model mainly refer to its less orthodox approach with respect to 
Becker’s model and its failure in predicting fertility patterns in the US after 1980. The 
major limitation of the model is data availability for wages and how to define 
aspirations and social environment. 
 
The decline of Russian fertility has been studied extensively by Russian 
demographers (see Zakharov 1999, 2008, Zakharov and Ivanova 1996 for a 
comprehensive analysis), but empirical studies are limited, especially at the regional 
level, given the only recent availability of data and the relatively short time period. To 
my knowledge, the only paper using regional data is Brainerd (2007), who focuses on 
the decade 1990-2001.  
Two theoretical issues need to be considered when dealing with transition countries 
and their fertility decline. On the one hand, as analyzed by Zakharov (1999, 2008), the 
general trend of declining fertility is in line with the predictions of the framework 
designed by Becker. At the same time, transition countries began to follow the path of 
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the Second Demographic Transition with a delay with respect to Western European 
countries, mainly because of the pro-natalist policies of the Soviet Union. On the other 
hand, the economic crisis argument must be considered when transition countries are 
analyzed. According to this argument, transition countries experienced sharply 
declining fertility rates as a response to uncertainty, unemployment and wage reductions 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Also, relative deprivation and the feeling to 
be poorer with respect to other people or to previous years will depress family 
formation and fertility.  
 
3.  Data sources and methods 
This study employs a top-down strategy which is data specific. Three levels of data are 
used: national data from 1965 onwards, regional data from 1995 to 2008 and individual-
survey data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey for the years 1994-1995 
(wave 5), 2002-2003 (wave 11) and  2008-2009 (wave 18). Sources for national data are 
the Statistical Yearbooks of USSR, the Statistical Yearbooks of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic and the Demographic Yearbooks of Russia. Regional data 
are from the Demographic Yearbooks of Russia and the volumes Regions of Russia. 
Individual level data are from multiple waves of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (RLMS). 
 
With national data, the theoretical issue of the pro or countercyclical relation 
between income and fertility is graphically analyzed and discussed, as are female 
employment and education. Given data sources for the Soviet period, whose reliability 
is sometimes a critical issue as for labor data, and the structural break of 1991, this 
strategy appears as the most suitable one. With regional data available after 1994 
different panel data models are tested to control for regional characteristics. Individual 
level data from the RLMS are employed in a logistic regression model to detect the 
factors affecting the probability of desiring children wave-by-wave. 
 
4.  Empirical analysis 
Each section is data specific in its empirical strategy and it is self-contained. Results are 
discussed in each section, and compared and summarized in the next paragraph.  
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4.1 National data   
Most industrialized countries in the past decades have followed a common pattern of 
higher income, higher life expectancy, lower death rates and fertility rates in line with 
the Second Demographic Transition. This has not been the case for Russia. Fertility 
indeed has declined, but life expectancy today is at the same level of the past five 
decades for women and much lower for men, while income had a sharp decline from 
1990 to 2000. During the early years of transition, lower fertility in Russia has not been 
associated to higher incomes or increase in life conditions, but it has instead been the 
reaction to economic uncertainty, high unemployment and income inequalities, a 
phenomenon in line with the economic crisis argument.  
A consistent long term relation between income and fertility has not been identified 
so far, due to data availability and the high economic instability. Results depend much 
on the time horizon used in the analysis. Figure 1 shows the dynamic of per capita gross 
domestic product (GRP) and total fertility rate (TFR) since 1965. While total fertility 
rate is specific for Russia, the series of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is taken 
from Maddison37 and represents the whole Soviet Union until 1989 and Russia from 
1989.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Dynamic of total fertility rate (TFR) and per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
Data sources: Statistical Yearbooks of USSR, the Statistical Yearbooks of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic and the Demographic Yearbooks of Russia 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Data and publications available online at www.ggdc.net/maddison/ 
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The GDP graph shows an upward trend until the structural break in 1991, when the 
Soviet Union collapsed. After the financial crisis of 1998, the recovery phase ended and 
GDP shows average annual growth rates of 5-6 percent. The TFR graph instead shows a 
non monotonic path until 1987-1988, but absolute values remained on average around 
the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. The sharp decline appears a few years 
before the structural break of GDP and it clearly shows a severe decline from 2.2 
children per woman in 1987 to 1.4 children per woman in 1992. The trend then 
decreased until the year 2000, and it reached value 1.5 children per woman in 2008, the 
same found in 1990. It is worth stressing that if TFR values are not much different from 
other low-fertility countries like Germany, Italy or Japan, Russian peculiarities are the 
severe decline in late Eighties – in line with the economic crisis argument – and the 
combination of fertility decline and decline in life expectancy, which is not found in 
other industrialized country. Family policies or benefits do not seem to have ever had 
the expected effects on fertility decisions of Russian women and families. The issue is 
crucial for the labor market and sustainable economic growth, given that a consistent, 
long-run trend of declining population, high mortality rates for working-age population 
- men in particular - will likely lead to a decline in the labor force, higher dependency 
ratio and non-sustainability of the pension system. 
Graphical analysis of the data leads to the conclusion that total fertility rate appears 
pro-cyclical, with TFR and GDP following parallel patterns.  
Figure 2 shows the dynamic of female education and female employment for Russia 
from 1965.  
 
Figure 2 Dynamic of female education and female employment 
Data sources: Statistical Yearbooks of USSR, the Statistical Yearbooks of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic and the Demographic Yearbooks of Russia 
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Employment rate should be taken with caution, as the Soviet government claimed 
that unemployment was liquidated in the early Thirties (see Gregory and Collier 1988). 
Female education is measured as thousand of female students enrolled in higher and 
secondary specialized educational institutions. The share of male and female students is 
available until 1987 and rather homogeneous through time, around 50/50. As for higher 
education, the number of female students more than doubled after the recovery phase.  
Female employment is measured in thousand of people and the graph shows that 
the number of women employed increased year-by-year with population until the end of 
the Soviet Union and had a sharp decline up to the financial crisis of 1998, then 
increasing again with economic growth.  
 
A lack of significant correlation exemplified by a 1.7 positive but indeed no 
significant correlation between GDP and TFR opens itself to further data inspection. 
The other correlations are .01 not significant correlation between TFR and female 
employment, as expected in a planned economy with full employment; negative -.65 
correlation significant at 1 percent between female education and TFR, as expected by 
the fact that female education counts students enrolled; .82 correlation significant at 1 
percent between GDP and employment and .44 correlation between GDP and students 
enrolled.  
 
4.2 Regional data    
Total fertility rate had a sharp decline in Russia in the last two decades and factors as 
climate, population density, religion and agrarian or industrial vocation of the region 
play a relevant role in fertility behavior of the resident population. The purpose of this 
section is to provide insights into the determinants of the Russian fertility decline at the 
regional level. The regional dataset employs data from various issues of the volumes 
Regions of Russia and the Demographic Yearbooks of Russia published by Rosstat. It is 
a balanced panel of 74 Russian regions covering the period 1995-2008. The regions 
which are excluded are Kaliningrad (Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania), 
Chechnya, Ingushetia, Chukotka, Tuva and Altai Republic because data are incomplete.  
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4.2.1  Regional trends 
Today Russia has a population of about 142 millions people and 73 percent is living in 
urban areas. The share of rural population has not changed greatly in the past few 
decades and remains around 27 percent. A national level population density of 8.3 
pp/km2 is low compared to the 32 pp/km2 of the United States and 112 pp/km2 of the 
European Union. For both indicators, the situation at regional level is not homogeneous 
for a number of reasons. Climate conditions have a major effect on the distribution of 
the population across the country, with the European part being the most populated. 
Asian Russia accounts for 75 percent of Russian territory, but only 22 percent of the 
Russian population. Regional variation in Russian population dynamics received 
attention first in the Seventies38 when the decision to adopt ad hoc policy measures was 
taken and maintained until late Nineties. In 1998, pro-natalist policies taken at a 
regional level were canceled owing to financial constraints and their inability to reach 
the expected goals. As shown in figure 3, the difference in total fertility rate between 
rural and urban population is decreasing over time, but it still remains in 2009. In 1962, 
the average number of children per woman in rural Russia was above three, while it was 
two in urban areas. Today, in urban areas total fertility rate is below replacement level 
while in rural areas it is still around 2 children per woman. 
 
        
       Figure 3 – Total Fertility Rate – rural and urban population 
 
 
                                                 
38
 Weber and Goodman (1981) document the demographic debate since 1976 and report the results of the 26th 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in 1981, where it was decided to introduce gradually 
“step by step in different regions of the country” new pro-natalist measures (lump-sum grants and partially paid 
maternity leave)  
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Table 1 shows the age specific birth rates per 1,000 women in the years 1998 and 
2008. Across all Districts the age groups with the highest number of births are those of 
women aged 20-24 and 25-29 years old, in line with the evidence at the national level.  
 
District Central North-W Southern Volga Urals Siberian Far Eastern 
 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 
15-19 30.2 25 27.1 24.7 38.8 34.8 32.3 27 35.4 34.4 39.9 38.6 39.8 35.5 
20-24 90.9 79.4 85.3 75 113.3 102.9 101.7 89 101.5 93.5 103.5 98.4 98.3 94.1 
25-29 62.1 85.6 63.4 85.8 78.7 97.1 71.3 91.4 69.7 95.5 66.7 94.1 66.1 89 
30-34 29.5 56.4 30.2 58.2 41 66.1 35 60 33.3 62.7 32.4 62 34.6 58.8 
35-39 10.1 23.9 10.3 24.6 15.3 30.1 11.6 25.3 11 27.3 11.2 26.1 13.2 26.2 
 
Table 1 - Age Specific Birth Rates – Federal Districts 
Notes: live births per 1,000 women in the specific age group 
 
There are differences between areas specialized in industrial activities and rural 
areas, in fact in the Central and North-Western Districts the number of births in the 
group 20-24 is lower than in the Southern District by a factor of 20 births per 1,000 
women. Results for Asian Russia are in between those for European Russia and the 
Caucasus and rather similar across Districts. Through time all Districts had a reduction 
in the first two age groups and an increase in the groups 25-29 and 30-34. The shift 
between the group 20-24 and the subsequent one is likely due to the decision to delay 
motherhood, a phenomenon which however remains weaker in Russia than in Western 
European countries. The reduction in the segment 20-24 is more pronounced in the 
richest Districts – which also have lower absolute numbers - than in isolated areas like 
Siberia and the Far East, where it is limited to 3-4 births per 1,000 women. Finally, birth 
rates across all age groups are higher in 2008 than in 1998, providing evidence  together 
with the dynamic of total fertility rate in figure 3 than the reduction of the Nineties must 
be analyzed in light of the general economic crisis of the country at the time. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the dispersion of crude birth rates across regions in 1990 and 
in 2009. The mean crude birth rate per 1,000 population was 14 in 1990 and it 
recovered to 13 in 2009 after the critical central phase of transition. The overall 
distribution did not change over time, in fact the regions characterized by low birth rates 
are concentrated mostly in European Russia in both years.  
 
 
 94  
         
 
Figure 4 – Standard deviation of crude birth rates across regions in 1990. 
Author’s elaborations using Rosstat data, software Geoda 
 
          
 
Figure 5 – Standard deviation of crude birth rates across regions in 2009. 
 
 
In the past few decades the population density in the least populated areas of the 
north and Far East dropped significantly (see Kontorovic 2000). The population in the 
Far East dropped by 15 percent after 1991 and today remains around 1 pp/km2 with 
inhabitants migrating to the European and Southern Russia regions where climate 
conditions and job opportunities are better. Using the Federal Districts as reference, all 
have two thirds of the population living in urban areas except the Southern and Siberian 
regions where the share is around fifty percent. 
Figure 6 shows the percentage population change in selected years (1990, 1995, 
2001-2007) for each of the seven Federal Districts. In 1990 all had a positive population 
change, with high internal differences. In the Central District ten of the eighteen regions 
were already on a negative path whilst Moscow bucked the trend with +1.5. 
The District with the highest population growth was the Southern one, with 
Chechnya +6.5 and Dagestan +3. Only five years later in 2007/2008, did all the Districts 
show a negative path moving towards zero or positive values except for the Southern 
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and the Central.  In 2009, eighteen regions out of 89 had a positive population growth. 
In 2008 and 2009 the Southern remained the only District with positive natural increase 
of population but was joined by the Urals and Siberian Districts the following year 
when they showed a small but positive natural increase. Total fertility rates vary from 
1.3 in industrialized urban areas to around 2 children per woman in remote rural areas of 
Siberia and in the Southern regions where there is a  Muslim majority.  
 
 
Figure 6 – Population change in the Federal Districts 
 
 
Aside fertility, mortality rates play a major role in shaping regional population. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the standard deviation of crude death rates on 1,000 population 
across regions in 1990 and in 2009. 
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      Figure 7 – Standard deviation of crude birth rates across regions in 1990. 
 
      
         Figure 8 – Standard deviation of crude birth rates across regions in 2009. 
 
 
 
Crude death rates faced an increase over time from 11 per 1,000 population in 1990 
to almost 16 in 2009. The regions with the highest death rates are in European Russia, 
whereas numbers in Asian Russia remain under the national average.  
 
Inter-regional migration flows have modified Russian population in both density and 
composition for example, compared to previous decades North Caucasus has shown an 
increase in population due to the higher fertility rates of the groups that have migrated 
there. 
Better job opportunities, climate and life conditions in the Southern and Central 
Districts led to a migration from the North and Far East Districts resulting in a loss of 
200,000 and one million inhabitants respectively between the years of 1990 and 1999. 
In the area of the Caucasus, the trend has been an out-flow of Russians and a 
concentration, in each republic, of the specific vocal ethnic group. The percentage of 
Russians in the entire population fell from 81.5 percent in 1989 and 79.8 in 2002. It is 
worth noticing that in 2001 a positive population change occurred only in the regions in 
which non-Russians migrated. 
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Religion is also likely to affect life habits and especially female participation rate in 
the labor market. The first and second most practiced religions in Russia are Christian 
Orthodox and Islam, with minor shares of Protestants, Catholics and Buddhists. Islam 
covers about one seventh of the total population and Muslims are the majority in the 
regions of the Caucasus and in some regions in the Volga area, mainly Bashkortostan 
and Tatarstan Republic, where more than 50 percent of the population is Muslim. 
Regional differences are in some cases influenced also by the main religion of the area, 
for instance Muslims consume less alcohol than other groups and therefore have fewer 
alcohol-related problems.  
 
 
4.2.2  Results 
The period of analysis goes from 1995 to 2008 and is divided in two sub-periods before 
and after the year 2000. First I employ as dependent variable the age-specific birth rate 
of the total age group 15-49 years old women, then each age-specific birth rate group 
15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39. The set of covariates includes the log of real per 
capita gross regional product as a proxy for income, the series of current price index as 
a proxy for uncertainty and volatility, the share of preschool coverage (used as the 
proxy for regional pro-natalist policies given that more specific data are not available at 
this level of aggregation) and the female labor participation rate. The inclusion of 
regional fixed-effects allows us to control for time-invariant characteristics at the 
regional level such as climate, share of rural and urban population, agrarian or industrial 
vocation of the region. The advantage of the inclusion of fixed effect is great for 
Russian regional fertility studies given that most of the regional peculiarities are time-
invariant or rather stable through time so the issue of omitted variables is highly 
reduced and estimation results are more precise. 
Control for male life expectancy is required in order to test if the increase in male 
mortality and the decrease in male life expectancy had an impact on fertility. According 
to Brainerd (2007) this hypothesis is supported if the coefficient for male life 
expectancy is positive and significant and she finds positive but not significant results 
controlling for male life expectancy. I controlled for male life expectancy and the 
coefficient is negative and not significant in all 
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signs that the decrease in male life expectancy is also affecting and damaging fertility 
decisions. Given its non significance, male life expectancy is not included on results. 
 
Regression results are reported in table 2 in the Appendix. The effect of real per 
capita GRP on fertility is negative in all specifications, showing a negative association 
between the proxy for income and fertility in line with Becker’s model predictions. The 
result is robust to different specifications using also the lagged value of GRP to avoid 
issues of simultaneity. In order to control for the non-linear component, it is necessary 
to test also for the square of GRP. The sign of squared income is positive and 
significant, suggesting that the relation between fertility and income is U-shaped. 
Fertility is expected to decline as income increases, but this negative effect decreases as 
income further increases, therefore fertility will eventually rise when income reaches a 
certain threshold. For the whole sample, as income increases by 1 percent, birth rates 
decrease on average by a factor of 70 births per 1,000 women, by contrast when income 
increases above a certain threshold, birth rates increase by a factor of 3 births per 1,000 
women.  
Regional consumer price index and its lagged value - since the decision to have a 
child is taken at least one year before the birth of the child – has been used as a proxy 
for economic uncertainty and instability. The coefficient has the expected negative sign, 
but it is generally not significant. 
The relation between fertility and female labor participation is negative and 
significant, showing that employed women are discouraged to have children. 
Interestingly, this trend is reversed controlling for the interaction between female labor 
participation rate and pre-school coverage: the interaction term is positive and 
significant across all specifications. If external childcare is adequately provided, 
employed women do have positive birth rates. The issue of childcare structure for pre-
school kids is a critical one for Russian women. During the Soviet time, preschool 
belonged to the set of free services provided to the population together with education 
and healthcare. Childcare was indeed provided by the firm where the mother was 
employed and given that employment was practically universal, families were relieved 
from the problems related to childcare availability. With transition and in particular 
until the year 2000, the availability of preschools decreased on the one hand because the 
Soviet system of full employment and childcare provided at the firm level was not 
existing anymore, on the other hand the actual number of kids was decreasing cohort by 
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cohort and so did the availability of childcare services. With lower birth rates, supply 
decreased for lack of financial resources by the State and also in response to the lower 
demand by families. 
 
Table 3 shows regression results for specification (7) for each specific age-group, 
which allow to detect any difference in signs or magnitude of the economic and social 
factors depending on the age of the woman. Results for the first group 15-19 years old 
women should be taken with caution, as the fertility level is low in this group and in 
addition most of the group is still not participant in the labor market. As for the whole 
sample, the most evident difference is the magnitude of income coefficients. For the age 
group 20-24, the decrease in birth rate in response to a 1 percent variation in income is 
95 births per 1,000 women, whereas it was 60 births less in the total age group. The 
reduction is decreasing in age as expected by the fact that as women become older and 
reach completed fertility, the effect of income on their decision decreases.  
 
The analysis is then repeated for the two subsamples 1995-1999 and 2000-2008. 
The threshold is defined by the turning point of the 1998 crisis and subsequent 
economic growth. Estimation gives results which are consistent with those of the whole 
sample. 
 
  4.3  Individual data    
The aim of this paragraph is to analyze what factors affect the intention to have children 
among a nationally representative sample of Russian women in order to extend the 
analysis conducted so far and find any difference in fertility behavior between aggregate 
data and the intentions of Russian citizens.  
The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) is a nationally representative 
household-based survey designed to monitor the effects of Russian reforms on the 
health and welfare of Russian households and individuals in the Russian Federation. 
The project started in 1992 and so far 18 waves have been collected. Phase I is 
composed of the first four waves, while Phase II begins with wave 5. The RLMS has 
been used for fertility-related studies by Kohler and Kohler (2002), Brainerd (2007), 
Grogan (2006, 2010), Perlman and McKee (2009) among others. I use three waves of 
the RLMS: waves V, XI and XVIII to compare the individual behavior between early 
years of transition (years 1994-1995), first years of recovery after transition itself and 
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the financial crisis of late Nineties (year 2002-2003) and today (years 2008-2009), after 
a decade of economic growth. 
 
4.3.1  Method and data 
The method for the empirical analysis is the logistic regression model used to analyze 
settings where the response variable is a binary variable which assumes only value 1 
(success, if the event occurs) or 0 (failure, if the event does not occur). Results are 
shown in table 5 in the Appendix expressed in term of odds ratio of “intending to have a 
child” relative to “do not intending to have a child” for that category of the control 
variable with respect to its baseline equal 1. For the interpretation of results, more 
positive parameters estimates refer to an increased likelihood of desiring a child. For 
instance, if the binary variable “married” reports an odds ratio of 1.80, we can say that 
for married women – with respect to the base category “single women” - the odds of 
intending to have a child increase by a factor of 1.80, holding other controls constant. 
For an easier interpretation of results I will compute and discuss also predicted 
probabilities. 
The dependent variable is the intention of the respondent to have (other) children, 
which is designed as a binary variable equal one if the intention is positive and zero if 
the woman does not intend to have other children. As shown by aggregate data and the 
concerns of the government, most of Russian women have only one child so it is 
straightforward to investigate which socio-economic factors have an impact on their 
decisions. The individual level of analysis allows to control for household income, self-
perception of the respondent, her labor market status, parity (defined as number of 
children and whether the respondent has children or not), her educational level and 
whether she is married or single, all factors which were not available at the regional 
level.  
Summary statistics for the three rounds are available in Table 4. The sample in each 
round is restricted to women aged 18-45 years. All the three waves of the RLMS 
provides real household income in 1992 rubles and I will use also two rank factors to 
control for economic conditions: self-perception about overall life satisfaction and self-
perception about individual economic conditions with respect to the society.  The 
variable for life satisfaction asks “To what extent are you satisfied with your life in 
general at the present time?” and answers are divided in five categories from “fully 
satisfied=1” to “not at all satisfied=5”. The second question asks to indicate on a scale 
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from one (“poor”) to nine the step where the respondent perceives herself to be in terms 
of income with respect to the society. Both indexes are slightly increasing over the 
period. I will refer to the first question as absolute self-perception and to the second one 
as relative self-perception. 
A respondent is considered participant in the labor market if she is currently 
employed or on paid/unpaid leave. The share of participants is rather constant through 
time and higher with respect to Western standards, it is indeed around 70 percent. In 
2004, employment rate of women as a percentage of female population aged 15-64 was 
45 percent in Italy, 59 percent in Germany and 62 percent in Russia (OECD, IMF data).  
Mean income and the drop between round V and round XI in particular reflect the 
dynamics of the Russian recovery after the end of the Soviet Union.  
The most significant fact highlighted by the summary statistics is the drop in the 
share of women who have ever had a child in the last wave of the survey. The share of 
mothers was around 90 percent in the waves held in 1994 and in 2001, whereas it 
decreased to 66 percent in the sample of 2009: these are women born between 1965 and 
1992, the cohorts who have been more involved in the economic and social changes of 
the Nineties, in fact most of the mothers of the first two waves had given birth before 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union or in the first early years. The last round of the 
survey is also the one with the highest real income level, which followed since the year 
2001/2002 an increasing pattern. 
 
 4.3.2 Results 
Results for the logit model are available in table 5. The relationship between 
household income and the intention to have (other) children has positive value in all 
waves, but its effect on predicted probability is low in magnitude, for instance for an 
employed woman aged 30 doubling income in different ranges increases the probability 
to want a child only by two percentage points in 1995 and 1 percentage point in 2008.  
On the other hand, the factors with a significant consistent pattern both in magnitude 
and through time are the self-perception factors showing that more than the income per 
se, what matters for Russian women and families is perceive wellbeing.  
Looking at the perception on individual economic conditions, the effect of self-
perception (both absolute and relative) on the likelihood of desiring to have children is 
positive in both scales. A respondent who is fully satisfied with her economic condition 
has a probability to want children of .32 in 1994, .23 in 2002 and .55 in 2008 and 
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absolute self-perception shows similar magnitudes. Looking at the dynamic across 
waves, the magnitude of the effect decreased in the time period 1995-2002 which was 
indeed characterized by high instability and very low birth rates, whereas it increased 
significantly in the recent years. 
The relationship between education and fertility desire is positive overall and the 
probability of wanting children is slightly increasing with grade although the predicted 
probabilities differ by a few percentage points for women with higher levels of 
education with respect to the baseline. It is worth noting that more than half of the 
sample has a high school diploma or higher grade level, so that achieved education is 
not a factor able to discriminate among individuals in the sample. 
Labor participation rate did not change dramatically for Russian women over time, 
in fact summary statistics show that the share of participant mothers is stable across 
waves. The share of employed mothers who declare to want a child is increasing over 
time from 20 percent of working mothers in 1994 to 31 percent of working mothers in 
2008 and comparable increases are found in the logit model looking at the predicted 
probabilities to want a child for employed mothers: the values are .22, .25 and .48 wave 
by wave. It is interesting to notice that the probability of wanting children for childless 
employed women increased by 14 percentage points between 1994 and 2008. In fact, 
starting from 2002 the group with the highest probability of desiring children is not 
anymore “childless women out of the labor market” – the model of the stay-at-home 
mum - but “employed childless women”.  
 
Individual level data allow to link the desire to have children with the actual 
number of children of the respondent, which is the most relevant connection for policy 
analysis. In 2007 the Russian government introduced a new policy, called the Maternity 
Capital Program, designed to give incentives toward the decision to have a second or 
subsequent child. Women giving birth to or adopting a second child (or third/forth etc, 
if the grant was not requested for the previous one, i.e. the second/third child) are 
eligible to apply for a grant set at 344,000 rubles (8,600 euro) in 2010 not to be spent 
before the child turns three years old. The grant was set at 250,000 rubles when the 
program started and it is indexed on inflation. It can be used for loans, housing, 
education, or added to the mother’s pension fund. The logit model shows that women 
who already have children, without disentangling for parities, are less likely to want 
other children than childless women, but the probability is increasing in self-perception 
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also for this group. Looking at transition into motherhood (which is the intention to 
have a first child), the predicted probabilities to want a first child are .74 in 1994 and 
.67 in 2008: although data on the share of childlessness in Russia are not available, it is 
likely that this phenomenon increased also at the aggregate level clarifying part of the 
decrease in crude birth rates. For mothers of one child, the probability to want a second 
child is .33 in 1994 and .46 in 2008 showing that the two-children family model is not 
shrinking per se but actually limited by the difficulties of balancing work and 
motherhood and financial constraints.     
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper aimed to provide a comprehensive analysis of Russian fertility patterns from 
the Sixties employing data at the national, regional and individual levels, collected with 
different techniques. This study suggests that at the national level fertility appears to be 
pro-cyclical, on a parallel line with the proxy for business cycle and in line with the 
economic crisis argument although the correlation between the two variables is limited, 
while at the regional level the fixed-effects analysis allows to control for regional-
specific effects which could have an impact on fertility. This deeper level of inspection 
reveals that the relation between income and fertility is U-shaped, meaning that fertility 
is decreasing in income until income reaches a certain threshold. Above this threshold 
fertility increases with income by a factor of 3 births per 1,000 women. The U-shaped 
relation is also confirmed for each age group with different magnitudes, in fact the 
highest decrease is found for the age group 20-24 and it is decreasing in age.  
Interestingly the logit model shows that for Russian women self-perception and 
perceived wellbeing at the absolute level and with respect to the society are more 
relevant than the income per se; as a result fertility intention is increasing in self-
perception. At the individual level the vehicle that is correlated with fertility expressed 
as the desire to have children is not income but perceived wellbeing in the form of self-
perception of the respondent about her life in general and self-perception about her 
economic condition.  
The relation between labor participation, motherhood and desired fertility does not 
show dramatic changes over time in trends, employed mothers are still less likely to 
desiring children than unemployed childless women in 1994 and in 2008, whereas a 
novelty of the last two waves is the evidence that within waves the specification with 
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the highest probability of desiring children is not unemployed childless women anymore 
(the stay-at-home mum model), but unemployed childless women.  
As for policy advises, it appears that the recent policy measure Maternity Capital 
Program is designed to reach to correct target represented by mothers of one child. The 
probability of desiring the first child is indeed almost double than the probability of 
desiring a second one and this evidence calls for ad hoc policy measures. Given that the 
first applicants received the grant in 2010, when individual level data will be available it 
will be possible to assess critically whether the Maternity Capital Program had the 
expected effects on fertility behavior.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 2 – Fixed-effects panel model 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: *** indicates 1 percent significance; ** 5 percent  significance; * 10% significance; 
Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis 
Pre-school coverage and female labor participation rate at t-1 give consistent results. Not 
included, results available upon request 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y: age-specific birth rate per 1,000 women aged 15-49 - time interval 1995-2008 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Income -3.55 
(2.6) 
* 
 
 -71.9  
(28.3) 
*** 
-70.8 
(29.5) 
** 
 
-58.5 
(27.3) 
** 
 
-73.2 
(28.7) 
*** 
-59.5 
(20.5) 
*** 
Incomet-1  -3.02  
(2.02) 
* 
 
     
Income2
 
  3.16  
(1.2) 
*** 
3.1  
(1.2) 
*** 
2.5  
(1.2) 
** 
3.2  
(1.2) 
*** 
2.6 
(.9) 
*** 
Uncertainty    -.002 
(.001) 
 
   
Uncertaintyt-1     -.002 
(.002)  
  
Pre-school coverage      .03 
(.06) 
 
-.91    
(.43) 
** 
 
Female labor pt rate      -.11 
(.05) 
* 
 
-.97    
(.45) 
** 
 
Pre-school cov*fem 
pt rate 
      .01    
(.007) 
** 
 
Regional fixed effects √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Time effects √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
R2 .66 .71 .70 .70 .73 .70 .72 
Obs. 962 962 1036 1036 962 1036 1036 
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Table 3 – Fixed-effects panel model – age groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: all columns test specification (7) in table 2 
*** indicates 1 percent  significance; ** 5 percent  significance; * 10% significance; 
Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y: age-specific birth rate per 1,000 women - time interval 1995-2008 
Age groups 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 
Income -8.6 
(11.2) 
 
 
-95.01  
(37.2) 
*** 
 
-66.7  
(40.7) 
* 
 
-36.7 
(26.2) 
 
 
-17.4 
(9.2) 
** 
 
Income2
 
.31  
(.51) 
 
4.01  
(1.86) 
*** 
 
2.8  
(1.8) 
* 
1.6    
(1.1) 
 
 
.76 
(.04) 
** 
 
Uncertaintyt-1 -.002  
(.001) 
* 
 
-.006  
(.003) 
** 
 
- - - 
Pre-school coverage -.68  
(.19) 
*** 
-1.28  
(.78) 
* 
 
-1.5  
(.86) 
* 
-1.03 
(.49) 
*** 
 
-.49 
(.20) 
** 
 
Female labor pt rate -.64  
(.218) 
*** 
 
-1.64  
(.82) 
** 
 
-1.74  
(.92) 
* 
 
-1.29 
(.52) 
*** 
 
-.43 
(.20) 
** 
 
Pre-school cov*fem pt rate .01  
(.003) 
*** 
 
.02  
(.01) 
* 
 
.03 
(.01) 
** 
 
.01 
(.008) 
*** 
 
.007 
(.003) 
** 
 
Regional fixed effects √ √ √ √ √ 
Time effects √ √ √ √ √ 
R2 .76 .66 .77 .90 .91 
Obs. 962 962 1036 1036 1036 
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Table 4 Summary statistics Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
 
Round V XI XVIII 
Observations (women 
aged 18-45) 
2,435 2,815 3,214 
Mean household 
income in real terms, 
y. 1992 rubles 
96,495 89,638 157,916 
Participant in the 
labor market  
1,782 (73%) 1,949 (70%) 2,259 (70%) 
Have children Yes=1,896 
(93%) 
No=139 Yes=2,013 
(92%) 
No=169 Yes=2,139 
(66%) 
No=1,074 
Share of mothers who 
are employed 
77% 74% 78% 
Mean number of 
children 
1.7  n.a. 1.4 
Intention to have 
(other) children 
Yes= 670 No=1,435 Yes=975 No=1,479 Yes=1,430 No=1,528 
Positive intention 
among mothers 
22% 26% 32% 
Positive intention 
among working m. 
20% 25% 31% 
Entitled to child 
benefits  
1,761 (58%) 1,619 (32%) 1,256 (21%) 
Status (married=1) n.a. 1,495 (53%) 1,361 (42%) 
Mean grade level 9.6 9.8 9.9 
Mean household 
income satisfaction 
(max=1 out of 5) 
4 = “less than  
satisfied” 
3 = “both yes and no” 3 = “both yes and no” 
Mean personal 
economic conditions 
satisfaction (max=9  
out of 9) 
3.5 4 4 
 
 
Author’s calculations on Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey data 
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Table 5 – Logistic regression model, odds ratios 
 
 
 
Wave V  XI  XVIII 
Dependent variable Do you want to have (other) children? 
Age 1.32 (.16) ° 1.29 (.18) * 1.67 (.13) ° 
Age squared .99 (.002) ° .99 (.002)  .98 (.001) ° 
Household income, 1992 th. rub 1.00 (.0004) **  1.00 (.0007) 1.00 (.0003) ° 
1 1  1  
.54 (.24)  .78 (.28)  1.15 (.26)  
.52 (.21)  .72 (.26)  1.21 (.29)  
.41 (.17) **  .59 (.22) * 1.18 (.30)  
Overall life satisfaction a 
  
 
.44 (.18) **  .22 (.11) °  1.13 (.35)  
1  1  1  
.90 (.31)  .95 (.48)  1.73 (.72)  
1.03 (.32)  1.38 (.63)  1.50 (.58)  
1.49 (.46)  1.43 (.68)  2.88 (1.12) °  
1.40 (.44)   1.43 (.74)  3.06 (1.40) °  
1.06 (.45) * 1.15 (.74)  4.09 (2.08) °  
2.49 (1.7) * -  4.18 (2.10)  
Individual econ. cond satisf. b 
2.89 (1.8) ° - 1.44 (1.20) 
Labor market pt .89 (.14) ° 1.43 (1.27) ** 1.15 (.17) ° 
Mother .08 (.02) ° .02 (.01) ° .03 (.04) ° 
0 children 1 0 children  1  
1 child .10 (.07) ° 1 child      .33 (.05) ° 
Parity c 
2 children .02 (.01) ° 
n.a. 
 
2 children .05 (.01) ° 
Education 
(binary=1 if high school and higher) 
.92 (.14)  1.37 (.26) * 1.04 (.14)  
Married  n.a. .71 (.12) * 1.22 (.19) ° 
Observations 1,521 1,179 1,692 
Pseudo R2 .28 .31 .32 
 
 
Notes to table 5: 
For space reasons, in table 5 significance level are indicated as follows: 
° indicates 1 percent significance; ** 5 percent significance as usual; * 10 percent significance as 
usual.  
All specifications control for unobserved heterogeneity with individual weights 
a/ Overall life satisfaction 1=fully satisfied, 5=completely unsatisfied 
b/ Economic condition 1=completely unsatisfied, 9=absolutely satisfied  
c/ Parity is a factor variable, the first rank is 0 children. Parities higher than 2 are limited to few 
observations, not reported on results. “Parity” and “Mother” are tested alternatively.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Why Not a Second Child? 
An Economic Analysis of Fertility Behavior of Russian Parents 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The Russian population has dealt with dramatic changes since the late Eighties which 
involved every aspect of life, in fact structure of the economy, employment, housing, 
education and many other features of the country were rebuilt in the new context of a 
modern market economy. Each one of these features has an impact on the decisions of 
family formation, and fertility behavior has indeed been deeply modified since the 
Soviet period, not only in Russia but in all Eastern European countries. Total fertility 
rate has been decreasing in the last decades all over the industrialized countries and not 
only in transition countries, as recognized by an extensive literature on fertility 
determinants (see Narayan and Peng 2006 for Japan, Del Boca 2002 for Italy).  
The case of Russia is peculiar also among transition countries because of the 
dramatic shock that fertility at aggregate level experienced just in few years around 
1989 and the increased male mortality, which are likely to exacerbate the negative 
effects of declining population. Total fertility rate dropped under the replacement level 
of 2.1 children per woman in the early Nineties and it is now at 1.4, on a slightly 
increasing path after two decades of decline (Grogan 2002, 2006). Although the habits 
of Russian families have changed through time, Russian society still maintains its own 
traditional characteristics in fertility behavior.  
As a matter of fact, the main difference between Western European countries 
and Russia in this setting is the postponement of fertility, in fact aggregate statistics and 
the literature39 show that mean maternal age at first childbirth has been stable or only 
slightly increasing at 24-25 years old since the Sixties for Russian women whereas 
today mean maternal age at first childbirth is much higher than in previous decades in 
Western European countries and particularly in Greece, Italy and Spain in Southern 
Europe. On the other hand, the age-specific birth rates of Russian women aged 24-30 
                                                 
39
 See Philipov and Kohler (1999), Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2002), Billari and Kohler (2002) 
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years suffered a severe decline. The combined analysis of these data and the evidence 
that most Russian women have already reached their completed fertility when they are 
35 years old prove that the trend is the one of not having more than one child rather than 
to consistently postpone the fertility, which is the reason why the Soviet model family 
of two children is now de facto substituted by the only-child family.  
Motivated by this consistent aggregate evidence this paper uses individual level 
data from the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) realized by Unece in 2004 to shed 
light on two fundamental features of family formation: postponement and fertility 
intentions. The two topics are indeed connected: due to the limited reproductive time 
span each woman has, if the first birth is postponed it is less probable to have other 
children and the decision to stop at parity 1 may not be intentional. On the other hand, if 
postponement of first birth is not a typical behavior of Russian women, it is 
straightforward to see what affects their fertility intentions to have a first and a second 
child and why they decide not to have a second child. In light of the measures 
introduced by the Maternity Capital Program, though the dataset uses data collected in 
2004 and the Maternity Capital Program began in 2007, it is essential to analyze what is 
the pattern that Russian women and parents are following, and what is the impact of  
income and other economic and social factors on parents’ decisions.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: in the second paragraph, the general trends of 
the Russian fertility patterns and issues related to postponement are analyzed at 
aggregate level, paragraph 3 describes the theoretical framework and paragraph 4 
presents data and method. Finally, results for first-birth intentions, evidence on 
postponement effect and second-birth intentions are discussed in paragraph 5. Paragraph 
6 provides robustness checks and the last paragraph concludes. 
 
2.  Russian fertility trends 
As seen in the previous chapters, in the early years of transition the Russian economy 
suffered dramatic changes: real gross domestic product per capita decreased by 40 
percent between 1989 and 1999, from 3,500 dollars to 2,000 dollars, while 
unemployment increased from a rate of 4.7 percent in 1992 to 13 percent in 199940. 
With the turning point of the financial crisis of 1998, just after the first decade of  
transition, a new phase of economic growth started. Since then, with the exception of 
                                                 
40
 Data source: Rosstat Yearbooks, IMF World Economic Outlook 
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the very recent years starting from 2008, the economy had an annual growth rate of 
gross domestic product of 5-6 percent. Russian population experienced a sharp decline 
since 1996/1997 when, after decades of positive growth rates or stable population size, 
for a combination of lower fertility rates and increasing mortality rates this trend was 
interrupted. At the same time, as shown in figure 1 the age-composition of the 
population started to show increasing shares of elderly people relatively to younger 
cohorts. 
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                     Figure 1 -  Age composition of the population 
 
 
Aside crude birth rates, what matters most to determine the causes of the decline 
in fertility and the peculiar characteristics of the decline in second-births is the age of 
the mother at first childbirth and then what factors affect her decision to have a child 
conditioning on parity. As shown in figure 2, the mean age of first time mothers did not 
change significantly through decades. 
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     Figure 2 -  Mean maternal age at childbirth 
  
The value was around 24 years in the Sixties, then dropped to 23 years from the 
Seventies to the year 2000 and since then it recovered to the value 24-25 years like in 
the Sixties. Therefore, looking at national aggregate evidence Russian women do not 
seem to be affected by the phenomenon of postponement of motherhood as it is 
happening in other European countries.  
The postponement of childbearing has been studied extensively by the 
literature41. Following Philipov and Kolher (1999), two effects must be combined in the 
analysis of total fertility rate: tempo effect and quantum effect. The tempo effect is the 
change in period fertility due to changes in the timing of births, while the quantum effect 
is the change in cohort fertility due to changes in the number of births. If the decrease in 
fertility is due to the tempo effect, postponement - which is measured by the increase in 
the mean maternal age at childbirth - is present. The two effects are negatively 
correlated because as the age of the mother increases, progression to second or third 
births will be less likely and eventually her completed fertility will decrease. 
 
Several factors explain the decision of individuals to postpone fertility42 or in 
general to change their fertility behavior like economic uncertainty, the rise in female 
education and the inadequate institutional setting. In transition countries, economic 
uncertainty, the struggle to find a stable job and the profound changes in family-related 
policies and benefits played a major role, whereas female education – and educational 
                                                 
41
 Lesthaeghe and Moors (2000), Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2002), Billari and Kohler (2002), Billari (2008) 
42
 See Billari (2008), Balbo (2009) among others 
 116  
level of the population in general – was already high and not dramatically affected by 
transition.  
 
Postponement is not found in all transition countries, in fact countries which 
recovered rapidly like Poland are now following Western European patterns of 
postponement while Russia, Bulgaria and Belarus are not. Philipov and Kohler (1999, 
p.11) perform a decomposition of the total fertility rate in tempo effect and quantum 
effect for Russia and some Eastern European countries. Results show that Russia and 
Bulgaria did not follow the pattern of the other countries: the evidence of postponement 
is limited to an increase of just few months in the mean age at first birth, so that the 
reduction in fertility is instead due to the quantum effect for the early years of transition 
and to a slowly emerging postponement effect for second births only in the recent years, 
which frequently ends up in the decision not to have a second child. Evidence in favour 
of the absence of a strong postponement effect in Russia is found also by Lesthaeghe 
and Moors (2000) and Billari and Kohler (2002), meaning that the pattern of lowest-low 
fertility is not mainly attributed to the tempo effect, but to the quantum effect and in 
particular to the decrease in second births.  
 
In Russia, the cohort born in the Seventies has been the most affected by all the 
phenomena related to transition: born and raised in a system where the State virtually 
cared for every aspect of life as health care, education, employment, housing, these 
people were the ones who suffered more the failure of the system. For the age-group 25-
29, the drop can be considered as a drop in second births because 25-29 years old 
women are generally not first-time mothers. This group is the focus of the recent policy 
called Maternity Capital Program, a policy designed to give incentives toward the 
decision to have a second (or subsequent) child. Women giving birth to or adopting a 
second child (or third/forth etc, if the grant was not requested for the previous one, i.e. 
the second/third child) are eligible to apply for a grant set at 344,000 rubles (8,600 euro) 
in 2010, not to be spent before the child turns three years old. The grant was set at 
250,000 rubles when the program started and it is indexed on inflation. It can be used 
for loans, housing, education, or added to the mother’s pension fund.  
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3.  Theoretical framework of fertility intentions 
Thanks to the growing number of individual and household surveys, the literature on 
fertility intentions is extensive across developed and developing countries43. The 
questions that are asked to the respondents generally take the form “Do you want to 
have children? How many more children would you like to have? Do you intend to have 
other children in the next two/three years? What is your ideal family size?” etc. The 
question that I use in this study from the first wave of the GGS survey is “Do you 
intend to have a/another child during the next three years?”.   
In all types of surveys, the way in which questions are phrased plays a major role. 
In the previous chapter the question asked to respondents of the Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey was “Do you want to have (other) children?” and it expressed a 
desire of the respondent whether to have other children, whereas the Generations and 
Gender Survey asks about intention. Both concepts call for a rational decision of the 
respondent, but for intentions it is assumed that the respondent is taking into account not 
simply her ideal family size and her life conditions, but the family size she actually 
plans to realize. Desire can be seen as a necessary, not sufficient condition for intention 
because contingent factors could affect the actual realisation of her desire.  
The inner value of both concepts for empirical studies is debated. How much can 
researchers rely on the assumption that a respondent is able to make  rational predictions 
on her future life, given that future conditions are unknown? Are desires and intentions 
good predictors for actual behavior? According to the theory of planned behaviour 
(Ajzen 1991)  - which is the theoretical background of the empirical analysis on the 
topic44 – intentions are determined by three factors: attitudes towards the behavior itself, 
subjective norms about the behavior and the extent to which the behavior is perceived to 
be under control. Manski (1990, p.940) stresses that “divergences may simply reflect the 
dependence of behaviour on events not yet realized at the time of the survey” and not 
being caused by the inability of the individuals to make correct predictions on their 
future. He underlines also that a common way to improve reliability is to extend the set 
of choice available for response as it is indeed the case of the ordered response variable 
that I use in this study.  
 
                                                 
43
 See Thomson (1997), Philipov, Speder and Billari (2006) 
44
 See Philipov et al (2006), Balbo (2009) 
 118  
As seen in the previous chapters, the drop in Russian fertility has been studied 
extensively, but to my knowledge this is the first study which deals explicitly with 
finding the determinants of first and second birth intentions using the Generations and 
Gender Survey.  
 
4. Data and method 
4.1 Data 
The Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) is part of the Generations and Gender 
Program, a cross-national study on family relationships coordinated by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The aim of the Generations and Gender 
Survey is to study what factors influence fertility, family formation and the relation 
between generations. It is designed as a panel survey with three waves, at an interval of 
three years. Konig (2001) uses the German and the Hungarian editions of the survey to 
analyze the differences in fertility intentions in the two countries, Balbo (2009) analyzes 
fertility intentions in Georgia while Rieck (2006) focuses on fertility intentions among 
Russian men. 
For the Russian survey the sample is a nationally representative sample 
(constructed through multistage probability sampling) of Russian citizens of Russian 
citizens aged 17-79 at the time of the first wave and so far the released data for the 
Russian Federation are indeed those of the first wave, conducted from June to August 
2004. Two subsequent waves at a interval of three years each will allow to have in the 
end a panel of individuals followed for six years.  
In the first wave, 11,261 persons were interviewed, 4,223 men (37.5 percent) 
and 7,038 women (62.5 percent). All tables report my calculations on the GGS dataset. 
Restricting the sample to female respondents aged 18-40, 2,509 observations remain. 
Questions related to fertility are asked also to women older than 40, but because of 
biological reasons and the typical Russian fertility patterns, the chances of having 
children after the age of 40 are limited.  
The two samples used in the empirical analysis are childless women and mothers of 
only one child. The total number of mothers aged 18-40 is 1,833, whereas childless 
women aged 18-40 are 676. In table 1.1 I classified mothers according to parity and this 
is the legend for child type in the second column of the table: a/ biological child with 
current partner; b/ biological child with former  partner; c/ stepchild; d/ adopted child; e/ 
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foster child. For 13 observations the child type is indicated as “not reported/not 
applicable”. 
 
Mothers with Child type  
a 678 
b 280 
c 25 
d 1 
Only 1 child = 999 mothers 
e 2 
2 children  616  
3 children  177 
4+ children  41 
Mothers, not by parity 1833 
Observations (women aged 18-40) 2509  
          Table 1.1 Children grid, by parity and type 
 
 
To avoid any prior assumption on second-birth intentions on the basis of a 
biological or a non biological child, I do not restrict the analysis to a specific type, but 
control for child type collapsing the five types in a dummy equal to 1 if the child is 
biological, 0 if he/she is a stepchild, adopted or foster child.  
Here I will describe the data, how they are registered in the Generations and the Gender 
Survey and how I will define them in the empirical models. The models used in the 
empirical analysis are the ordered logit model, a discrete choice model for ordered 
response variables, and the logit model used as a robustness check45.  
 
Response variable. The question related to fertility intentions which will be used 
as response variable is “Do you intend to have a/another child during the next three 
years?” and in table 1.2 I report the answers given by the two samples according to the 
four ordered categories “definitely not/probably not/ probably yes/definitely yes”. In the 
group of childless women answers are equally distributed among choices and the 
category with the highest frequency is as expected “probably yes”, whereas the one with 
the lowest frequency is “definitely yes” and the number of women who do not intend to 
have children for sure is higher than the number of those who definitely plan to become 
mothers. Looking at mothers with one child, 65 percent of them answered that they do 
not intend to have other children in the next three years, with the decision being definite 
                                                 
45
 Both models accept factor variables, but some post estimation commands for ordered logit in Stata 11 do not 
work if factor variables used. For this reason, I will construct binary variables. 
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or still not taken for good. In the empirical analysis, the software automatically sets the 
category with the highest frequency as base outcome, so “definitely not” will be the 
base outcome with respect to the other three options. 
 
 Childless women Mothers, 1 child 
Definitely not  153 340 
Probably not 151 262 
Probably yes 197 230 
Definitely yes  119 82  
Respondents  620  914 
  Table 1.2 - Intentions to have a/another child in the next three years  
 
Respondents’ vital statistics. In each specification I control for the age of the 
respondent and in the regressions of mothers’ intentions I control also for the age, sex 
and type of the first child. The mean age of women with one child is 30 years and their 
mean age at first childbirth was 22 years. The mean age of childless women is 23 years 
sot that the individual data are in line with the aggregate statistics which show that the 
age-group of first time Russian mothers is 20-25 years old women46. The mean age of 
the biological children is 8 years, whereas it is slightly higher for stepchildren or 
adopted children as expected by the time needed to make the decision to adopt, the 
adoption process itself or the time of family dissolution of their current partner, in the 
case of mothers of a stepchildren. Half of the children are girls and half boys. I control 
also for the status of the respondent being single or in a relationship without 
disentangling marriage from cohabitation given that cohabitation is increasing among 
younger couples in Russia as it is in Western European countries. Among childless 
women, 75 percent of the sample is single, while among mothers with one child the 
share without a partner is 33 percent.  
Education. Education is defined through the international Isced system 
developed by Unesco47, with ranking from 0 (pre-primary education) to 6 (second stage 
of tertiary). In tables 1.3. and 1.4 I show the distribution of respondents of the two 
samples on the categories of the response variable on the basis of their highest achieved 
level of education. 
 
 
                                                 
46The GGP Contextual database reports 29.6 years as a mean age at first birth for Italian women in 2004, 27.9 
for Germans in 2005, 24 for Russians. 
47
 International Standard Classification of education 
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Intention to have a child during then next three years Educational level 
Definitely not Probably not Probably yes Definitely yes 
Total 
Primary 0 0 0 1 1 
Lower secondary 6 3 5 4 18 
Upper secondary 60 47 45 22 174 
Post secondary 11 18 26 12 67 
First stage of tertiary 68 76 108 73 325 
Second stage of tert. 1 0 1 0 2 
Total 146 144 185 112 587 
           Table 1.3 Fertility choices and highest reached educational level, childless women 
 
 
Intention to have a child during then next three years Educational level 
Definitely not Probably not Probably yes Definitely yes 
Total 
Pre primary&primary 1 0 1 1 3 
Lower secondary 12 13 6 7 38 
Upper secondary 80 66 52 13 211 
Post secondary 73 47 41 12 173 
First stage of tertiary 151 123 112 44 430 
Second stage of tert. 2 0 1 0 3 
Total 319 249 213 77 858 
      Table 1.4 Fertility choices and highest reached educational level, women with one child 
 
With respect to the educational levels the two samples have different 
distributions and in particular the first group have lower educational levels, but 
differences are essentially determined by age, in fact the women of the first sample have 
not yet reached their absolute highest possible level of education like the second group, 
but only the highest possible level conditioning on their actual age (which is on average 
23 years old). On the other hand, the joint distribution is similar across groups. 
Employment status. Labor participation rate of Russian women is at aggregate 
level higher than the one of selected Western European countries48. The distribution of 
respondents in the four categories of the response variable according to their 
employment status is shown in table 1.5 for childless women and in table 1.6 for women 
with one child. As for education, statistics for the first group are influenced by age.  
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 In 2004 employment rate of women as a percentage of female population aged 15-64 was 45 percent in Italy, 
59 percent in Germany and 62 percent in Russia  
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Intention to have a child during then next three years Employment status 
Definitely not Probably not Probably yes Definitely yes 
Total 
Employed-self emp 46 75 128 72 321 
Unemployed 15 8 17 19 59 
Student 80 65 44 17 206 
Looking after the home 6 1 6 6 19 
other 6 2 2 5 14 
Total 152 151 197 119 619 
        Table 1.5 Fertility choices and employment status, childless women 
 
Intention to have a child during then next three years Employment status 
Definitely not Probably not Probably yes Definitely yes 
Total 
Employed-self emp 240 167 163 42 612 
Unemployed 20 22 12 2 56 
Student 4 6 4 5 19 
On maternity leave 38 33 23 14 108 
Stay-at-home 35 34 26 18 113 
other 2 0 2 1 5 
Total 339 262 230 82 913 
            Table 1.6 Fertility choices and employment status, women with one child 
 
Half of the childless women group is composed of employed women and 30 
percent is still in school or in vocational training. More than half of the second sample is 
employed or self-employed and twelve percent is currently on maternal or parental 
leave. Part-time contracts are not frequently used in the Russian labor market, the share 
of part-time workers is 8 percent in the second sample, so the sample of mothers with 
one child is almost totally composed of women working fulltime. Looking at women 
who are not participating in the labor market, 12 percent is composed of stay-at-home 
mothers. A rather small six percent of the sample is unemployed, a share that represents 
those who are not voluntarily out of the labor force given that fulltime mothers and 
students have ad hoc categories.  
Since the sample is composed of women who have already a child, one may 
think that a self-selection mechanism into employment is in place, though the sample 
participation rate is in line with the aggregate one. I compute the same distribution not 
parity-specific for all the women aged 18-40 interviewed by the Generations and 
Gender Survey. The cross tabulation does not provide evidence that a self-selection 
process has taken place and the relative shares in all categories are the same for my 
sample and the whole GGS.  
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For the empirical analysis, for childless women I will create three binary 
variables: a binary variable for employed respondents, one for students and one for 
other categories. For the second group I will define three binary variables: a binary 
variable specifically for mothers currently on leave, one for employed mothers and one 
for the other categories, which will be the reference category. The direction that links 
fertility and employment is a debated topic as expressed by Cramer (1980) and the rich 
subsequent literature. The direction is generally considered to be from fertility to 
employment in the short period, and from employment to fertility in the long time 
horizon when individuals plan their family size. Following this theoretical argument and 
given that the response variable asks what is the intention in the next three years, I use 
employment status as a control variable49. Income by work and other sources as rents 
for the previous twelve month in euro is also available. 
Self-reported effects on respondent’s life of having a/another child and factors 
affecting the intention to have one.  The Generations and Gender Survey allows to elicit 
directly from the sample of interest what are the factors that affect the intention to have 
(other) children and what effects would the birth of the child have on the life of the 
respondent herself. The questions concern the expected effect on various aspects of life 
such as financial situation, employment opportunities for both the respondent and her 
partner, quality of the relation with the partner and satisfaction from life among others. 
The questions about factors that could affect the intention concern work, financial 
situation, employment opportunities, health, partner and his work/financial situation. As 
for the empirical analysis, I will create a group of binary variables to investigate the 
effects of having another child on the employment situation, on the financial situation 
and one question to investigate how the availability of childcare is affecting the 
decision. As said before, three years after the survey was conducted, the government 
introduced the Maternity Capital Program giving incentives toward the decision of 
having a second child, with a grant of about 10,000 euro to be used for specific 
purposes. The survey and the Maternity Capital Program are independent of each other, 
but this group of questions will allow to see if, for a sample which is precisely the target 
of the Maternity Capital Program, the incentives offered by the government are in line 
with the needs of Russian mothers with one child.  
 
                                                 
49
 The GGS survey provides another response variable which is specific for analysis of current fertility desire in 
the short period, while the one I chose for this study is designed for long term intentions. 
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Partner’s characteristics. Most of the second sample is composed of women 
with a partner, so I will control for being in a relationship with a binary variable without 
distinguishing between married couples and couples which cohabitate without being 
legally married. I will control also for partner characteristics such as his education, 
income and employment status. With the income specifically recorded for the woman 
and the partner, it has been then possible to control for the different effects of an 
increase in income for the mother and the father developed in Becker’s model. In the 
second sample I will control also for the desire of the partner to have other children, a 
question that will allow to elicit the effect on fertility intentions of the agreement or 
disagreement within the couple on family size. 
 
4.2. Method 
The method used in the empirical analysis of intentions is the ordered logit model, a 
discrete choice model applied to categorical variables with a natural ordering. Typical 
examples are opinion surveys like “How a good job do you think the president is 
doing?” with choices “Very good job/good job/neither good nor bad/poor job/very poor 
job” or “How well do you like this book? Rate the book from 1 to 7” (Train 2009).  
The model description is based on Greene and Hensher (2009), Train (2009) and UCLA 
Academic Technology Services online. 
The ordered logit model is used to describe the data generating process for a 
random outcome that takes a set of discrete, ordered outcomes. The unobservable 
random variable U is defined as 
 
                                               Ui* = xi’β + zi’γ + εi                        (1) 
 
The respondent, by giving her answer, reveals a censored version of Ui* through a 
discrete response that, in this study, takes the form 
 
Yi = 1 definitely not intend to have a (second) child                  (2) 
    = 2 probably not intend 
    = 3 probably intend 
    = 4 definitely intend 
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The translation between the latent variable (1) and the observed variable (2) produces 
the ordered choice model 
 
Yi = 1 if Ui*≤ µ0                                  (3) 
    = 2 if 0 < Ui*≤ µ1 
    = 3 if µ1< Ui*≤ µ2 
    = 4 if µ2< Ui*≤ µ3 
 
where µ are the threshold parameters to be estimated with the other model parameters.                      
In discrete choice models, the coefficients do not have an immediate interpretation: as 
explained by Greene (2009), “neither the sign nor the magnitude directly indicates the 
effect of changes in a variable on the observed outcome”. The model assumes a logistic 
distribution for the errors  εi, so that predicted probabilities can be calculated and used 
for an easier discussion of results. The probit model which assumes an underlying 
normal distribution gives as usual results which are very similar to those of the logit.  
The interpretation of the ordered logit coefficient is that for one unit increase in 
the independent variable (a change from 0 to 1 for binary variables), the response 
variable is expected to change by its underlying coefficient in the ordered log-odds 
scale, while the other variables in the model are held constant. For instance, with regard 
to the variable “having or not a partner” and supposing to obtain a log-odds of .50 we 
could say that for one unit increase in the control variable “couple” (i.e. a change from 0 
to 1, because the variable is binary) we would expect a .50 increase in the log odds of 
being in a higher level of “intention” (i.e. moving from the base outcome “definitely 
not” to one of the remaining three, where it is more probable to intent to have a child) 
holding all other controls constant.  
Since the interpretation of the log odds is not immediate, for an easier 
interpretation results will be discussed based on predicted probabilities. In the Appendix 
I will report in table 2 the log odds for the two samples and I will discuss results in the 
text using predicted probabilities. 
One of the assumptions of the ordered logit model is that the relationship 
between each pair of outcome groups is the same. The model assumes that the 
coefficients that describe the relationship between the lowest versus all higher 
categories of the response variable are the same as those that describe the relationship 
 126  
between the next lowest category and all higher categories, etc. For this reason, the 
model gives only one set of coefficients. The assumption is that the slope coefficients 
are the same across the levels of the response variable and each probability curve differs 
only in being shifted to the right or to the left. This is called the proportional odds 
assumption or the parallel regression assumption (see UCLA Academic Technology 
Services online). Results for the Brant test on the parallel regression assumption are 
shown in the table of results in the Appendix. If the assumption is violated, the solutions 
are to apply a generalized ordered logit model or a standard logit model. Given that the 
generalized ordered logit results do not have an easier interpretation and diagnostics are 
limited, as a robustness check I will perform the analysis also through a logistic 
regression model collapsing the ordered dependent variable in a binary variable which 
assigns value 1 to the categories “definitely intending” and “probably intending” to 
have a child, zero to “probably not intending” and “definitely not intending” to have a 
child.  
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Intention to have a first child    
Transition into motherhood is a life-changing decision which involves factors like age, 
current and future employment and financial situation, whether the individual is 
optimistic about her overall future and eventually the country where she lives in, 
whether the society provides help to families. In this study I will focus in particular to 
the role of income and uncertainty to test the empirical validity of Becker’s model and 
the economic crisis argument. The availability of data on income of the woman and 
income of her partner will allow to detect the substitution effect and the income effects 
of Becker’s model, whereas the questions on the expected effects of childbearing will 
allow to test the role of uncertainty.  
Results are shown in table 2 in the Appendix. For the precision of estimates, I 
did not include “couple” and partner characteristics because only few observations 
remained given that the majority of this sample is single. Moreover, due to the limited 
number of observations, the Brant test for parallel regression assumption could not be 
computed.  
The demographic variables show that the ordered logit of being in a category 
higher than “definitely not intending to have a first child” is higher than 1 and 
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significant for the age of the woman, in fact the predicted probability of “probably 
intending” to become mother for a woman aged 23 – which is the mean age of the 
sample – is .35, while it is .39 for women aged 30.  
The logit of being in a higher category for students and women with a university 
degree is negative and the predicted probabilities of “definitely intending to become 
mother” within the next three years is .16 for more educated women and .50 for women 
with high school diploma.  
Finally, feeling insecure about her own financial situation and her work 
condition has a highly detrimental effect on the intention to become mother. The result 
is not surprising given that half of the sample declared to be employed. The predicted 
probability of “probably intending to become mother” for an employed woman with a 
university degree who is concerned for her financial or work situation is .28, whereas it 
is .35-.39 if she is not concerned on these issues.  
 
5.2.  Mean maternal age at first birth  
Looking at aggregate statistics on the mean age of mothers at first birth in figure 2, a 
strong postponement effect does not appear to characterize the fertility behavior of 
Russian women. Mean age at first birth was 24-25 years in 1960 and it is still the same 
age today. Moreover, the pattern in the decades in between is a decreasing one, showing 
that Russian women have continued through time to have their first child in their 
twenties. Balbo (2009) carries out a survival analysis to investigate mean maternal age 
at birth in Georgia and found a similar pattern. Kesseli (2008) performs an event-history 
analysis for Russian cohorts between 1930 and 1986 and finds that cohorts born 
between 1930 and 1986 had the first child earlier than subsequent cohorts, whereas the 
trend is opposite for young women but the size is limited..  
I will divide my sample of interest in four groups to see if it is in line with 
aggregate statistics or it is characterized by a postponement effect which could explain 
the decline in second births using a biological phenomenon. If on the contrary, the 
decision to have the first child is not delayed, then the drop in second births is more 
likely to be intentional and driven by other factors than age.  
The birth year of the sample stands between 1963 and 1986. I defined four 
groups: 1963-1967, 1968-1974, 1975-1980 and 1981-1986, hence in table 3 I am 
showing statistics for each group.  
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 N Mean St.dev Median Min Max 
1963-1967 181 23.8 4.2 23 16 37 
1968-1974 344 23.1 4 22 16 36 
1975-1980 352 21.7 2.6 21 14 28 
1981-1986 119 19.2 2 20 13 23 
           Table 3 Mean maternal age at first child 
 
Data do not reveal the presence of a postponement effect and results are in line 
with aggregate statistics. Mean and median maternal age at first birth remain in the 
early-middle twenties and also the minimum age in each cohort is in line with the cases 
of early teen pregnancies. The maximum age in each cohort, on the other hand, 
strengthens the assumption that a strong postponement effect is not in place: for the 
mothers of one child surveyed by the GGS, the maximum age when they had their first 
child is decreasing through time, a pattern which is common to some other Eastern 
European countries and not to Western Europe.  
 
5.3. Intention to have a second child 
The decision to have a second child differs inherently from the decision to enter into 
motherhood from various perspectives. The mother is likely to have less uncertainty on 
her skills, the expenses she will have to bear, how motherhood affects her daily routine 
and work. The experience she acquired during the first childbearing contributes also to 
the strength of the regression results, given that it is likely that intentions to proceed to 
higher parities are more conscious than transition into motherhood. 
Different features of second birth intentions have been analyzed by the literature. 
Olah (2003) analyzes second birth intentions in Sweden and Hungary to compare a 
gender-parity country with a traditional one. She finds a positive effect of family 
policies which reconcile parenthood and employment in Sweden and a positive effect of 
household tasks division in both countries. In both Sweden and Hungary no negative 
effect of female education is found, showing that policies aimed at reducing fertility 
costs for women are effective. Cooke (2004) uses data from the German Socio 
Economic Panel to analyze predictors of tasks division within the family and how tasks 
division affects the intention to have a second child. She finds that the contribution of 
fathers in childcare increases the likelihood to have a second child while the time 
devoted to general household tasks does not. Miller Torr and Short (2004) test the effect 
of tasks division in the United States – where total fertility is not lower than the 
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replacement level of 2.1 children per woman - using data from the National Survey of 
Families and Households and find that the relationship is U-shaped, with the threshold 
being the wife doing less than half of family tasks (modern couples) and the wife doing 
more than 80 percent of them (traditional couples). Finally, Craig and Siminski (2010) 
employ data from the Household, Income and Labor Dynamics in Australia Survey and 
find that neither the time allocation of fathers to household tasks nor the relative shares 
have a significant impact on the decision to have a second child, but mothers’ own 
amount of tasks decreases the probability of moving to higher parity.  
 
The demographic variables of the first child show that for a one year increase in 
his/her age, the expected log-odds decrease by .08 when moving to a higher category, 
i.e. moving from the base outcome “definitely not intending” to the other categories. In 
fact, predicted probabilities of “probably intending to have a second child” are .37 is the 
first child is 2 years old, .34 if he/she is 4 years old and .29 if he/she is 8 years old, 
holding other controls constant. The age of 8 years is relevant from a policy perspective 
in this study because the mean age of the first child is indeed 8 years and predicted 
probabilities from that age on decrease consistently.  
The ordered logit for a biologic first child is -1.38 less than that for a non-
biological first child, holding other controls constant. As expected, if the first child is a 
biological child of the respondent, she is less likely to intend to have a second one. The 
predicted probabilities of “definitely not intending” and “definitely intending” to have a 
second child are .24 and .07 respectively for a first biological child, .05 and .31 for a 
first non-biological child. Given that 97 percent of the sample is the biological mother 
of her first child and aggregate statistics are similar, this evidence does not create 
positive expectations of a consistent increase in second births in the near future.      
As for the age of  the respondent, the probability of moving to higher categories 
is decreasing in age: a mother aged 25 years old has a 9 percent predicted probability of 
“probably intending to have a second child”, whereas a mother aged 30 years old has a 
6 percent probability. The trend was opposite in the group of childless women, where 
indeed the intention to become mother was increasing in the age of the respondent. 
Clearly once motherhood desires have been realized, the respondent feels less hurry to 
proceed to higher parities.  
The logit of mothers being in a higher category is .68 more likely if they are employed, 
meaning that employed women have higher probabilities of being in a higher category. 
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An employed mother aged 30 has a .33 probability of “probably intending” to have a 
second child, whereas it is .21 if she is unemployed. 
Personal income and partner’s income or his employment status are not 
significant (for partners the effect acts through educational level being a university 
degree or higher) and predicted probabilities do not significantly change for different 
incomes, whereas the expected effect on work situation of the mother is highly 
significant, as the employment status. If the respondent thinks that her work situation is 
likely to worsen with a second child, she is less likely to “probably intend to have a 
child”, in fact the predicted probabilities are .26 for an employed concerned mother 
aged 30 and .30 for the same woman not concerned for her work situation.  
In all respondent’s profiles, if she is orthodox her probabilities are lower than 
being atheist or muslim or other religions, while religion had no role in transition into 
motherhood. 
The most interesting result for this sample of mothers with respect to the sample 
of childless women is the possibility to elicit the effect of partner’s intentions on family 
size. The positive intention of the partner has a high positive significant effect on the 
intention of the mother: an employed mother aged 30 who is concerned for her work 
condition has a .38 percent probability of “probably intending to have a second child” if 
her partner desires a second child, and a .17 probability if he does not intend.  
His positive attitudes more than compensate for the concerns of the woman on 
her work conditions, which is one of the most significant predictors: the predicted 
probability for an employed mother aged 30 who is concerned for her work condition 
and has a partner with positive attitudes is .38, whereas it is .30 if the same woman is 
not concerned for her work conditions, but her partner does not desire other children. 
  
6.  Robustness checks 
As a robustness check, first I run again the regressions of the ordered logit model 
excluding those variables which proved to have a limited effect on predicted 
probabilities: results are consistent and the Brant test is still valid with a p-value of 1.6, 
i.e. the parallel regression assumption is not violated. 
The limited number of observations in the sample of childless women did not allow to 
perform the Brant test, so I repeat the analysis – for both samples – through a standard 
logit model. The dependent variable in these specifications is a binary variable equal 
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one if the respondents “probably intend” or “definitely intend”, equal zero in the other 
two categories. 
I perform different specifications and show results in table 4 in the Appendix for the 
same specification of the ordered logit model. Among various specifications, I use also 
the original factor variables for the levels of completed education, employment status 
and religion and results are confirmed. As in the ordered logit model, the limited 
number of observations remains a critical point and it does not allow to control for 
partner’s characteristic.  
Results for the intention to have a second child are in line with those of the ordered logit 
model which also performs better for variables’ significance and strengthens the validity 
of the original ordered specification shown by the Brant test. 
 
7.  Concluding remarks  
The aim of this study was to analyze the determinants of first and second birth 
intentions among Russian women to determine what factors drive their decision to enter 
into motherhood and to proceed to higher parities.  
For the second sample, results have policy implications in light of the Maternity 
Capital Program designed to give incentives in order to promote second births. Since 
the late Eighties, the Russian family model has changed from the traditional two-
children family to the one-child family and previous studies found mixed results on the 
effects of income and uncertainty on fertility behavior.  
Using the Generations and Gender Survey, this study suggests that transition 
into motherhood is determined by age, level of education and concerns of the woman on 
her financial situation and the availability of childcare. In particular, results for age 
confirm that the social norm is still one of becoming a mother in the early twenties and 
not to postpone fertility, in fact the probability of intending to have a child is increasing 
in age once mid-twenties are reached childless. Obstacles to motherhood are concerns 
on the availability of social services and the effects on financial situation.  
The decline in second-birth has a richer design given the availability of the 
characteristics of the first child and the possibility to control for partner’s intention. The 
decline is not driven by a consistent postponement of first births as in other European 
countries like Italy or Germany, but by perceived uncertainty. Mothers facing 
uncertainty in their employment status and financial situation are reluctant to have a 
second child, while, on the other hand, income per se does not play a role in their 
 132  
decision. Given that most of the sample is currently employed, it is likely that income 
acts through concerns on employment status.  
The positive attitudes of the partner toward to decision to have a second child is 
crucial and its effects more than compensate for the decrease of intending to have a 
second child driven by financial or work concerns.  
The Maternity Capital Program has a long-term design given that it assigned the 
grant to the mother when the child is three years old and only for specific purposes. For 
its long-term financial incentive and in particular for the possibility given to employed 
mothers – which are the majority of the group - to collect the grant in their pension 
fund, the program could indeed prove to reach the target correctly and to sustain the 
traditional two-children family model in Russia.  
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Appendix 
Table 2 Ordered logit results, log-odds   
 
 Childless women Mothers with one child 
  
Age of the respondent  
18-24 .61 (.59)  ref 
25-29 2.78 (.83) *** .18 (.37) 
30-34 2.31 (.72) *** .04 (.42) 
35-40 ref -.75 (.52) * 
Age of the first child - -.08 (.03) * 
Type of the first child 
(binary=1 if biological child) 
- -1.38 (.64) * 
Sex of the first child 
(binary=1 if  
- -.01 (.22) 
Education  
(binary=1 university and higher) 
-1.67 (.82) **  .17 (.23) 
Employment status  
Employed -.31 (.59)  .68 (.38) ** 
Unemployed/others ref ref 
On maternal leave - -.22 (.45) 
Students -1.16 (.75) * - 
Income (thousand euro) -.18 (.14) -.04 (.06) 
Effects of having a child on  
Work 
(binary=1 if worsening) 
-.02 (.43)  -.77 (.25) *** 
Financial situation 
(binary=1 if worsening) 
-1.10 (.47) ***  -.29 (.24)  
Factors affecting the intention  
Availability of childcare 
((binary=1 if affecting the intention) 
-1.21 (.51) *** -.004 (.29) 
Couple 
(binary=1 partnership) 
- - 
Respondent’s religion 
(binary=1 if orthodox, 0 others) 
.25 (.48) -.45 (.27) ** 
Partner’s characteristics  
His fertility intention  
(binary=1 if yes, 0 if no/not sure) 
- 1.22 (.24) *** 
Education  
(binary=1 university and higher) 
- .53 (.23) *** 
Employment status  
(binary=1 if employed, 0 otherwise) 
- -.32 (.34) 
Income (thousand euro) - -.007 (.02) 
Observations 107 345 
LRchi2 40.17 142.35 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 .16 .14 
Brant test p-value - .29 
Notes on the next page 
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Notes to table 2 
* indicates 10 percent significance, ** 5 percent significance, *** 1 percent significance 
The null hypothesis of the Brant test is H0: parallel regression assumption violated, 
so a p-value higher than .10 provides evidence that the assumption is not violated and the ordered 
logit model is correctly specified. 
 
  
Table 4 Logit results, log odds 
 Childless women Mothers with one child 
  
Age of the respondent  
18-24 .42 (.79)  ref 
25-29 2.07 (1.07) ** .69 (.50) 
30-34 1.18 (1.03)  .62 (.58) 
35-40 ref -.21 (.77)  
Age of the first child - -.04 (.04)  
Type of the first child 
(binary=1 if biological child) 
- -2.50 (1.12) * 
Sex of the first child 
(binary=1 if  
- -1.17 (1.30) 
Education  
(binary=1 university and higher) 
-2.02 (1.18) **  .16 (.34) 
Employment status  
Employed -.17 (.71)  .34 (.59)  
Unemployed/others ref ref 
On maternal leave - -.43 (.64) 
Students -1.93 (.91) * - 
Income (thousand euro) -.20 (.18) -.05 (.08) 
Effects of having a child on  
Work 
(binary=1 if worsening) 
1.08 (.72)  -.66 (.35) ** 
Financial situation 
(binary=1 if worsening) 
-2.10 (.76) ***  -.62 (.32) **  
Factors affecting the intention  
Availability of childcare 
((binary=1 if affecting the intention) 
-.67 (.66) *** -.87 (.44) 
Couple 
(binary=1 partnership) 
- - 
Respondent’s religion 
(binary=1 if orthodox, 0 others) 
.33 (.59) -.71 (.40) * 
Partner’s characteristics  
His fertility intention  
(binary=1 if yes, 0 if no/not sure) 
- 1.41 (.29) *** 
Education  
(binary=1 university and higher) 
- .40 (.32)  
Employment status  
(binary=1 if employed, 0 otherwise) 
- -.40 (.45) 
Income (thousand euro) - -.007 (.02) 
Observations 107 309 
Pseudo R2 .22 .22 
* indicates 10 percent significance, ** 5 percent significance, *** 1 percent significance 
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Conclusions 
 
The research developed within this doctoral thesis deals with several aspects of the 
Russian economic and social patterns before and after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. The main contribution to the literature on Russian transition is the focus on 
regions in different topics such as income disparities, fertility determinants and fertility 
intentions. 
 
In chapter one I reviewed the paths of the Russian transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy focusing on regions. The analysis of the composition of 
the Gross Regional Product has provided evidence of between and within Districts 
differentials, in fact on the one hand the Districts in European Russia and in the South 
present a range of economic activities whereas the Districts with oil availability are 
specialized in heavy industry, on the other hand high disparities remain within District if 
the area has a strong specialization in oil-related activities.  
The literature on spatial analysis has shown that the visual inspection of the 
geographical correlation between observations can be very useful in order to understand 
the patterns of development of a country. In chapter one the analysis of income 
dispersion has shown that the regions are characterized by growing disparities.  
In chapter two I applied exploratory spatial data analysis and spatial econometrics 
techniques to shed light on an empirical issue which is still debated by the literature, 
that is the presence of convergence or divergence in per capita income across Russian 
regions. The results of this approach were interesting on several grounds. First of all, 
Russian regions are characterized by clusters of homogeneous type and this evidence 
precludes findings of convergence. Results were consistent to different specifications 
and to the use of both the spatial correlation model and the spatial error model. 
Although the introduction of the spatial patterns did not remove the diverging effect, it 
showed that the regions which are responsible for the spatial correlation are diminishing 
over time and, in particular, new clusters of non-homogeneous type are emerging.  
The Moran’s I index which measures spatial correlation decreases over the period 
and the spatial econometrics estimates showed that controlling for spatial patterns, the 
degree of divergence declines whereas the proxy for technical progress remains not 
significant. This result confirms the conclusions drawn by the exploratory spatial data 
analysis towards a decrease in the spatial concentration of economic activities which 
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could indeed lead to a convergence result if adequately promoted and sustained in the 
near future.  
Second, the clusters were stronger in the first phase of transition and they are 
diversifying in the recent years. Following the suggestion by Solanko (2003) and 
splitting the sample in two sub periods 1995-1999, 2000-2008 this study showed that 
the pattern of divergence was stronger in the first phase, whereas it is sharply decreasing 
in the second phase. This evidence combined with the visual inspection of the clusters 
proved that not only the cluster of high-high income type regions is less numerous, but 
the low-low income type cluster in the Caucasus is smaller: in fact, the regions which 
succeeded in diversifying their economic activities and maintain a stable political 
climate are now facing higher growth rates of income.  
As a general result, economic diversification and political stability proved to be 
the vehicles upon which disparities can be reduced. In fact, the concentration of 
investments in the area of Moscow and in the Urals in last decades did not contribute to 
the development of poorer areas, but indeed it disrupted resources from sectors such as 
manufacturing and services which need to be adequately sustained.  
 
As for the path of transition, Russia retains its own peculiar characteristics also for the 
demographic situation. Chapter three was dedicated to the descriptive analysis of 
Russian vital statistics since the Sixties and in chapter four I extended the descriptive 
analysis of trends using national, regional and individual levels data.  
Results proved that the difficulties of identifying a clear pro-cyclical or counter-
cyclical relation between fertility and income can be attributed to two factors. On the 
one hand, the relation is U-shaped at the regional level, meaning that fertility is 
decreasing in income as predicted by Becker’s model, but the relation is non monotonic 
and as income increases up to a certain threshold, fertility also does. To my knowledge 
this was the first study which analyzed the topic at the regional level for the whole 
period after transition.  On the other hand, the logit model for the data of the Russia 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey showed that more than income, the intention to have 
children is positive related to self-perception indeces such as feeling secure about the 
personal financial situation. From a policy perspective point of view, we can say that  
feeling secure with adequate resources could help to sustain the two-children traditional 
family model and that the Maternity Capital Program – which is reaching the correct 
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target – could prove to be efficient if combined with  adequate provisions of services to 
employed mothers.   
In chapter five I use data from the first wave of the Generations and Gender 
Survey to analyze the issue of birth intentions and postponements in a sample of women 
interview in 2004. To my knowledge this was the first study which analyzed both first 
birth intentions and second birth intentions. It appears also to be so far the first attempt 
to gain hints on the expected effectiveness of the Maternity Capital Program though the 
two are not directly linked. Although the survey is not regionally representative, the 
richness of the questions asked to the respondents allowed to understand more in depth 
why Russian women generally have only one child despite the fact that the two-children 
family model still proved to be the social norm. Results showed that still in 2004 
women entered into motherhood at the same age as they did in Soviet times, when they 
are around 24-25 years old and they did not move to the Western European standard of 
postponing fertility. On the other hand, given the high participation rate of Russian 
women which also dates back to Soviet times, if they face uncertainty in their 
employment condition they tend not to have a second child. Although data on the 
Maternity Capital Program are not yet available, we can try to give some policy advices. 
The Program assigns the grant to the mother when the child is three years old and it can 
be used only for specific purposes. Given that the most important concerns of the 
respondents deal with the employment condition – which has a long term perspective - 
the possibility given to employed mothers to collect the grant in their pension fund 
could indeed help to sustain the traditional two-children family model in Russia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
